TALES FROM BARILOCHE: ARGENTINA HOSTS A SUCCESSFUL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BUENOS AIRES 000999 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/02/2029 TAGS: PREL SNAR MASS AR SUBJECT: TALES FROM BARILOCHE: ARGENTINA HOSTS A SUCCESSFUL UNASUR SUMMIT? REF: (A) BUENOS AIRES 0911 (B) BUENOS AIRES 0927 Classified By: CDA Tom Kelly for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary and introduction: The August 28 summit meeting in Bariloche of South American Union (UNASUR) leaders is getting puzzled, mixed reviews. After seven hours of a rambling, inconclusive discussion (on live television) of the U.S.-Colombian Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) and other issues, the dozen leaders issued a statement calling on their defense and foreign ministers to develop confidence- and security-building measures (CSBM) and "analyze" a U.S. Air Mobility Command "strategy for South America." Colombian President Uribe won plaudits for ably defending the DCA, praising U.S. assistance as "practical and effective," and subtly reproaching his neighbors for their lack of support and cooperation in combating the narco-terrorist threat that Colombia faces. A Colombian delegation member expressed satisfaction with the outcome, especially Chavez's "discombobulation" at the end. As host, Argentine President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner mostly played a moderating role, but some of her comments -- and certainly those of her MOD after the meeting -- belied a strong suspicion of U.S. and Colombian motives. End summary. ¶2. (C) Organized on two weeks' notice, the UNASUR summit brought together a dozen South American leaders in the ski resort of Bariloche August 28. They met and talked for seven hours. The discussion had been scheduled to last no more than two hours followed by lunch. As the discussion wore on, the lunch was abandoned and the leaders ended up speaking -- on live television, often while nibbling on something to keep them going -- for seven hours straight, winding up with the odd spectacle of the leaders in a rushed discussion of how to edit the short communique. (Comment: Brazilian Embassy officers told us that neither the GOA as host nor the Government of Ecuador as pro tem president of UNASUR had shared the draft communique in advance of the meeting, which would explain the extemporaneous scrambling that television viewers witnessed.) ¶3. (SBU) In the joint statement, the leaders called on their defense ministers and foreign ministers to meet in the first half of September to design measures to build confidence and security. The leaders also instructed the South American ;Defense Council to "analyze" the text of the U.S. Air Mobility Command's "Global En Route White Paper South American Strategy." The UNASUR document also calls for "strengthening South America as a zone of peace and to work for the peaceful solution of conflicts and that the presence of foreign forces may not threaten the peace of countries in the region." It ends with an instruction to the South American Council for Combating Narcotrafficking to develop "urgently" its statute and a plan of action "with the goal of defining a South American strategy for combating the illicit trafficking of drugs and the strengthening of cooperation between the specialized agencies of our countries." ¶4. (C) Colombian President Uribe won plaudits for ably defending the DCA, praising U.S. assistance as "practical and effective," and reproaching his neighbors for their lack of support and cooperation in combating the narco-terrorist threat that Colombia faces. It was also reportedly at Uribe's insistence that the meeting was broadcast live and direct, reportedly because of Uribe's concern that the Argentine public television network in charge of covering the event would do a biased hack job if left to editing the affair into sound bites. Peruvian President Alan Garcia delivered the most-quoted crowd-pleasing line when he popped Venezuelan Hugo Chavez's bubble by asking why the U.S. would need to invade Venezuela and seize its oil fields when Chavez was already selling all Venezuela's oil exports to the U.S. Brazil's Lula reiterated his public position that Brazil would respect the sovereign right of countries to strike agreements but would seek "juridical guarantees" that its own sovereignty would not be encroached. He also said the police, not the military, should lead counter-narcotics efforts. Media Coverage -------------- ¶4. (SBU) The major media in Argentina portrayed the summit as a largely "inconclusive" debate with a slight victory for Colombian president Uribe. The country's largest-circulation newspaper "Clarin" said "U.S. Military Bases in Colombia BUENOS AIR 00000999 002 OF 003 Accepted," and newspaper of record said "Uribe Avoids Regional Condemnation." Under the headline "Together with Lula, the President Tried to Preserve Unity," "La Nacion" credited CFK and Brazilian President Lula with playing a moderating role at the summit, asserting they sought a middle ground between Colombian and Venezuelan positions. The weekend newspaper "Perfil" said "Summit Fails Amid Tension and Cross Accusations." The English-language Buenos Aires "Herald" aptly said "UNASUR Closes with Vague Agreement." CFK's Contribution to the Debate -------------- ¶5. (C) Argentine contacts contend that President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner (CFK) played the moderating role incumbent upon her as host of the summit. During the debate and in statements to the press, however, CFK also drew some specious analogies between the U.S. Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) with Colombia and Argentina's "terrible experiences of colonial enclaves with extra-continental bases," in an obtuse reference to Argentina's long-standing objection to the British presence on the Malvinas/Falkland Islands. CFK claimed that "if in a neighboring country they were to install bases, I, for one, would feel unsafe/insecure." CFK insisted her misgivings were not directed against the specific countries involved in the DCA and that she was guided by principles of universality to establish a "common doctrine" for all of South America. "We need to establish uniform norms that are not a double standard for the installation of extraterritorial forces in South America. The doctrine must be for everyone and in all circumstances." MOD Garre Voices her Misgivings -------------- ¶6. (C) Defense Minister Nilda Garre was less circumspect in making clear the target of her suspicions. In an interview with newspaper of record "La Nacion" at the conclusion of the summit, she said Argentina still objected to the "installation of U.S. bases in Colombia" and that they would only gain "legitimacy" when it was proven that their use would be restricted to narco-trafficking or terrorist targets within Colombian borders. Garre, who is scheduled to visit Washington September 7-11 for meetings with Secretary of Defense Gates and others, said "many of us have our doubts" as to the ultimate objective of the DCA. "Why do they need C-17s, for example? The FARC are groups that are militarily primitive ("atrasados"). There does not seem to be any proportionality that justifies this." Garre also pointed out that C-17s could reach Argentina from Palanquero in Colombia. Finally, Garre dismissed the concerns raised at the summit by Uribe and Peruvian President Garcia of a burgeoning arms race in South America. Business newspaper "Ambito Financiero" noted that Garre spoke of the U.S. C-17 aircraft to be deployed "as if it were a plan developed by an enemy nation." It also said MOD sources claimed Garre intended to raise with Secretary Gates her objections and misgivings about the DCA. The View from the Chancellery -------------- ¶7. (C) The CDA discussed the summit with Vice Foreign Minister Taccetti and MFA Chief of Staff D'Alotto, who were both in Bariloche. D'Alotto said he had worked closely with CFK and Colombian Vice Foreign Minister Clemencia Forero (whom he characterized as "very smart") to work out acceptable language for the last paragraph of the communique. He said that he witnessed personally CFK's willingness to reach out to and accommodate Uribe despite their lack of ideological affinity - both in the communique drafting and in her seeking him out after the summit to get him to participate in the group photo despite his reluctance ("he was mad about the comments by Correa, Morales, and Chavez"). ¶8. (C) D'Alotto said that Venezuelan FM Maduro complained to him later that the GOA had put Chavez in a bad spot with the final communique language and let Colombia "off the hook." He said Chavez looked a little discombobulated at the end. ¶9. (C) The CDA pointed out to D'Alotto that the anti-American rhetoric from the likes of MOD Nilda Garre had stolen defeat from the jaws of victory. Her comments over the weekend that the DCA had "no legitimacy unless it can be proved that it BUENOS AIR 00000999 003 OF 003 does not threaten other countries" and that US C-17s could reach Argentina from the Colombian bases were offensive and would not be well received in Washington, especially given that Garre declined to meet with WHA DAS McMullen the day before the summit. D'Alotto did not attempt to defend Garre's remarks. ¶10. (C) Taccetti claimed to the CDA that the GoA took pains to distance itself from the Bolivarian countries with their "ridiculous aversion to everything about your country." Taccetti said the GOA recognizes that the U.S. and Colombia have the sovereign right to sign an agreement on defense and security issues; along with many other countries, such as Brazil, it only seeks more assurances that the agreement will not have security implications in third countries. Taccetti said that DAS McMullen's visit to Argentina was very useful in clarifying the context and the USG position, but he added that "we still have concerns." The CDA offered to work together to mollify those concerns, adding that it was not productive to air them in the press. Colombian Ambassador's Views -------------- ¶11. (C) Colombian Ambassador Alvaro Garcia-Jimenez attended the summit and told the CDA afterward that Uribe did not want to take the "family photo" because he felt surrounded by unfriendly leaders who were striving to trip up his government. Pretending that everything was fine afterwards did not sit well with him, but, out of courtesy, he agreed to join the photo after CFK insisted. Garcia thought that Chile's Bachelet, among all of the leaders, had distinguished herself with interventions that were factual, well-reasoned, and constructive. ¶12. (C) Ambassador Garcia said that the GOC was not unpleasantly surprised by Alan Garcia's performance, though the Colombian delegation enjoyed his remark mocking Chavez for his "fear" of U.S. designs on Venezuelan oil fields. He expressed surprise that President Garcia joined those seeking onsite inspections to "verify" the DCA's innocent intent. Garcia observed that Ecuador's Correa was offensive as usual, but when he and Uribe bumped into each other in a narrow hallway, they greeted each other without coming to blows. Ambassador Garcia said Bolivia's Evo Morales was the worst of the lot -- out of control, unsalvageable, and wearing his hatred for the United States on his sleeve. Venezuela's Chavez, however, seemed more restrained than usual. Comment -------------- ¶13. (C) If the measure of diplomacy is the peaceful resolution of disputes, then the UNASUR gabfest was a harmless affair. But the event had a superfluous quality to it. As one Embassy contact pointed out, UNASUR leaders had already exhausted the DCA "issue" at the August 10 summit in Quito when CFK artificially prolonged its life by inviting the other leaders to continue the discussion in Argentina, adding for good measure that "we cannot permit that the Americans, in addition to exporting to us the economic crisis and the (H1N1) influenza, now establish a situation of belligerence in the region." As host in Bariloche, CFK played a moderating role in usurping some of Correa's rightful role (as UNASUR president pro tem) in steering the discussion and in personally working out a communique that Colombia could accept. But even in this moment of potential glory, she did not inspire confidence. CFK's center of balance tilts leftward, causing her to utter inanities like the comparison equating U.S. troops visiting Colombia under a bilateral agreement with "the foreign occupation of the Malvinas." KELLY