CHARGE'S JULY 31 MEETING WITH MFA CHIEF OF STAFF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 001005 SIPDIS HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD DEPARTMENT PASS TO AID/OTI (RPORTER) E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2029 TAGS: PGOV KDEM VE SUBJECT: CHARGE'S JULY 31 MEETING WITH MFA CHIEF OF STAFF CARACAS 00001005 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: ACTING POLITICAL COUNSELOR DARNALL STEUART, FOR REASON 1.4(D) ¶1. (C) Summary: Charge d'Affaires (CDA) met July 31 at his request with Temir Porras, the chief of staff for Foreign Minister Nicolas Maduro to discuss the return of Ambassador Duddy. Porras said that the Ambassador had no reason to be concerned about a second expulsion, despite the tensions with Colombia over its announcement of a joint defense cooperation agreement with the United States and the much-publicized discovery of several Swedish missiles, sold to Venezuela, that had ended up in FARC hands. Porras suggested that the Government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (GBRV) saw Colombia's recent public actions as a "betrayal of confidence" and expressed pessimism that relations with Bogota would thaw in the foreseeable future. He echoed President Chavez's public discourse that elements within the US Government had been involved in the Honduras coup, but that President Obama has good intentions and was unaware of what his government was doing. Porras agreed that creating an ongoing dialogue between the Foreign Ministry and the Embassy was important, and was amenable to future visits from US officials, including Congressman Eliot Engel. End Summary. -------------- --- VZ-COL RELATIONS STAYING IN THE FREEZER, FOR NOW -------------- --- ¶2. (C) The CDA opened the meeting by asking whether Ambassador Duddy should be concerned about being expelled for a second time, drawing a parallel between the current tensions with Colombia and the unrest in Bolivia that proceeded the Ambassador's expulsion in September 2008. Porras responded emphatically in the negative. He went on, however, to express the GBRV's disappointment over the latest events in Colombia, contending that Presidents Chavez and Alvaro Uribe and Foreign Ministers Maduro and Jaime Bermudez have talked frequently on the phone and freely passed information back and forth. Porras asserted that Colombia had taken actions that contradicted its private assurances, which he called a "betrayal of confidence." He complained that Bogota had not tried honestly to approach the GBRV behind-the-scenes about its concerns with FARC arms transfers before going to the press, suggesting that their response towards Venezuela was "pre-determined." Porras expressed pessimism that relations would thaw in the foreseeable future. ¶3. (C) The CDA said he understood that the Colombians had directly passed information on the captured FARC arms. Porras somewhat dismissively acknowledged this but said it was a Xerox image of the weapons in a smudged envelop passed by the Colombian Foreign Minister to Maduro at the San Pedro Sulsa OAS meeting in early June. Venezuela did not consider this a formal request for information and had not provided any response to the Colombian. ¶4. (C) Porras noted that Colombia's internal conflict and its pending defense cooperation agreement with the United States pose significant challenges to Venezuela's efforts to create a "military doctrine for South American integration." Speaking for the region as a whole, Porras contended that Colombia was trying to force "its issues" onto the rest of the world, but only wants other countries to become involved on Colombia's terms. He said "if Colombia wants its problems to become regional, then it needs to accept the region's reaction." Porras noted that Venezuela has another vision for the region, specifically on security issues, which would look towards the 21st century and not towards a Cold War mentality. According to Porras, Chavez had noted that if Colombia sees Venezuela as a threat and builds itself up militarily as a result, then the GBRV has no choice but to protect itself as well. The CDA pointed out that the Colombians had a very different perception of the security situation in the region and especially of Venezuela's relationship with the FARC. Given Venezuelan concerns about alleged foreign interference or plotting, the CDA was surprised that President Chavez could not understand why Colombia was upset that armed movements trying to overthrow its government and murder its president was present in Venezuelan territory. -------------- (MIS)CONCEPTIONS OF WASHINGTON -------------- ¶5. (C) Moving on, Porras suggested that the GBRV saw a "great debate" going on within Washington over policy towards Venezuela. He said that President Obama has taken a CARACAS 00001005 002.2 OF 002 positive, constructive approach towards Venezuela, which "irritates" and elicits pressure from other sectors of the US Government who want to destroy Obama's vision. Porras cited as an example the July 31 Op-Ed article in the Washington Post that calls for Venezuela to be designated a state sponsor of terrorism. He noted his concern about "hostile elements" within Washington, given that the United States is the most powerful country in the world, and related that Chavez had warned that "an empire without a boss is very dangerous." ¶6. (C) The CDA emphasized that the United States is a democracy with an independent media and legislature that does not necessary agree with the President's policies, but President Obama is firmly in charge of US foreign policy, quipping that "the coup was in Honduras, not in Washington." He noted that the United States and Venezuela share the same opposition towards the coup in Honduras, and yet Chavez attacked the United States in the aftermath. Porras responded that from Chavez down, the GBRV feels "empathy" for President Obama and he lamented that it is difficult to transition beyond the GBRV's historically anti-imperialist discourse. Nevertheless, Porras said that Chavez's comments reflect a popular perception among Chavistas that the US Government either directly or indirectly supported the coupsters. He pointed out that despite Obama's professed commitment to change, within the past two months there has been a coup and plans for a military build-up in Colombia -- suggesting that these events were more representative of 1970s era US policy towards Latin America. Porras admitted this was a "typically Latin American" conception. The CDA reiterated that neither he nor the US military based in Honduras create their own policy, and in fact only take orders from the White House. -------------- INCREASED ACCESS? -------------- ¶7. (C) The CDA mentioned that during his Washington consultations, Ambassador Duddy had met with Venezuelan Ambassador Alvarez. Ambassador Duddy had supported access by Ambassador Alvarez to US officials, including his invitation to a White House reception in the spirit of improving communication. Porras strongly agreed with the CDA's suggestion that it is important to create an ongoing dialogue between the GBRV and Washington, and said he would try to set up a meeting for the Ambassador and Maduro as soon as possible. Porras said he would also use his influence with Maduro to press Venezuela's drug czar, Nestor Reverol, to meet with the Ambassador. Porras responded favorably to the suggestion of future visits, and specifically suggested that Congressman Eliot Engel would be welcome. He noted that "we would welcome anyone who does not come with a predetermined agenda." ¶8. (C) Comment: Porras, who has hitherto appeared to represent a more pragmatic element within the GBRV, showed message discipline or perhaps even credence in echoing Chavez's message that the US Government was running amok, outside of President Obama's control, and was involved in the Honduras coup. Nevertheless, he strongly agreed that dialogue with the Embassy is important no matter what turn bilateral relations take, and seemed disposed to actively pursuing meetings between the returning Ambassador and high-ranking members of the GBRV. End Comment. CAULFIELD