(U) C-WP8-01022- HUNGARIAN SECURITY OF NUCLEAR

S E C R E T BUDAPEST 000073 DEPARTMENT FOR INR/I AND EUR/CE JAMIE LAMORE E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2034 TAGS: PINR PARM MNUC KNNP HU SUBJECT: (U) C-WP8-01022- HUNGARIAN SECURITY OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS REF: 08 STATE 135193 Classified By: P/E Counselor Eric Gaudiosi, reason 1.4(c) ¶1. (U) Post provides the responses below sequenced to reftel questions in para 3.A (1-3). ¶2. (S) Hungary has multi-layered security measures in place at the country's two nuclear facilities - the main power plant at Pecs and the research reactor in Budapest. For example, during a December 2008 visit to the research reactor site, PolOff and visiting NNSA and GAO representatives were first required to submit full personal data and passport information to the Hungarian Atomic Energy Agency (HAEA) several days in advance of the visit. On arrival at the site, the group first passed through a manned control gate, were issued passes, and then escorted to the reactor facility. At the reactor facility they were issued an additional security pass requiring escort at all times. During the visit host officials also confirmed that further restrictive access procedures - two-person rule, coded key pads, and visual recognition - are required for access to several highly sensitive areas, to include the reactor area and fuel storage areas. Security cameras were also present with a central, manned surveillance operation. ¶3. (S) During this and a November 2008 meeting at the HAEA, Hungarian officials confirmed with PolOff that the guards at both facilities carry side arms. This semi-governmental security force receives annual training and certification by the Hungarian National Police to carry weapons. ¶4. (S) Hungary has strict procedures concerning transportation of nuclear materials. The recent transport of spent fuel to Russia in September 2008, in coordination with DOE, reflected stringent security measures coordinated between site security personnel and the national police authority. The GOH moved the spent fuel via train from Budapest to the Slovene border for follow-on transport via a Slovene port for transport by sea to Russia. DOE plans another visit to Hungary early in 2009 to discuss an additional spent fuel shipment. ¶5. (S) The HAEA continues to address security issues at the nuclear facilities as well as other facilities that use or produce small amounts of radioactive material. The HAEA projected completion of its Design Basis Threat (DBT) project by EOY 2008. In 2009 the HAEA also targets development of detailed requirements for elements of physical protection systems for users and producers of radioactive materials. ¶6. (S) The USG, through DOE and NNSA, has worked closely with the GOH over the past decade to address nuclear security issues. We have provided mobile equipment for Second Line of Defense programs, provided Rail Interdiction Training for Customs and Border Guard personnel, sponsored Hungarian participation in Export Control and Border Security conferences, and worked closely with the GOH in coordinating the above mentioned spent fuel shipments. Post recommends contacting Brian Waud at brian.waud@nnsa.doe.gov or Peter Ruedel at ruedelp@gao.gov to request the GAO report of its December 2008 visit to HAEA facilities. Foley