ARGENTINA: RISING PRESSURES FOR THE RIACHUELO RIVER

UNCLAS BUENOS AIRES 001061 SIPDIS SENSITIVE DEPT FOR OES/ENV AND WHA/EPSC DEPT PLEASE PASS TO EPA E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: SENV ECON EFIN EIND AR SUBJECT: ARGENTINA: RISING PRESSURES FOR THE RIACHUELO RIVER CLEAN-UP TO BEGIN REF: 08 BUENOS AIRES 1703 -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) A massive, long-delayed cleanup of the Riachuelo- Matanza River Basin, the most polluted basin in Latin America, is due to begin shortly. Funded in part through a $2 billion World Bank loan, the project is expected to define the World Bank's involvement in Argentina in the medium to long-term. Administrative intransigency and a lack of cooperation between different government bodies, however, raise the possibility of further delays for the clean-up, while orders from the federal court supervising the project put pressure on the GoA to start work immediately. The high-profile clean-up has the potential to be an important achievement or a resounding failure for the Kirchner Administration, although its outcome will not be known for some time. End Summary. -------------- -------------- World Bank Loan for Huge Environmental Clean-Up Project -------------- -------------- ¶2. (SBU) ESTHOff met on September 3 with World Bank (WB) officials Franz Dress-Gross and Renan Poveda to discuss the Matanza-Riachuelo River Basin Clean-Up Project (Riachuelo clean-up). The project is a massive $3.5 billion, 12-year project to clean up the greater Buenos Aires Riachuelo river basin, through construction of new sewage treatment systems and curtailment of industrial effluent flow. A WB loan signed in August by the GoA is to provide $2 billion in financing in two tracts, with the first loan of $840 million to be committed this November. The GoA will provide 44% of the total funding, a higher than normal counterpart for WB projects. Poveda suggested that the GoA chose to provide this higher level of funding as a means of showing its commitment to the project. ¶3. (SBU) The Riachuelo river basin is home to about four million people, of which 35% do not have clean drinking water access and 65% do not have sewage connections. Approximately 4,100 industries are located in the basin, with many discharging untreated effluents directly into the river. The river has organic compound levels that are 10 times what is needed to maintain a healthy, aerobic river, as well as high levels of heavy metals and other pollutants. ¶4. (SBU) Pursuant to a 2008 Supreme Court decision that mandated a clean-up of the river, the GoA established an overarching authority, ACUMAR (La Autoridad de Cuenca Matanza- Riachuelo),to manage the project. ACUMAR, which by statute operates under the Secretariat of the Environment, includes representatives of the national government, province, City of Buenos Aires, and 14 other municipalities that make up the river basin. ACUMAR is to work closely with AySA (the primary water and sanitation utility in Buenos Aires),which has technical expertise and runs the sewage system and water treatment plants. The decision also gave a federal judge in Quilmes, Luis Armella, supervisory power over the project. ¶5. (SBU) The WB-funded clean-up project consists of two parts. The first is to direct runoff and sewage into massive collector pipes and then to primary treatment plants, which will remove organic pollutants. The wastewater is then discharged via underground pipelines 11 km into the Rio de La Plata river, where it will disperse. While some NGOs have criticized the plan for not including secondary treatment that would allow the water to be discharged directly into the river, the WB determined that this was the most cost-effective means of cleaning up the Riachuelo. The sewer extensions will increase sewage coverage from 35% to over 75% of river basin residents. ¶6. (SBU) The second part of the clean-up is the progressive elimination of point source discharge, directly controlling effluent from the 4,100 industries lining the river. This project focuses on monitoring and requiring companies to treat discharge and/or direct it to treatment plants. Tanneries and milk/meat producers are the primary sources of pollutants, discharging respectively 43% and 17% of all pollutants. Grants will be available to small and medium-size enterprises to assist in updating their treatment facilities. The WB and ACUMAR are considering moving factories involved in the most polluting parts of the tanning process (splitting fur off leather and softening the leather) to one location, so as to allow for targeted treatment and monitoring. ¶7. (SBU) According to WB Project Head Dress-Gross, ACUMAR and AySA "are committed to the project." The first stage of the project, involving the construction of a new collector and treatment plant on the left bank of the river, will free up capacity on the right bank to allow AySA to expand its sewage network. The Environment Secretariat has already transferred inspectors to ACUMAR to begin inspections of the industrial polluters and is reportedly transferring almost half of its employees to work on the clean-up. It is not clear what implications this has for the Secretariat's other day-to-day work. Although a previous cable (ref A) noted that the GoA may be open to water and sanitation tariff increase to pay for AySA's operating costs related to increased coverage and treatment, WB Official Poveda said that this now appears to be off the table and that the GoA will have to find another revenue source for AySA. ¶8. (SBU) In addition to the WB-funded project, the municipalities along the river are required by law to clean the river banks within 35 meters on either bank. The supervisory federal judge has ordered the river bank cleanup to begin by November. The City of Buenos Aires plans to clean up floating solid waste and to demolish illegal buildings along the river. This plan has been complicated by the existence of several illegal housing units along the river that will require the removal of approximately 1,500 households. City environmental officials told ESTHOff that the City, although nominally part of ACUMAR, played no part in the WB loan negotiations and feels frozen out of the larger clean-up, since ACUMAR is part of the national government structure and responds to Presidential Cabinet Chief Anibal Fernandez. -------------- But Delays Loom for Political Reasons -------------- ¶9. (SBU) The WB officials told ESTHOff that ACUMAR is now being restructured, which may cause delays in the project's start-up. The WB loan agreement locates the administrative and technical units in the Environment Secretariat but outside of ACUMAR, thus giving the Secretariat primary control of the project. According to Poveda, however, Cabinet Chief Fernandez has ordered that the administrative and technical units be moved to ACUMAR to allow him to have more direct authority over the clean-up project and its funding. This administrative restructuring will require an amendment in the WB loan, however, which may lead to a delay in the initial disbursement. ¶10. (SBU) Poveda said that the need for GoA approval of the loan amendment opens the door for GoA infighting and delays, as several ministries must sign off on the amendment. Therefore, the GoA has asked the WB to release funds to begin the project while the amendment is pending. WB lawyers are currently reviewing that request, but Poveda indicated that the GoA may have to begin carrying out eligible expenditures itself, to be reimbursed once the loan becomes effective. ¶11. (SBU) According to Poveda, Fernandez decided to reassert control over the clean-up project when he became Cabinet Chief in July 2009. The restructuring of ACUMAR and the loan agreement is an attempt to make ACUMAR more directly accountable to his office. Andres Napoli, head of the Riachuelo project of the environmental NGO Fundacion Ambiente y Recursos Naturales, confirmed to ESTHOff that the restructuring is a political decision to give Fernandez close control of ACUMAR. Napoli said to the daily newspaper "La Nacion" that repeated change of personnel was delaying any work on the project: "It can't be that every new official who joins the process starts from zero. In this year the representatives of ACUMAR have already changed four times." Fernandez's restructuring of ACUMAR could be an attempt to get the stagnant body to function more efficiently through tighter control over the WB loan funds. ¶12. (SBU) Meanwhile, the WB expressed some concern that ACUMAR build the capacity to handle the complex procurement/contract guidelines of international loans. Although it can access experts from many ministries, ACUMAR will need time to build this capacity. Even though ACUMAR is to be staffed primarily from within the Environment Secretariat, and up to half of the Secretariat's staff is to be reportedly assigned to the project, our contacts tell us that individual offices within the Secretariat are reluctant to release employees to ACUMAR. -------------- While the Court Demands Action Immediately -------------- ¶13. While delays loom due to politics, the federal judge supervising the clean-up has ordered immediate action. According to "La Nacion," Judge Armella ordered on September 4 that ACUMAR must start work within two months. He threatened the imposition of daily fines on the officials responsible for the delay if the order is not complied with. Judge Armella found that ACUMAR was not in compliance with the initial Supreme Court orders of last July and therefore issued the new demand for the project to begin, and for the national, provincial, and city governments to put forth the necessary funds to start work. According to "La Nacion," this order was a response to a statement by Buenos Aires Mayor Mauricio Macri that the City of Buenos Aires would not put forth funds for its part of the Riachuelo clean-up. ¶14. (SBU) According to WB Project Head Dress-Gross, the judge also ordered that ACUMAR must immediately begin inspections of all 4,100 industrial sites in the basin and that the Secretariat must transfer inspectors to ACUMAR to complete that task. The WB believes that ACUMAR/AySA can complete 200 inspections per month, so this tasking alone would take 20 months to complete. -------------- Plans to Involve Civil Society and NGOs -------------- ¶15. (SBU) Poveda indicated that NGOs are strategic allies in the project and that he was meeting with two groups of NGOs on the same week that he met with ESTHOff. Napoli of FARN, however, said that ACUMAR is "totally closed" to NGO involvement or monitoring, even though the Supreme Court order created a "Cuerpo Colegiado," a committee of NGOs authorized to monitor and assist with the clean-up. Poveda agreed that Environment Secretary Homero Bibiloni, and the GoA in general, seemed quite skeptical of NGO involvement and refused to include grants or programs for NGOs in the WB loan funding. The WB still hoped to involve NGOs and smaller municipalities, Poveda added, as many NGOs and municipal officials already know who the main polluters are and can direct ACUMAR to them. ¶16. (SBU) Poveda noted that the WB has another on-going project focused on solid waste management in Buenos Aires. Although not within the framework of the Riachuelo loan, solid waste is a concern in the river basin, and Poveda said the WB planned to seek additional financing for the solid waste management project to pay for clean-up of solid waste in the basin, community work to prevent dumping, and social campaigning. He believed that this would provide a backdoor for NGO/civil society involvement in the Riachuelo clean-up. -------------- Comment: A High-Stakes Project -------------- ¶17. (SBU) With a $2 billion WB loan agreement in place, the Riachuelo clean-up project finally appeared ready to go forward. The need for a loan amendment and restructuring of the administrative and technical units, however, will make it difficult for ACUMAR to begin the project within the two-month deadline set by Judge Armella. As a high-profile project for residents of Buenos Aires, the clean-up has the potential to be an important achievement or resounding failure for the Kirchner Administration, although its outcome will not be known for some time. End comment. MARTINEZ