AFGHANISTAN, GEORGIA & PIRACY DISCUSSED BY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 BRUSSELS 000886 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2019 TAGS: EUN MARR MOPS PREL EAID KDEM PINS PTER MASS GG, SO, AF SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN, GEORGIA & PIRACY DISCUSSED BY EU,NON-EU NATO ALLIES AND EU ASPIRANTS REF: A. USEU 810 ¶B. USEU 819 ¶C. STATE 63551 BRUSSELS 00000886 001.2 OF 006 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Christopher W. Murray for reason 1.4b/d ¶1. (C/NF) SUMMARY: The Czech EU Presidency's Ambassador Ivo Sramek chaired a meeting of the EU Political Security Committee (PSC)ambassadors with NATO Allies and EU accession states on June 23. Topics were the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM),the EU's Civilian Police mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL),and the EU's anti-piracy effort, Operation Atalanta. The EU said the absence of an ISAF-EUPOL technical agreement on security and logistical support put the burden on PRT lead nations to provide clear assurances of support. This statement was framed as an allusion to unsuccessful efforts to find a formula to enable EUPOL civilian police to deploy to U.S.-led PRTs. The EU election monitoring mission will begin to deploy to Afghanistan on July 15 and will coordinate with a local monitoring group. In Georgia, failure to renew the OSCE and UN monitoring missions increases the importance of the EU Monitoring Mission, but the EU does not yet seem open to expanding the mission to permit third-county participation, as Turkey desires. With the EU considering new security sector reform and capacity building measures in Somalia, USEU Charge urged close coordination among all partners. End Summary. AFGHANISTAN ¶2. (C) EU Council Secretariat official Matthew Reece presented a positive picture of EUPOL's recent progress under Head of Mission Kai Vittrup. EUPOL is helping the Afghan National Police, with EUPOL strength was nearing 300 but its pace of growth is limited in part by the absorption and employment capacity of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams. With bilateral technical agreements in place, about 70 EU civpol have deployed to work with 12 Provincial Reconstruction Teams. He regretted that ISAF and EUPOL had not been able to conclude a technical agreement on ISAF security and logistical support. He stressed that this placed an increased responsibility on PRT lead nations to provide clear assurances of support. (Note: With Turkey's objections blocking an ISAF-EUPOL agreement, the EU has pursued bilateral agreements with PRT lead nations, including such non-EU countries as New Zealand, Norway, and Canada. EUPOL is now finalizing a technical agreement to permit deployment to the Czech PRT in Loghar Province and hopes to deploy another 15 civpol to U.S.-led PRTs in ISAF's Regional Command-East, starting with Laghman Province, if the U.S. will agree to a bilateral technical agreement. End note.) EUROPEAN COMMISSION PLANS FOR ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION ¶3. (SBU) Richard Wright of the European Commission (EC) provided an update on Commission plans to deploy an independent election monitoring mission to Afghanistan. He BRUSSELS 00000886 002.2 OF 006 characterized it as "the most difficult mission that we have ever attempted to undertake" due to deteriorating security conditions. The mission would attempt to facilitate "legitimate" elections that would bestow credibility upon the new government, he said, which depended upon the EU's mission also being credible. The EU election monitoring mission will be based in Kabul and have seven regional hubs. Its leader, retired French General and European Parliamentarian Phillippe Morillon, would be assisted by a core staff of 20, supplemented by about 35 long-term observers who would deploy to Afghanistan around July 15. Short-term observers would be contributed for election day coverage by Kabul-based embassies, said Wright. ¶4. (SBU) Wright announced that the EU is inviting non-EU countries to contribute election observers to Morillon's team, with arrangements being made to integrate Norwegian, Canadian and Swiss participants into the mission. Wright projected that an OSCE election assistance mission of about twenty staff would work in close coordination with the EU mission and share housing and office space in Kabul and the regional hubs. Wright said that although NATO's Secretary General had provided a letter guaranteeing in extremis support to the EU monitoring mission, the EU would strive to ensure that its observers were "visible and close tothe population." First-ring security would terefore be provided by Afghans. Wright also said that the EU mission will coordinate wih an Afghan non-governmental observer organization which hopes to deploy 8,000 Afghan observers. EUPOL ¶5. (C) USEU Charge urged that EUPOL continue to increase its role at provincial and district levels. He welcomed the deployment of about 70 EU civpol to work with 12 different Provincial Reconstruction Teams. He also noted the importance of training Afghan police for the upcoming elections. He also emphasized, as insructed in Ref C, U.S. impartiality in the elections, and urged EU member states to issue statements in support of the Afghan election process (reported septel). 6.(SBU) Charge stressed the need for better civ-mil integration and collaboration among international organizations and the Afghan government. In applying the, &Shape, Clear, Hold, Build8 counterinsurgency paradigm, progress cannot be defined or pursued in purely linear terms, Charge explained. Civilian and military plans of all actors must therefore be integrated from the beginning. Charge cautioned that the influx of new troops should improve the overall security for the Afghan population, but could cause a flare-up of violence as insurgents were squeezed into certain areas. ¶7. (SBU) Canada's Ambassador Ross Hornby noted that Canada, "an early supporter of EUPOL," would augment the ten Royal BRUSSELS 00000886 003.2 OF 006 Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) it contributed to EUPOL with an anti-corruption advisor and two mentors for the Ministry of Interior. He hoped that in the future, EUPOL would expand its deployment to provincial and regional teams and urged that EUPOL develop benchmarks to measure progress, offering Canadian assistance. He stressed Canada's desire to participate in the EU election monitoring mission and said that Canada would help provide security for the observers. He stressed the importance of cooperation between EUPOL and the NATO Training Mission. ¶8. (C) German Deputy PSC Representative Andreas Kindl -- who served in Afghanistan until last summer -- opined that training the Afghan National Police was a necessary precondition to ANP progress and that EUPOL should emphasize training. He suggested that EUPOL work with CTSC-A to develop a unified training system for Afghan police. Reece of the EU Council Secretariat asserted that the EUPOL mission was already doing more training work, pointing to the Kabul City Project as an example, and needed to focus on sustainable progress. Kindl called for the deployment of European Gendarmerie forces to be carried out "in a NTM-A context." He said the visit of newly-arrived Ambassador Eikenberry to Herat had highlighted the potential for future German-U.S. cooperation that region. Kindle inquired about the progress on EUPOL plans to deploy to U.S.-led PRTs in RC-East. ¶9. (C) Norway's Ambassador Oda Sletnes said that Norway was responding to the Afghan need for mentors by configuring PRT personnel into a civ-mil Police Mentoring Team. She urged EUPOL to be equally pragmatic. Denmark's Ambassador Faaborg-Anderson complained that EUPOL was not growing fast enough. He urged additional national contributions and the "rehatting" of civilian police already deployed to Afghanistan. ¶10. (C) Returning to elections, Faaborg-Anderson agreed that it was important to do more to create a level playing field. He bemoaned the absence of a clear mechanism for coordinating international community electoral support. Czech Ambassador Sramek noted that the EU was not applying its normal standard to the Afghan election, instead of insisting on "free and fair" elections, the EU sought merely to facilitate a "credible" outcome. Dutch PSC Ambassador Marjanne de Kwaastniet focused on the need for unified messages following the election, stating that the international community needed to be "unisonal" in responding to the Afghan election outcome. GEORGIA ¶11. (SBU) Chairman Sramek lamented the failure to agree on renewal of either the OSCE or UN monitoring missions in Georgia. This would leave the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) as the only international presence on the ground. Sramek said the EUMM had not been able to implement fully its BRUSSELS 00000886 004.2 OF 006 mandate, as access to the disputed enclaves remained blocked and Russia had fulfilled its agreement with the EU and withdrawn fully. He disclosed that the EU would shortly begin discussions of a revised concept of operations for EUMM. EUMM OPERATIONS UPDATE ¶12. (SBU) Mathew Reece of the Council described a recent roadside bomb attack on an EUMM convoy, probably with a Claymore-style mine, and while the convoy was returning from the Abkhaz border. An unarmored Georgian ambulance had been hit and its Georgian driver killed. The EU urged both sides to better protect the areas under their control. Reece noted that Georgian police were not actively patrolling the area where the attack took place. The EUMM had implemented a telephone hotline in South Ossetia, he said, but not yet in Abkhazia. ¶13. (C) The EUMM's responsibilities would increase in the absence of OSCE and UN missions, said Reese, and the EU was ready to extend the activities of the monitoring mission. Conversely, he responded to Turkish Ambassador Bozkir's query, on whether the EU would open up EUMM to third country participation, by stating that the mission was already "fully staffed and equipped." (Note: Norway privately asked us the same question on the margins of the meeting. End Note) Polish Ambassador Beata Peksa-Rawiec said that the UN and OSCE should be a given a role in talks aimed at resolving the conflict and hoped a formula could be found to enable the EUMM to observe "the entire territory." The topic should be on the agenda in "the Geneva format" and at the OSCE Corfu ministerial. Estonian Ambassador Sander Soone also called for discussing Georgia in Geneva talks which were now "more important than ever" and in Corfu. EU PLANS IN SOMALIA ¶14. (SBU) Chairman Sramek said that with the mandate of Operation Atalanta extended until December 2010, the EU was considering other ways to contribute to stabilizing the situation ashore in Somalia, such as contributing to Security Sector Reform efforts. Council Secretariat Defense Issues Director Claude-France Arnaud specified that the EU naval force's mandate had been extended partly, "in order to facilitate and organize proper force generation." While the various arrangements for the EU naval mission had been successful, Operation Atalanta would not suffice to eradicate piracy. Hence, the EU's effort to consider working with partners on land. 15.(SBU) Arnaud said that the EU had received positive reactions from the UN and AU to Solana's proposal (Ref A) that the EU consider six new lines of activity in Somalia: -- Consideration for the appointment of an EU Special Representative for the region; BRUSSELS 00000886 005.2 OF 006 -- Regional maritime capability development; -- Reinforced support to the African Union in Somalia; -- Capacity building for the Somalia Security sector; -- Long term assistance strategy for Somalia; and -- Reinforced international legal framework to increase the risks and decrease the profits for pirates. ¶16. (SBU) USEU Charge emphasized the importance of international coordination. He described Operation Atalanta's success as a function of its close coordination with Combined Task Force 151 and NATO. He highlighted the importance of EU and U.S.-led Coalition co-chairing the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction meetings that bring together countries and organizations working to combat piracy in the region. U.S. ASSISTANCE TO THE TFG ¶17. (SBU) Charge also underlined that we all realize the solution to the piracy problem was a viable Somali state and outlined U.S. efforts toward that goal, focusing on assistance to AMISOM and the TFG in its fight against Al-Shabaab. In addition to assistance to AMISOM and humanitarian aid, the U.S. had governance, social and economic development programs. Charge said the U.S. had provided over $135 million worth of training, equipment and logistical support for AMISOM since its creation. U.S. REQUEST FOR EU COOPERATION IN SOMALIA ¶18. (SBU) Our cooperation at sea has been exemplary, said the Charge, and we should now enhance our cooperation on the land effort. With the EU considering additional security sector reform and capacity building measures, Charge hoped we could ensure that international efforts were coordinated and mutually reinforcing. He urged the EU to join the U.S. on strategic planning efforts and the Security Sector Review assessment in August that are meant to enable the TFG to elaborate a plan for developing its police and military forces. Charge also encouraged the EU to consider supporting TFG operational requirements like salaries and to help support a security sector reform framework for the longer term. PROSECUTING PIRATES IN DOMESTIC COURTS ¶19. (SBU) Since a viable Somali state is not likely to be realized in the near future, said Charge, we have relied upon other venues to try and incarcerate Somali pirates. Kenyan judicial and correctional systems are already nearly saturated and the international community cannot rely indefinitely on unqualified Kenyan agreement to prosecute pirates. Charge noted the work being funded by the EU to help develop prosecutorial and penal capacity in the region, and suggested that EU member states whose ships are attacked by pirates should prosecute pirates in domestic courts if the BRUSSELS 00000886 006.2 OF 006 member states' legal systems so permit. He recognized the diversity of member states' laws on this issue. Arnaud confirmed that different legal systems among EU member states and partners (ref C) present a challenge on prosecution of Somali pirates. NON-EU ALLIES SAILING UNDER THE EU FLAG ¶20. (SBU) Croatian EU Ambassador Branko Baricevic announced that Croatia was finalizing a participation agreement to permit Croatian officers to participate in the EU's Operation Atalanta. Norway's Ambassador Sletnes noted that Norwegian vessels would take part in the EU naval force from August 2009 through February 2010. Ambassador Hornby voiced Ottawa's support for the EU's anti-piracy effort and echoed USEU Charge's point that root causes of piracy need to be addressed. Alluding to the difficult effort to generate sufficient forces for a NATO mission, he stressed the need to coordinate and not compete for resources. Canada was considering participating in a future NATO "Ocean Shield" anti-piracy operation. NO NATO-EU ANTI-PIRACY FLOTILLA ENVISIONED ¶21. (C) Turkey's EU Ambassador Volkan Bozkir inquired about EU thinking as to supporting the EU operation with NATO assets and capabilities. Arnaud responded that, "nobody envisages using NATO planning and capabilities" but said efforts were being made to reinforce staff-to-staff contacts with NATO. She underlined EU satisfaction with present pragmatic cooperation at tactical and force level. Apparently responding to Ambassador Hornby's comments, Arnaud hoped that as NATO develops its own response to piracy, it would not compete with EU efforts. .