CI/KR RESPONSE FOR S/CT - AUSTRALIA

S E C R E T CANBERRA 000248 SIPDIS NOFORN S/CT - S CLARK E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/13/2019 TAGS: PTER PGOV ASEC EFIN ENRG KCIP AS SUBJECT: CI/KR RESPONSE FOR S/CT - AUSTRALIA REF: STATE 15113 Classified By: ECON COUNS E KAGAN, REASONS 1.4 B, D ¶1. (S/NF) Based on criteria in reftel A, Post has identified undersea cables landing in Australia, and civilian/commercial owned and operated terrestrial cables, as critical infrastructure/key resources in Australia whose loss would immediately affect the security of the United States. ¶2. (S/NF) The undersea cables such as the Southern Cross undersea link which lands near Sydney is the most obvious "direct" link between the US and Australia (and New Zealand). Losing it would disrupt national security and financial data flows, as well as basic news and information. With modern communications sending packets of data in multiple directions at once, loss of any undersea cable has the potential to create major disruptions that could affect national security, so post recommends including all such undersea cables on the list for Australia. ¶3. (S/NF) Australia's terrestrial network also is critical. Reftel A notes we don't need to discuss jointly controlled defense facilities, but the US depends on the civilian telecommunications infrastructure, which carries critical intelligence, defense coordination, and military logistics data, to meet the demands of our alliance. ¶4. (S/NF) Post notes inclusion of several key ports from other countries in the east Asia region. Australia's two busiest commercial ports are in Melbourne and Sydney. Although important to Australia's trade flows, these ports are not as important as ports such as Kobe and Shanghai for US trade. Post defers to Department/DHS about including the minerals and pharmaceuticals listed in reftel A on the Australia list. CLUNE