Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09CAIRO872
2009-05-19 12:05:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Cairo
Cable title:
FULL EAC MEETING, MAY 18, 2009
how-toVZCZCXYZ0000 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHEG #0872 1391205 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 191205Z MAY 09 FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2463 INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 2046 RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 1245 RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 1069 RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 1918 RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 1178 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUCNFB/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
S E C R E T CAIRO 000872
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR DS, D, P, M, CA, S/CT, DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/CC, INR
AND NEA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/18/2029
TAGS: AEMR ASEC CASC KWBG PTER EG
SUBJECT: FULL EAC MEETING, MAY 18, 2009
REF: A. STATE 50245
B. CAIRO 329
C. CAIRO 810
Classified By: William Stewart, A/DCM, reasons 1.4(b),(c),(d)
S E C R E T CAIRO 000872
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR DS, D, P, M, CA, S/CT, DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/CC, INR
AND NEA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/18/2029
TAGS: AEMR ASEC CASC KWBG PTER EG
SUBJECT: FULL EAC MEETING, MAY 18, 2009
REF: A. STATE 50245
B. CAIRO 329
C. CAIRO 810
Classified By: William Stewart, A/DCM, reasons 1.4(b),(c),(d)
1. (C/NF) The acting DCM convened a full Emergency Action
Committee (EAC) meeting in response to ref A, to review
potential security implications for USG interests in Egypt
resulting from the possible release of photographs of
detainees, and to discuss the impending release of Egyptian
wage reviews, and the determination of essential personnel in
the event of a pandemic in Egypt. Representatives from OMC,
DAO, NAMRU, RSO, ORA, LEGATT, DEA, ICE, RMO, CONS, MGT, PAO,
FCS, FAS, ECPO, USAID and LOC were present.
2. (C/NF) The A/DCM began the meeting by eliciting comments
and discussion on ref A. EAC agreed that the impact of any
release of photos of detainees would be negligible, and have
little effect on the security posture of the USG interests in
Egypt.
3. (SBU/NF) The EAC also briefly discussed the potential
impact on morale of the recent decision to raise LES salaries
by 3.9% in light of the recent GOE salary hike of 10%. It
was agreed that the wage hikes would have little impact on
the security of the Embassy.
4. (C/NF) With the continuing threat of H1N1 Swine flu
pandemic in Egypt, the EAC agreed it should create a list of
"essential" personnel, i.e., personnel who are essential to
the operation of the Embassy and providing required services
in the event of a pandemic in Egypt in which Embassy
personnel are requested to shelter in place. The A/DCM
suggested that the drawdown list be used as a starting point,
but reminded members that essential personnel would be only
those personnel needed to maintain limited operations at the
Embassy, and would thus be the first to receive Tamiflu if
needed. ECPO added that the Embassy would not be evacuating
in the event of a pandemic, but Embassy personnel would be
instructed to shelter in place, which the RMO echoed. It was
also stressed that collection of information for the
preparation of the essential personnel list should be kept as
confidential as possible to preclude anxiety or panic. A/DCM
requested that section heads have the list of essential list
by COB 19 May, 2009.
5. (S/NF) GRPO stated that there are no specific threats
against the US Embassy or US interests at this time, but as
always, there are bad people in Egypt who want to do bad
things. GRPO also mentioned that an analytical link had been
established between the recent bombings in Cairo; at the Khan
el Khalili on February 22, 2009 (ref B) and el Azra church,
May 10, 2009 (ref C): similar materials and modus operandi
were used in both instances, but there is still no definite
link between the events despite reported arrests, on May 18,
2009, of suspects associated with the bombings. However, in
light of the announcement of the upcoming visit by POTUS, the
Embassy should assume the terrorists consider the next few
weeks as a viable hunting season - a successful attack would
have a greater impact due to the proximity of the POTUS visit.
SCOBEY
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR DS, D, P, M, CA, S/CT, DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/CC, INR
AND NEA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/18/2029
TAGS: AEMR ASEC CASC KWBG PTER EG
SUBJECT: FULL EAC MEETING, MAY 18, 2009
REF: A. STATE 50245
B. CAIRO 329
C. CAIRO 810
Classified By: William Stewart, A/DCM, reasons 1.4(b),(c),(d)
1. (C/NF) The acting DCM convened a full Emergency Action
Committee (EAC) meeting in response to ref A, to review
potential security implications for USG interests in Egypt
resulting from the possible release of photographs of
detainees, and to discuss the impending release of Egyptian
wage reviews, and the determination of essential personnel in
the event of a pandemic in Egypt. Representatives from OMC,
DAO, NAMRU, RSO, ORA, LEGATT, DEA, ICE, RMO, CONS, MGT, PAO,
FCS, FAS, ECPO, USAID and LOC were present.
2. (C/NF) The A/DCM began the meeting by eliciting comments
and discussion on ref A. EAC agreed that the impact of any
release of photos of detainees would be negligible, and have
little effect on the security posture of the USG interests in
Egypt.
3. (SBU/NF) The EAC also briefly discussed the potential
impact on morale of the recent decision to raise LES salaries
by 3.9% in light of the recent GOE salary hike of 10%. It
was agreed that the wage hikes would have little impact on
the security of the Embassy.
4. (C/NF) With the continuing threat of H1N1 Swine flu
pandemic in Egypt, the EAC agreed it should create a list of
"essential" personnel, i.e., personnel who are essential to
the operation of the Embassy and providing required services
in the event of a pandemic in Egypt in which Embassy
personnel are requested to shelter in place. The A/DCM
suggested that the drawdown list be used as a starting point,
but reminded members that essential personnel would be only
those personnel needed to maintain limited operations at the
Embassy, and would thus be the first to receive Tamiflu if
needed. ECPO added that the Embassy would not be evacuating
in the event of a pandemic, but Embassy personnel would be
instructed to shelter in place, which the RMO echoed. It was
also stressed that collection of information for the
preparation of the essential personnel list should be kept as
confidential as possible to preclude anxiety or panic. A/DCM
requested that section heads have the list of essential list
by COB 19 May, 2009.
5. (S/NF) GRPO stated that there are no specific threats
against the US Embassy or US interests at this time, but as
always, there are bad people in Egypt who want to do bad
things. GRPO also mentioned that an analytical link had been
established between the recent bombings in Cairo; at the Khan
el Khalili on February 22, 2009 (ref B) and el Azra church,
May 10, 2009 (ref C): similar materials and modus operandi
were used in both instances, but there is still no definite
link between the events despite reported arrests, on May 18,
2009, of suspects associated with the bombings. However, in
light of the announcement of the upcoming visit by POTUS, the
Embassy should assume the terrorists consider the next few
weeks as a viable hunting season - a successful attack would
have a greater impact due to the proximity of the POTUS visit.
SCOBEY