ELECTORAL LAW PROMULGATED WITH LITTLE PUBLIC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 001111 SIPDIS HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD DEPARTMENT PASS TO AID/OTI (RPORTER) E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/12/2029 TAGS: PGOV KDEM VE SUBJECT: ELECTORAL LAW PROMULGATED WITH LITTLE PUBLIC RESPONSE CARACAS 00001111 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION JOHN CAULFIELD, FOR REASON 1.4(D) ¶1. (C) Summary: The new Organic Law of Electoral Processes (LOPE) entered into law August 12 with minimal response from the public, whose attention has been distracted by President Chavez's vigorous public campaign in support of the passage of the Education Law (Reftel A). LOPE's text has been re-tooled slightly from the version that purportedly was submitted to public discussion this summer (Reftel B),but its overall effect -- giving unprecedented discretionary authority to the Chavista-dominated National Electoral Council (CNE) -- remains intact. Political observers have noted that unlike other controversial laws under discussion in the National Assembly (AN),LOPE's implementation is relatively easy and has a low political cost. Post contacts acknowledge that the changes in the complex method that apportion legislative seats boggle even the minds of well-educated Venezuelans. At the end of the day, LOPE will greatly advantage majority parties, namely Chavez's United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV),but its tangible effects will not be felt until the next round of legislative elections, which are at least a year away. End Summary. ¶2. (C) LOPE passed its second AN vote July 31 and was signed into law by Chavez on August 12. Civil society groups have made some effort to counter the law, for example, the pro-democracy NGO Sumate in early August called for national consultation with all sectors of society to develop and then propose its own electoral bill to the AN. Coordinator of the opposition's electoral "unity table" (Septel) Felix Arroyo told Poloffs privately August 7 that he disagreed with Sumate's approach, arguing that it was a waste of money and energy to challenge a law whose passage, at the time, was virtually assured. He suggested instead that the opposition and civil society should focus its resources on understanding the electoral changes and establishing a municipality-by-municipality strategy for how to win the most seats possible under the new system. Arroyo said that it was key to create a "perfect alliance" within the opposition that allows them to capitalize on the new rules of the game. -------------- ;WHAT'S AT STAKE? -------------- ¶3. (C) Electoral expert Gabriel Matute shared with POLOFF an article-by-article critique of the final text of the law. Most of his criticisms focus on LOPE's changes from the old legislation which has regulated elections for more than a decade. His chief complaints are that LOPE's vague language is open to interpretation and leaves too much to the discretion of the CNE, ranging from the selection of poll workers to the auditing of the vote. With the CNE dominated by Chavistas and the judiciary beholden to the executive, LOPE could permit Chavez and the PSUV to change the electoral rules and voting districts to their advantage and on a state-by-state basis for legislative elections -- while remaining in full compliance with the law. Martinez noted that LOPE will require the CNE to establish at least 19 separate regulations for how balloting will take place before every election, giving it the discretion to change rules on a whim and at any time since LOPE does not set timeframes. ¶4. (C) LOPE's changes in how votes are allotted essentially decreases the number of proportional representation seats, particularly in the densely-populated states or municipalities that the opposition currently controls. Electoral expert Eugenio Martinez cited to POLOFF August 18 the two most extreme cases: in the most rural Venezuelan state, Delta Amacuro, there will be a 50/50 split between candidates selected by list versus by name. In Zulia State, however, 80 percent will be selected nominally and just 20 percent from a list. While the opposition has used "morochas" ("twins") previously in places like Zulia where it has a relative majority to achieve its own legislative over-representation, Martinez explained that the CNE can simply redefine municipal districts to dilute the opposition in emblematic regions, i.e. Maracaibo, Barquisimeto, and Sucre municipality in Caracas. He said that in theory, Gerrymandering just these three districts could deprive the opposition of twelve AN deputy slots that they otherwise would have a strong chance of winning. (Note: Former Governor of Yaracuy State Eduardo Lapi first employed "morochas" in 2000 to game the system -- allowing a party to run under two names, and thus getting to count twice as many votes. Chavez subsequently began employing the strategy and CARACAS 00001111 002.2 OF 003 in 2005, the TSJ ruled "morochas" constitutional. End Note.) ¶5. (C) There are other problematic details in the law. Martinez noted that elections for the metropolitan council of Caracas, which works in conjunction with Mayor of Greater Caracas Ledezma's office, are in a state of legal "limbo" since they are not mentioned in LOPE. The law mentions the creation of "mobile voting centers" but offers no specifics for how they will manage voter registration, auditing, or electoral "witnesses." The discussion of "independent tables" indicates that all voting booths in a given center will have to stay open so long as a single voter is in line, leading to the practice of "voter towing" -- keeping the polls open as late as possible while the party machine systematically rounds up anyone who has not voted. Martinez also noted that LOPE calls for more voting centers, part of an effort to atomize larger centers and push them into the rural reaches of the country where the PSUV has a presence but the opposition does not. Martinez noted wryly that despite opposition claims, they have never managed to have voter witnesses at more than 60 percent of the voting centers -- a number that is likely to decline proportionate with the increase in centers. To register as an independent candidate, the new law raises the number of signatures that a candidate needs to collect from 1 percent of the constituency's electoral registry to 5 percent, increasing the burden on officials like Chacao Mayor Emilio Grateron who ran without party support. -------------- SOME CHANGES FROM THE ORIGINAL BILL -------------- ¶6. (C) The AN originally accepted the LOPE bill text from Miraflores over the version submitted by the CNE. That bill, however, underwent several changes between its original reading and the final version that was signed into law. Sumate's Dashiell Lopez told POLOFF that the final law removes the stipulation that all members of parroquial boards (the administrative organization of which municipalities are comprised) would be elected nominally. The final version also removes mention of a specific process for inscribing or updating the national electoral registry -- a topic that has received considerable criticism in past elections. Perhaps the most symbolic change, Dahsiell noted, is that the final version mentions in at least 20 separate articles that the CNE is charged with "regulating" the details of a prescribed process, compared to just ten mentions in the original bill. -------------- PPT: PLEASE RECONSIDER -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Pro-government Patria Para Todos (PPT) spokesman Gustavo Hernandez publicly asked Chavez August 4 not to sign the bill into law, and to instead send it back to the AN on the grounds that it is unconstitutional. PPT's five Deputies did not attend the August 31 AN session as a sign of protest, despite not actually viewing the final text of the law up for vote. They only formally challenged Article 8 of the bill, which effectively institutionalizes the practice of morochas. Hernandez argued that the law will actually favor the opposition and that "its concept is conservative, it does not obey progressive criteria" and he criticized its "inexplicably hurried passage." He added that PPT was studying the possibility of convoking a popular referendum to repeal the law, an idea originally suggested by Podemos AN Deputy Ricardo Gutierrez several days prior. Hernandez voiced his hope that his PSUV colleagues would "rectify and reform" the electoral law before 2010, when AN elections are constitutionally mandated. ¶8. (C) Curiously, the small pro-government Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV),which currently holds three AN seats, has remained publicly supportive of the LOPE and voted in favor of it. Martinez opined that the small pro-government parties were gambling on how best to ensure their survival; PCV may be calculating that the PSUV will need their support and be willing to broker an arrangement whereby they receive some guaranteed AN representation in return for supporting Chavez's legislation. PPT, on the other hand, is trying a more vocal approach perhaps because the party feels that it has less under-the-table negotiating power after several of its members ran on pro-government dissident tickets in the November 2008 elections. The small pro-government parties may be as negatively affected by LOPE as the fractured CARACAS 00001111 003.2 OF 003 opposition. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (C) LOPE represents a major change in Venezuelan electoral law and a substantial transfer of power to the Chavista CNE. Nevertheless, perhaps due to strategic timing, the law's passage has been eclipsed by the public debate over other controversial legislation in the AN. LOPE may eventually be exploited by the central government to ensure that Chavez maintains his much-needed legislative control, but it will also raise the stakes for the PSUV's continuing dominance. As Martinez quipped, the law advantages any majority party -- regardless of its name. Chavez is likely counting on the opposition's history of divisiveness to prevent it from becoming a unified threat in upcoming elections. Martinez suggested that despite Chavez's declining popularity, he might calculate that it would be better to hold at least some elections sooner rather than later -- as early as June or July 2010, while the opposition is still arguing over its slate of "unity" candidates. End Comment. DUDDY