SNOWY RIVER HYDRO SCHEME IN TROUBLE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 CANBERRA 000367 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: SENV ENRG ECON AS SUBJECT: SNOWY RIVER HYDRO SCHEME IN TROUBLE REF: CANBERRA 357 ¶1. (SBU) Australia's largest hydropower scheme is facing greater water shortages, decreased ability to raise capital, and competition from larger, more integrated power providers in the region. Snowy officials are pessimistic about the independent future of the scheme, despite efforts to diversify their fuel supply. The drive to privatize the New South Wales electricity grid will likely further hurt the scheme's competitiveness once it is completed. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) The Snowy Mountains Hydro-electric Scheme is one of Australia's most iconic infrastructure investments, begun in the 1950s as a nation-building project to secure water and electricity for the region. It has a network of seven power stations, 31 generating units, 16 dams and 135 miles of tunnels and aqueducts dispersed over a catchment area of over 1900 square miles in Kosciuszko National Park near Cooma in New South Wales. Snowy Hydro Corporation (which owns and operates the scheme) was established in 2002 when the previous government authority was 'corporatized'. It has a generation capacity of over 4300 MW, making it the third largest generator by capacity in the National Electricity Market (NEM). However, reduced water flows in the region due to the ongoing drought (and attributed by many to climate change) means that capacity has actually been around 3000 MW on average since 2003. Snowy Hydro also has two gas-fired power stations in Victoria (which generate over 600MW) that were purchased as part of a fuel-switching plan as hydro resources have declined. Snowy Hydro has significant water and energy capacity but declining water inflows (either rain or snow run-off) mean both actual power generation and water releases have declined over the last decade. ¶3. (SBU) Snowy describes itself not as an electricity generator, but as a leading supplier of "electricity price risk hedging products" to other NEM participants (retailers and other generators) who are seeking protection to limit the price risk they face in the volatile NEM. Snowy Hydro's ability to draw on large scale generation at short notice means it is able to offer such contracts and generally hedge the risk it takes on those contracts by generating electricity as required. Currently, the Snowy scheme provides less than 5% of Australia's total electricity demand although its capacity is significantly above this, partly 
because of decreasing demand in the region and physical problems in storing and transporting electricity. SNOWY AND THE NATIONAL ELECTRICITY MARKET -------------- ¶4. (SBU) The NEM was formed in 1998 following the deregulation of the power industries of a number of State governments and the Commonwealth governments. The NEM is the wholesale market for the supply of electricity to retailers and end-users in Australia, excluding Western Australia and the Northern Territory. It was created to improve competitiveness in the electricity sector and to provide choice for consumers. The NEM is still incomplete as both Queensland and NSW have resisted the privatization of their electricity utilities out of concern that prices could rise significantly. Reform in the Australian electricity market has had a significant impact on Snowy Hydro's ability to be Qhas had a significant impact on Snowy Hydro's ability to be an important participant in the National Electricity Market, which accounts for around 93 per cent of electricity consumption in Australia. Snowy Hydro's key competitors such as Origin Energy and AGL have been successful in expanding their generation capacity and customer bases through acquisitions and increased investments, but the privatization push would reduce the need for extremely high-reliability "hedging" products that Snowy currently competes well on. WATER MARKET NO IMMEDIATE ANSWER -------------- ¶5. (SBU) According to the Snowy Hydro General Counsel David Harris, Snowy's ability to develop alternate revenue through water trading is hampered because there is no real market in Australia for the supply of water as flexible prices. Instead, water allocation is typically by license and those allocations are limited (in theory - most irrigation sources have been hopelessly over-allocated) by regulations requiring CANBERRA 00000367 002 OF 002 environmental water releases. This imposes a fixed demand on Snowy Hydro as outdated licensing agreements mean that it does not own the water (it only has the right to 'divert, collect and release' water). Selling for a profit would allow Snowy Hydro to upgrade its assets - which require at least A$100 million to keep them operating effectively in the future - but absent a renegotiated agreement it will be hard to do so. In practice, Snowy Hydro (with one third of water storage capacity in NSW) provides essential water to inland irrigators and water for environmental releases, as well as flexibility for electricity generation - although these can be competing uses for the available water. Under normal water inflow conditions, a total of around 2000 gigaliters is released into two state owned holding dams (Blowering Reservoir and the Hume Reservoir) in accordance with the Snowy Water License. Both reservoirs are controlled by government authorities for release to irrigators. The absence of a water market means that water cannot be efficiently allocated between recipients, including micro players such as license holders and major suppliers such as Snowy Hydro - which also cannot directly access funding for infrastructure improvements and expansions. ¶6. (SBU) Harris told econoff that the inability to raise capital (when Snowy was corporatized in 2002, it still had A$800 million (US$560 million) of capital debt, of which the government agreed to pay off half) has meant that increasingly integrated power producers and marketers like Origin and AGL will have an advantage as the relative value of their "hedging product" (high reliability generation) declines with continued drought and climate change. Harris said that he could easily see Snowy being bought out by one of the larger utilities sometime in the next decade as it struggled to meet environmental and market demands. While more flexibility in water marketing might help, Harris said, he did not see a scenario where financial conditions improved that helped competitors less than Snowy itself. Although the implementation of a carbon trading scheme would make Snowy's product more competitive, the low initial carbon price, and likely compensation to coal-fired power generators, would not significantly alter the economic realities for the company, at least not in the early years. Harris asked pointedly about the possibility of U.S. investors looking at the renewable energy sector in Australia, but agreed that current financial conditions in the U.S. would make expectations of large-scale investment very uncertain. ¶7. (SBU) Comment: The Snowy scheme is a national icon, and PM Rudd referred to the scheme on April 6 as an example of the glory age of "nation building" - a rhetorical device to sell his new A$43 billion (US$30 billion) government broadband network program (reftel). The scheme's overall competitiveness, however, is not going to improve, and it is increasingly vulnerable to a takeover as the value of its assets fall. Rising concerns about the health of the rivers its dams sit on will increase pressure to release water for environmental purposes, putting additional pressure on its generating business. Whether a Snowy scheme operated by a "normal" Australian energy giant like AGL or Origin would be Q"normal" Australian energy giant like AGL or Origin would be seen as a failure is unknown, but the myth of the Snowy as a producer of clean energy for Australia's growth would be busted permanently. RICHE