AUSTRALIA DEMURS ON DEMARCHING NAMIBIA OVER

C O N F I D E N T I A L CANBERRA 000202 SIPDIS STATE FOR ISN/RA, NEA, AF AND EAP VIENNA ALSO FOR IAEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2019 TAGS: KNNP MNUC PARM TRGY ENRG ETTC EMIN IR AS SUBJECT: AUSTRALIA DEMURS ON DEMARCHING NAMIBIA OVER URANIUM SALES TO IRAN REF: STATE 18236 Classified By: Political Counselor James F. Cole. Reasons: 1.4(b)(d)(f) (h). ¶1. (SBU) We presented reftel demarche to John Sullivan, Assistant Secretary for Arms Control and Counter-Proliferation, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT),on February 27. Bill Bryson, Executive Officer for Arms Control, joined on the call. ¶2. (C) Sullivan reacted with some puzzlement to our points and non-paper, inquiring whether the U.S. had been prompted to approach Australia and the UK solely on the basis of the February 3 press report in The Namibian, or whether it had additional information suggesting that the GRN was selling uranium to Iran or, conversely, that Iran was managing to acquire uranium from the Rossing mine. The GOA was aware of The Namibian article and had examined the issue, Sullivan said, but had concluded there was no information to suggest Namibia planned to reverse its policy and sell uranium to Iran. Consequently, the GOA would be reluctant to demarche Namibia based on the strength of the news report alone, he told us, as it would be too "heavy-handed." ¶3. (C) Sullivan pointed out that France had recently demarched Namibia on preventing the sale of uranium to Iran, and Australia had made similar representations to South Africa and China. Morover, he went on, Ann Harrap, the new Australian High Commissioner in Pretoria, who is also accredited to Namibia, had presented her credentials one week earlier in Windhoek and had offered to provide the GRN information on nuclear policies, including assisting it with ratification of the Additional Protocol. Both DFAT and Harrap were aware of the February 3 press article, which had informed her talking points, according to Sullivan. (Sullivan said he had not received a readout of her meeting, but would use the occasion of our demarche to ask for it.) He added that the previous head of the Australian Mission in Pretoria (Philip Green) had discussed nuclear safeguards, including the need to prevent Iran from acquiring uranium, with GRN President Pohamba approximately 18 months ago. One result was that Pohamba had urged representatives from Langer Heinrich Uranium Mine, owned by an Australian company, Paladin Energy Ltd., not to sell uranium to Iran, he stated. ¶4. (C) Likewise, Sullivan told us, the uranium mining industry, including Rio Tinto and Paladin, is fully informed and sensitized to the need to prevent Iran from acquiring uranium under terms of UNSCR 1737, and the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO) is in frequent contact with senior company officials on this issue. He assessed as "highly unlikely" that either of the two uranium mines in Namibia were able to process uranium for sale to Iran in a form, such as pellets, that is permitted under UN Security Council resolutions. The investment needed to do so would be prohibitive, he observed, and such a move would be quickly apparent, especially to South Africa, which had the resources and pool of trained miners to pick up on it. ¶5. (C) Sullivan requested the United States to advise the GOA if it receives further information suggesting that the GRN is contemplating selling uranium concentrate to Iran, or Iran is managing to acquire it from Namibia. Qmanaging to acquire it from Namibia. CLUNE