WATCHING THE WATCHDOG: REFORMING HUNGARY'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BUDAPEST 000477 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/CE, EB/OMA, INR/EC, TREASURY FOR ERIC MEYER, JEFF BAKER, LARRY NORTON E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2014 TAGS: EFIN ECON PREL HU SUBJECT: WATCHING THE WATCHDOG: REFORMING HUNGARY'S FINANCIAL SUPERVISORY SYSTEM REF: 08 BUDAPEST 1027 Classified By: Acting P/E Counselor Jon Martinson, reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary. Amidst a sea of criticism and disagreement over the restructuring of the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority (HFSA),HFSA Supervisory Council Chairman Istvan Farkas resigned on June 18. Ministry of Finance officials and National Bank Governor Andras Simor favor the National Bank taking on some of the responsibilities of the HFSA, a move the HFSA strongly opposes. On June 29, Parliament approved the appointment of Adam Farkas as the new HFSA Chairman, and it appears that no changes will likely be made to the organizational structure of the HFSA until the autumn at the earliest. The IMF and EU are leading the call for strengthening the HFSA, and Chairman Adam Farkas expressed commitment to improving the HFSA's ability to identify potential risks to the financial system and preventing them from developing. ¶2. (C) Controversy has also reached National Bank Governor Andras Simor following press reports that he transferred millions of forints out of Hungary into his Cyprus-based firm. Analysts believe calls for Simor's resignation are politically motivated by both the opposition, as well as by some Socialist Party MPs possibly seeking to deflect blame for the economic crisis. Excessive criticism of the HFSA and the national bank leadership could reduce confidence in Hungary's still vulnerable financial system. End summary. CRITICISM OF THE HFSA ¶3. (SBU) In recent months, the HFSA (also known by the Hungarian acronym PSZAF) has faced increasing criticism for being ineffective and insufficiently independent of government and lobby group influence. Complaints include criticism that the HFSA should have taken greater steps to curb the explosion in recent years of foreign currency lending by banks (reftel),and that it should impose stricter penalties on financial service providers not complying with HFSA rules. In addition, the HFSA was faulted in March for failing to initially join a statement by financial supervisory authorities of other Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries warning against making overly broad and potentially misleading statements on the economic and financial health of the region. ¶4. (SBU) Finally, last November, the HFSA suspended trading by real estate funds that were facing severe liquidity issues due to large capital withdrawals. HFSA's decision to suspend trading was criticized as both unnecessary as well as contributing to the liquidity problem by fueling further flight from the funds. REFORM, RESIGNATION, REORGANIZATION ¶5. (SBU) Both the EU and IMF emphasized the need to strengthen and provide additional regulatory authority to the HFSA. In particular, in its review of Hungary's financial stabilization package implementation, the IMF notes that the HFSA is constrained by its lack of authority to issue regulations, as well as by its status as a semi-autonomous agency subordinated to the Ministry of Finance. It also notes the need for stronger supervision of large financial groups, as well as the need to improve its capabilities in the area of on-site bank inspections. Hungarian National Bank (MNB) Deputy Governor Ferenc Karvalics noted that Hungary will receive a technical assistance team to help with institutional strengthening in the area of banking supervision. HFSA's newly approved Supervisory Council Chairman Adam Farkas (note: no relation to former Chairman Istvan Farkas. End note) also announced that he intends "to create a new financial regulatory and control framework for the HFSA," in order to ensure the HFSA devotes more attention to identifying potential risks to the financial system and preventing them from developing. ¶6. (C) There is strong internal debate, however, as to how HFSA's organizational structure will be impacted by these changes. Press and analyst sources indicate that Ministry of Finance officials and National Bank Governor Andras Simor favor incorporating HFSA responsibilities into the MNB. The HFSA opposes this approach, maintaining that the HFSA should remain a separate independent entity. HFSA Director General Csaba Varga argues that the focus of the two entities is different, with the MNB focused primarily on price stability, while the HFSA's mandate is broader, and includes issues of BUDAPEST 00000477 002.2 OF 003 competition and consumer protection, and that only as separate entities can all interests be properly safeguarded. HFSA Director General Csaba Varga recently complained to Embassy officials that discussions about the possible merger of the HFSA into the national bank have been carried out without input from HFSA. ¶7. (SBU) The issue came to a head in mid-June when current HFSA Supervisory Council Chairman Istvan Farkas announced his resignation. In a letter posted on the HFSA website, Farkas noted he is resigning because there is no hope of finding a common position between the HFSA and "government branches responsible for shaping financial regulations" on organizational and management changes to the HFSA. Farkas' resignation appears to have at least temporarily postponed any major changes; the daily newspaper Nepszabadsag goes even further, suggesting that Farkas' resignation may have been the price for HFSA to maintain its current organizational structure. Krisztian Szabados of the research firm Political Capital notes, however, that the government still plans to revisit the organizational structure of HFSA in the next parliamentary session. MNB GOVERNOR SIMOR ALSO UNDER ATTACK ¶8. (SBU) The MNB has not been without its share of drama as well. National Bank Governor Andras Simor has recently been accused by the opposition FIDESZ Party as well as by several Socialist Party MPs of tax evasion by "concealing millions of forints from Hungarian tax authorities" through the use of an "offshore company." Simor responded to these accusations by noting that his foreign-registered company is registered in an EU Member State (Cyprus),and pays taxes based on local regulations. He notes that there is no tax liability on the after-tax assets moved into the company. Analysts generally believe this is not a case of tax evasion, although some note the case raises ethical issues given the MNB Governor's failure to list these foreign assets in his property declaration. Although accusations of Simor's "offshore dealings" have subsided somewhat lately, FIDESZ continues to call for him to step down. ¶9. (SBU) Analysts note that the Socialists and FIDESZ have different motivations for attacking Simor. Some socialists may be trying to use Simor as a scapegoat for Hungary's economic situation and the austerity measures the government recently enacted. They may also be concerned that Simor's tight monetary policy is making problems worse for Hungarians by stifling economic growth. The opposition, although also arguing that the MNB should be more aggressive in rolling back last October's emergency 300 basis point rate increase, continues to associate Simor with many of the failed policies of the previous Gyurscany government, and believes he should resign. ¶10. (C) There is likely to be little practical effect, however, of demands for Simor's resignation. Removal of the National Bank Governor requires proposal by the Prime Minister and approval by the President. Given the close relationship between the Prime Minister and the National Bank Governor (Note: Simor was formerly PM Bajnai's boss. End note),as long as Prime Minister Bajnai remains in power, MNB Governor Simor is unlikely to be forced out of his position. Some analysts speculate, however, that the Socialists may find it in their interests to appoint a new central bank governor, who would remain in place well beyond the 2012 expiration of Simor's current tenure. COMMENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR FINANCIAL REGULATORY SYSTEM ¶11. (C) Although criticism of the HFSA and attacks on MNB Governor Simor are not directly related, together they serve the interests of both Socialist Party MPs looking for a scapegoat for Hungary's financial problems, as well as the opposition hoping to tarnish the government's image in the run-up to national elections. They may become victims of their own success, however, should attacks on the credibility of financial regulation (and regulators) reduce confidence in Hungary's financial system and continue to keep investors away. ¶12. (C) The increased focus on strengthening the HFSA, led primarily by pressure from the IMF and the EU, will help Hungary improve its system of financial supervision. It is unclear whether what will emerge will be a stronger independent HFSA, or whether the responsibilities of the HFSA will be folded into a national bank with an expanded mandate. BUDAPEST 00000477 003 OF 003 As we have already seen, however, as is often the case in Hungary, the process is unlikely to be smooth and unpoliticized. End comment. Levine