CHARGE'S JULY 31 MEETING WITH MFA CHIEF OF STAFF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 001005

SIPDIS

HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
DEPARTMENT PASS TO AID/OTI (RPORTER)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2029
TAGS: PGOV KDEM VE
SUBJECT: CHARGE'S JULY 31 MEETING WITH MFA CHIEF OF STAFF

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Classified By: ACTING POLITICAL COUNSELOR DARNALL STEUART,
FOR REASON 1.4(D)


1. (C) Summary: Charge d'Affaires (CDA) met July 31 at his
request with Temir Porras, the chief of staff for Foreign
Minister Nicolas Maduro to discuss the return of Ambassador
Duddy. Porras said that the Ambassador had no reason to be
concerned about a second expulsion, despite the tensions with
Colombia over its announcement of a joint defense cooperation
agreement with the United States and the much-publicized
discovery of several Swedish missiles, sold to Venezuela,
that had ended up in FARC hands. Porras suggested that the
Government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (GBRV) saw
Colombia's recent public actions as a "betrayal of
confidence" and expressed pessimism that relations with
Bogota would thaw in the foreseeable future. He echoed
President Chavez's public discourse that elements within the
US Government had been involved in the Honduras coup, but
that President Obama has good intentions and was unaware of
what his government was doing. Porras agreed that creating
an ongoing dialogue between the Foreign Ministry and the
Embassy was important, and was amenable to future visits from
US officials, including Congressman Eliot Engel. End Summary.

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VZ-COL RELATIONS STAYING IN THE FREEZER, FOR NOW
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2. (C) The CDA opened the meeting by asking whether
Ambassador Duddy should be concerned about being expelled for
a second time, drawing a parallel between the current
tensions with Colombia and the unrest in Bolivia that
proceeded the Ambassador's expulsion in September 2008.
Porras responded emphatically in the negative. He went on,
however, to express the GBRV's disappointment over the latest
events in Colombia, contending that Presidents Chavez and
Alvaro Uribe and Foreign Ministers Maduro and Jaime Bermudez
have talked frequently on the phone and freely passed
information back and forth. Porras asserted that Colombia
had taken actions that contradicted its private assurances,
which he called a "betrayal of confidence." He complained
that Bogota had not tried honestly to approach the GBRV
behind-the-scenes about its concerns with FARC arms transfers
before going to the press, suggesting that their response
towards Venezuela was "pre-determined." Porras expressed
pessimism that relations would thaw in the foreseeable future.


3. (C) The CDA said he understood that the Colombians had
directly passed information on the captured FARC arms.
Porras somewhat dismissively acknowledged this but said it
was a Xerox image of the weapons in a smudged envelop passed
by the Colombian Foreign Minister to Maduro at the San Pedro
Sulsa OAS meeting in early June. Venezuela did not consider
this a formal request for information and had not provided
any response to the Colombian.


4. (C) Porras noted that Colombia's internal conflict and
its pending defense cooperation agreement with the United
States pose significant challenges to Venezuela's efforts to
create a "military doctrine for South American integration."
Speaking for the region as a whole, Porras contended that
Colombia was trying to force "its issues" onto the rest of
the world, but only wants other countries to become involved
on Colombia's terms. He said "if Colombia wants its problems
to become regional, then it needs to accept the region's
reaction." Porras noted that Venezuela has another vision
for the region, specifically on security issues, which would
look towards the 21st century and not towards a Cold War
mentality. According to Porras, Chavez had noted that if
Colombia sees Venezuela as a threat and builds itself up
militarily as a result, then the GBRV has no choice but to
protect itself as well. The CDA pointed out that the
Colombians had a very different perception of the security
situation in the region and especially of Venezuela's
relationship with the FARC. Given Venezuelan concerns about
alleged foreign interference or plotting, the CDA was
surprised that President Chavez could not understand why
Colombia was upset that armed movements trying to overthrow
its government and murder its president was present in
Venezuelan territory.

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(MIS)CONCEPTIONS OF WASHINGTON
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5. (C) Moving on, Porras suggested that the GBRV saw a
"great debate" going on within Washington over policy towards
Venezuela. He said that President Obama has taken a

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positive, constructive approach towards Venezuela, which
"irritates" and elicits pressure from other sectors of the US
Government who want to destroy Obama's vision. Porras cited
as an example the July 31 Op-Ed article in the Washington
Post that calls for Venezuela to be designated a state
sponsor of terrorism. He noted his concern about "hostile
elements" within Washington, given that the United States is
the most powerful country in the world, and related that
Chavez had warned that "an empire without a boss is very
dangerous."


6. (C) The CDA emphasized that the United States is a
democracy with an independent media and legislature that does
not necessary agree with the President's policies, but
President Obama is firmly in charge of US foreign policy,
quipping that "the coup was in Honduras, not in Washington."
He noted that the United States and Venezuela share the same
opposition towards the coup in Honduras, and yet Chavez
attacked the United States in the aftermath. Porras
responded that from Chavez down, the GBRV feels "empathy" for
President Obama and he lamented that it is difficult to
transition beyond the GBRV's historically anti-imperialist
discourse. Nevertheless, Porras said that Chavez's comments
reflect a popular perception among Chavistas that the US
Government either directly or indirectly supported the
coupsters. He pointed out that despite Obama's professed
commitment to change, within the past two months there has
been a coup and plans for a military build-up in Colombia --
suggesting that these events were more representative of
1970s era US policy towards Latin America. Porras admitted
this was a "typically Latin American" conception. The CDA
reiterated that neither he nor the US military based in
Honduras create their own policy, and in fact only take
orders from the White House.

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INCREASED ACCESS?
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7. (C) The CDA mentioned that during his Washington
consultations, Ambassador Duddy had met with Venezuelan
Ambassador Alvarez. Ambassador Duddy had supported access by
Ambassador Alvarez to US officials, including his invitation
to a White House reception in the spirit of improving
communication. Porras strongly agreed with the CDA's
suggestion that it is important to create an ongoing dialogue
between the GBRV and Washington, and said he would try to set
up a meeting for the Ambassador and Maduro as soon as
possible. Porras said he would also use his influence with
Maduro to press Venezuela's drug czar, Nestor Reverol, to
meet with the Ambassador. Porras responded favorably to the
suggestion of future visits, and specifically suggested that
Congressman Eliot Engel would be welcome. He noted that "we
would welcome anyone who does not come with a predetermined
agenda."


8. (C) Comment: Porras, who has hitherto appeared to
represent a more pragmatic element within the GBRV, showed
message discipline or perhaps even credence in echoing
Chavez's message that the US Government was running amok,
outside of President Obama's control, and was involved in the
Honduras coup. Nevertheless, he strongly agreed that
dialogue with the Embassy is important no matter what turn
bilateral relations take, and seemed disposed to actively
pursuing meetings between the returning Ambassador and
high-ranking members of the GBRV. End Comment.
CAULFIELD