ROMANIA: NATIONAL LIBERAL PARTY MIRED IN SUMMER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BUCHAREST 000593

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/CE ASCHEIBE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/26/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL RO
SUBJECT: ROMANIA: NATIONAL LIBERAL PARTY MIRED IN SUMMER
DOLDRUMS

Classified By: CDA Jeri Guthrie-Corn for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: The center-right National Liberal Party
(PNL) is on a losing streak. After its exclusion from the
governing coalition following the November 2008 parliamentary
elections, the party underperformed in the June 2009 European
Parliament (EP) elections and PNL presidential candidate Crin
Antonescu lags badly in the polls. An apparent attempt to
differentiate the party and Antonescu from Basescu's
pro-American image risks alienating the public and marking
PNL as anti-Basescu and little else. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) PNL has so far failed to capitalize on its opposition
status during the economic crisis, and NOW finds its
presidential candidate Crin Antonescu running anywhere from
third to fifth in current polls. Pundits and party insiders
accurately perceive Antonescu as an unconvincing candidate,
hamstrung by a weak party structure, intra-party divisions
and a lack of fresh ideas on the campaign trail. Statements
in the presidential candidate's platform that suggest a mild
foreign policy tilt away from the U.S. and toward Russia
appear to lack substance and seem designed to distinguish the
party from Basescu's perceived pro-American positions. The
PNL risks being defined by the public (and us) as viscerally
anti-Basescu, and little else.


3. (C) PNL was the unanimously perceived loser of the June
European Parliamentary elections. In contrast to the Liberal
Democrats (PDL) and Social Democrats (PSD),which both
performed as expected with 30 percent, the Liberals mustered
only 14 percent of the vote, short of their target of 20.
PNL's weaknesses were numerous: loss of incumbent seats and a
resulting drop in party morale; new, untested leadership;
insufficient activism; and disorganized branches in many
communities. In addition, several Antonescu consultants
describe the party's decision-making process as chaotic, the
chain of command slow to respond to new challenges, and the
get-out-the-vote effort unfocused -- especially in urban
areas. The party also lacks PDL's and PSD's experience in
vote counting and developing records of voting patterns.


4. (C) Crin Antonescu's leadership provides a further area
of concern for party consultants. Many see him as soft, at
times overwhelmed by the party's numerous issues. They tell
us that party discipline is weak, as is the sense of
solidarity around Antonescu. Despite bringing close
associates of former Prime Minister and PNL Chairman Calin
Popescu Tariceanu on board Antonescu's campaign team, the
party still appears divided into two camps, a testament to
Antonescu's lack of skill in winning over rivals.


5. (C) PNL,s voice has rarely been loud enough for PDL and
PSD -- the two most popular parties -- to interrupt their
constant bickering. Antonescu's campaign trips all but
stopped after the EP elections. Moreover, he continues to
top the list of members most absent from Parliament.
Recently PNL gained some visibility by sponsoring and
chairing two ad-hoc parliamentary committees to investigate
PDL ministers Monica Iacob-Ridzi and Elena Udrea, but this
alone is unlikely to win significant electoral support.


6. (C) PNL's presidential strategy aims to have the party
expand and aggregate around its candidate, more in the
American style than the European model centered on ideology
and party. If elected, Antonescu promises to be "a different
kind of President," and he kicked off his presidential bid
with Obama-like slogans emphasizing positive change.
However, Antonescu speeches tend toward stale denunciations
of what the PNL casts as Basescu's egregious misconduct in
office.


7. (C). In terms of relations with the U.S., Antonescu's
presidential platform contains a vague call "for a
re-founding of the partnership with the United States" based
on Romania's having achieved full membership in NATO and the
EU. "The first step of this process would be clarifying the
issue of entry visas for the United States," the platform
document declares. Until the mid-2000s, PNL was the most
pro-Western party in Romania. However, during the 2005-2008
government of PNL Prime Minister Tariceanu, the party opposed
Basescu's pro-Americanism. For example, in 2006 high-level
PNL members unilaterally announced Romania's pullout from
Iraq. Party leaders later claimed they were merely staking
out anti-Basescu ground; the new PNL leadership privately
tells us they weren't consulted and they disapproved of the
Iraq statement.


8. (C) While suggesting a more "balanced" approach toward
the U.S., Antonsecu's electoral platform also recommends a
positive shift towards Russia: "As President of Romania,

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relations with the Russian Federation represent a priority of
my foreign policy project... Relations with Russia have had
areas of inadmissible hovering, reflective of (an) inability
to grasp the strategic importance of good relations with the
Eastern neighbor."


9. (C) COMMENT. The PNL's major priority is to
differentiate itself from Basescu and capitalize on its
perception of Basescu's mismanagement of Romanian-Russian
relations. In the view of PNL leaders Basescu erred by
creating an adversarial relationship with the Russians during
the winter 2008-2009 natural gas crisis, thereby damaging
Romanian economic interests. Faced with internal malaise and
a daunting set of challenges, the party at this point seems
unable to raise its sights beyond the visceral anti-Basescu
sentiment that determines its positions. It will need a
serious game changer (a major corruption scandal involving
PDL or PSD leaders, for example) between NOW and Election Day
for Antonescu's prospects to improve. END COMMENT.
GUTHRIE-CORN