GOH MATCHES PROGRESS ON NABUCCO WITH NEXT MOVES ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BUDAPEST 000195 SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/FO JGARBER AND MBRYZA, EUR/CE, EUR/RUS, EUR/ERA, EEB/FO, PLEASE PASS TO NSC KHELGERSON E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2019 TAGS: ENRG ECON EPET PGOV RU HU SUBJECT: GOH MATCHES PROGRESS ON NABUCCO WITH NEXT MOVES ON SOUTH STREAM REF: A. BUDAPEST 135 ¶B. 2008 BUDAPEST 1058 ¶C. BUDAPEST 186 ¶D. BUDAPEST 101 Classified By: A/Pol-Econ Counselor Jon Martinson, reasons 1.4(b),(d) ¶1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 8. ¶2. (C) In characteristically non-transparent fashion, Prime Minister Gyurcsany led a delegation comprised of cabinet ministers and business executives to Moscow on March 10 for a series of intergovernmental consultations and to sign agreements related to the construction of the planned South Stream pipeline (ref C). The day prior to the scheduled trip, Parliament and the press still appeared to be in the dark regarding the substance of what would be discussed and te deals that would be struck. Few details have been reported since the agreements were signed. WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT THE SOUTH STREAM DEAL ¶3. (C) Prime Ministers Gyurcsany and Putin oversaw the signing by Hungarian Development Bank (MFB) president Janos Eros and Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller of an agreement to create by May 15 a 50-50 joint venture to construct the 10-bcm/a Hungarian stretch of the South Stream pipeline. A final decision to move forward on the project must be made within two years of the agreement's signing. The decision will depend on relevant regulatory approvals as well as a feasibility study for the Hungarian leg that is to be completed by the end of 2009. According to Gyurcsany's statement to reporters, Hungary will be responsible for 10-15 percent of the total cost of the 31-bcm/a South Stream pipeline, which Putin now estimates at 10 billion euro, in sharp contrast to recent Gazprom estimates of a 25 billion euro price tag for the pipeline. (Comment: During U.S. NATO Ambassador Volker's March 12 office call with the Prime Minister's Security and Foreign Policy Advisor Karoly Banai, Banai, who accompanied the Prime Minister to Moscow, provided a read-out of the agreement. Banai said the signing was "simply" the implementation of the February 2008 bi-lateral agreement on South Stream. He stated that the latest agreement will lead to the establishment of a Hungarian-registered joint venture between the state-owned MFB and Gazprom to initiate work on the pipeline's feasibility study in the next 3-4 months. According to Banai, Putin told Gyurcsany that the Nabucco project would fall victim to the "irresponsible behavior" of transit countries such as Turkey, Georgia, and Azerbaijan, just as the current pipeline system is subject to the "irresponsible behavior" of Ukraine. According to Putin, whereas Nabucco needs both gas supplies and transit capability, South Stream has adequate gas resources but just needs to work out transit arrangements. End comment.) ¶4. (C) In a separate deal, MOL CEO Zsolt Hernadi and Gazprom president Alexei Miller signed an agreement to build a 1.3-bcm gas storage facility in Hungary that will be jointly owned by MOL and Gazprom Export on a parity basis. Construction is expected to begin in 2010 for completion in 2012 or 2013. Upon completion, this storage facility, combined with new commercial and strategic storage capacity currently under construction, will increase Hungary's total storage capacity to more than 7 bcm, representing about half of the country's annual gas consumption. The MOL-Gazprom storage facility will add 15 million cubic meters to Hungary's daily storage withdrawal capacity, which is already expected to reach 75 mcm/d under current expansion plans. (Comment: This 90 mcm/d capacity far exceeds Hungary's peak consumption rates, which ranged between 65-75 mcm/d in the days before the January gas cutoff, and appears designed to support MOL's efforts, now with Gazprom's assistance, to become a strategic player in Central Europe's gas market. During the meeting with Ambassador Volker, Banai confirmed that the additional storage capacity will enable storage of half of Hungary's annual consumption, commenting that it will "increase Hungary's energy independence." End Comment.) WHAT WE DON'T KNOW ABOUT THE DEAL BUDAPEST 00000195 002 OF 003 ¶5. (C) There are a number of important questions that remain unanswered about the Moscow agreements, and which may remain so for some time if there is any truth to a rumor conveyed by a Fidesz contact that the GoH plans to keep the details classified for ten years. -- One obvious question concerns eventual ownership of the Hungarian leg of the pipeline. The MFB has committed to an equal stake in the construction of the pipeline, but we do not yet know if it plans to retain an ownership interest upon its completion. -- We have not seen anything about proposed financing for the projects beyond Putin's statement that financing for the pipeline would be "no problem." -- The allocation of management and operational control of the pipeline and storage facility are not yet clear. Gazprom seems likely to hold sway over the pipeline given the MFB's presumed lack of experience in operating gas pipelines. -- We also lack information concerning the gas in the pipeline and the storage facility and what sort of transit and ownership arrangements have been concluded. Miller told the press that Gazprom "will be fully in charge of its gas transit through Hungary." -- Equally concerning is the potential for connected side deals that may never be fully brought to light. Such agreements could involve the fate of Hungary's financially-troubled airline Malev (ref A),the proposed capacity expansion at Hungary's Paks nuclear power plant, and the privatization of the MVM electric utility and/or its power grid subsidiary, MAVIR. THE OPPOSITION'S REACTION: "OUR DEBATE IS NOT WITH RUSSIA, BUT WITH GYURCSANY" ¶6. (SBU) Concurrent with the announcement of the agreements in Russia, Fidesz foreign policy chief Zsolt Nemeth held a press conference in Budapest where he contrasted the negotiations, which were undertaken without consulting Parliament, with proceedings on Nabucco, which have occurred within the framework of open international fora. Referring to the Moscow negotiations as "irresponsible" and "outrageous," he accused Gyurcsany of working for the benefit of his Socialist cronies and clients with Russian help. He called on the GoH to submit the pipeline agreement to a Parliamentary vote and to publicize any discussions with the Russians that dealt with MVM and MAVIR. Expressing strong disagreement with Gyurcsany's statement that Hungary's interest is in having as many pipelines as possible, Nemeth countered that South Stream will increase Hungary's dependence on Russia and reiterated his view that Nabucco should remain Hungary's top priority. He emphasized, however, that Fidesz' issue is not with Russia, which it considers an important poltical and economic partner, but with Gyurcsany and his penchant for backroom dealing. (Comment: In a March 12 office call, Nemeth told Ambassador Volker that the Nabucco pipeline is the key to decreased dependence on Russia for energy. Citing Chancellor Merkel's recent statements opposing EU financial support for Nabucco, which in Nemeth's opinion reflects the "bedrock cooperation" between Russia and Germany on energy, Nemeth emphasized that the USG must be a key supporter of Nabucco, highlighting DAS Bryza's efforts as "crucial" to bring the project to fruition. Nemeth stressed that the new Administration must "demonstrate continuity" on energy policy to send a strong message of support to its Central European partners. End comment.) ¶7. (C) According to one of his staff members, Janos Koka, SzDSz head of the Parliamentary Nabucco Committee, has asked Gyurcsany to appear before the committee on April 9 to provide an account of the negotiations and the details of the agreements. MOL CEO Hernadi has also been invited to appear. The staff member remarked that once again Gyurcsany has concluded an intergovernmental agreement without parliamentary consent and ignored his obligation to keep the BUDAPEST 00000195 003 OF 003 Nabucco Committee informed about government actions that could have a material impact on Nabucco. He added that Koka is requesting a report from the Hungarian intelligence service concerning possible Russian efforts to obstruct Nabucco. ¶8. (C) Comment and action request: The Embassy has been aware for several months, based on regular conversations with Foreign Policy Advisor Banai, that further movement on South Stream would likely occur in the early part of this year (ref B and C). The GoH may have timed this latest development to avoid directly undercutting the progress made on Nabucco at the summit it hosted in January (ref D). Gyurcsany's effort to match forward progress on Nabucco with progress on South Stream appears to be based on his view that if South Stream is going to be built, it is better to be in than out, and the more pipelines entering Hungary, the better. Speaking to press in Moscow, Gyurcsany hailed Hungary's "strategic partnership" with Russia and the "leaps and bounds" improvement in Hungary's energy security brought by South Stream. To the extent that this progress on South Stream undermines Nabucco, however, this "strategic partnership" could well come at the expense of Hungary's--and Europe's--long-term energy security. Accordingly, we request that Washington issue a strong statement in support of Nabucco in light of this latest agreement between Hungary and Russia on South Stream. End Comment. Foley