EU DEVELOPING COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO FIGHTING PIRACY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 000878 NOFORN SIPDIS PASS TO NAVCENT POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/24/2019 TAG: PREL, EWWT, KCRM, MARR, MOPS, PINS, XF, XW, EN SUBJECT: EU DEVELOPING COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO FIGHTING PIRACY REF: A. USEU BRUSSELS 810 ¶B. USEU BRUSSELS 839 ¶C. USEU BRUSSELS 819 ¶D. USEU BRUSSELS 692 ¶E. STATE 44005 ¶F. USEU BRUSSELS 869 ¶G. USEU BRUSSELS 133 ¶H. USEU BRUSSELS 725 BRUSSELS 00000878 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Christopher Murray for reasons 1 .4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C//NF) Summary: In several recent meetings, in the run-up to the GAERC's decision to extend the Atalanta mission to December 2010, EU Officials outlined to us the thinking behind High Rep Solana's effort to prompt discussion among member states on a bigger EU role in Somalia. The EU is further developing its "comprehensive approach" to combat piracy off Somalia by: reinforcing EU naval action; supporting additional African nations' judicial and penal authorities; providing financial and military planning support to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM); training Somali security forces; and pursuing development activities. The EU Council Secretariat and the European Commission are writing a joint paper for EU Foreign Ministers that will propose EU initiatives to address the root causes of piracy. The EU cannot solve the crisis in Somalia on its own, and our contacts are looking for opportunities to partner with the U.S. One EU Council Secretariat official informally suggested considering a joint program whereby the U.S. would equip, and the EU train, Somali security forces in Djibouti. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) As reported Ref A, EU High Rep Javier Solana wrote EU Member States on May 28 to urge that they consider initiatives to address the root causes of Somali piracy. In his letter, Solana recommends EU actions on six fronts: the appointment of an EU Special Representative to the region; regional maritime capability development; reinforced support to the African Union; capacity building for the Somali security sector; a long-term development assistance strategy; and a reinforced international legal framework to change the cost-benefit calculus for would-be pirates. In early June, the EU's Political and Security Committee (PSC) Ambassadors tasked the EU Council Secretariat and European Commission to prepare a joint options paper for consideration by Member �0A;States before the next foreign ministers, meeting in late July. This paper is to use Solana,s six lines of action as a point of departure. We note that the recent violence in and around Mogadishu seems to have intensified EU discussion on new initiatives but may also make reaching a final decision more difficult. CHANGING PIRATES, COST-BENEFIT CALCULUS ¶3. (SBU) Solana,s May 28 letter begins by urging EU Member States to extend the mandate for the EU,s naval operation, and on June 15, EU Foreign Ministers agreed to extend its mandate until December 2010 (Ref B). The decision was taken early in order to facilitate future force generation. The force currently numbers twelve ships supported by three maritime patrol aircraft. ¶4. (C) On June 12, Didier Lenoir, Head of the EU Council Secretariat's Operations and Exercises Unit, told USEU BRUSSELS 00000878 002.2 OF 004 PolOffs that industry must also be involved in anti-piracy efforts. Echoing U.S. arguments, he said this could mean embarking armed security guards on ships. Because ransom payoffs are often in cash, Lenoir is considering creative approaches to tracking pirate finances. He suggested, for example, that the international community could scan the region for overt signs of wealth, such as villa purchases. ¶5. (C) Lenoir also suggested that increasing the risk and decreasing the rewards for piracy mean complementing the EU's action at sea with legal arrangements for the prosecution of pirates. He said the EU,s agreement with Kenya and pending agreement with the Seychelles would be insufficient in just a few months; however, there is no EU agreement on domestic prosecution of pirates or an international court (Ref C). ¶6. (SBU) USEU PolOffs also heard on June 17 from Michael Doyle and Dilarde Teilane from the Commission's Directorate General (DG) for External Relations. Doyle, who was deeply involved in managing the EU's provision of 1.75 million euros of support to the Kenyan government (Ref D),expressed concern about Kenya bearing the burden for pirate prosecutions, saying that Kenyan Muslims have begun to criticize the government,s involvement in piracy prosecutions. He suggested alleviating the political strain on Kenya by increasing support from other regional governments for Kenya,s role. Solidifying judicial mechanisms for prosecuting pirates may be one focus of the joint Council-Commission options paper. On June 24, Italian PSC Ambassador Andrea Meloni called Charge to ask about alternatives to landing pirates in Kenya for prosecution. He was aware that the Kenyans are now overwhelmed, and the Italians were at a loss on what to do with some Somali pirates held aboard an Italian ship near Mombasa. AID FOCUSED ON SECURITY, EDUCATION, AND AGRICULTURE ¶7. (SBU) As reported in Ref E, the European Commission is making a substantial contribution to development in Somalia, including pledges of up to 60 million euros for AMISOM and 12 million euros to a UNDP-implemented Rule of Law mission that trains Somali police forces. Since 2003, the Commission has provided 278 million euros of development aid to Somalia, focusing projects on three sectors: governance and security; social sectors, including education and healthcare; and agriculture, livestock, and food security. For the period 2008-2013, the Commission has allocated 215 million euros to these projects. In addition, since 2005 the Commission has provided 87 million euros in humanitarian assistance to Somalia. On June 12, Roger Moore, DG Development's Director for the Horn of Africa and East and Southern Africa, in a meeting with Acting USAID Assistant Administrator Earl Gast, also confirmed that the Commission is working on a major Somalia policy statement covering piracy, security, and development issues, which should be available by the end of June (Ref F). ¶8. (SBU) According to Lenoir, the appointment of an EU Special Representative (EUSR),as Solana recommended, would bring greater coherence to the EU,s development, political, and security efforts. Our Commission contacts, however, questioned how the EUSR,s role would be defined and how much impact the person would have. REINFORCING AMISOM BRUSSELS 00000878 003.2 OF 004 ¶9. (SBU) Our contacts are confident the EU can make a difference by supporting AMISOM and regional security forces. The Commission already supports AMISOM on two fronts: by providing direct support to defray the cost of the AU force, and by helping to stand up a capable AMISOM strategic planning unit in Addis Ababa. On June 17, Jens Moeller, Principal Administrator of the Commission-run African Peace Facility (APF),told PolOffs that the APF has not yet begun spending the 60 million euros it pledged at the April donors, conference. ¶10. (SBU) The Commission cannot begin to disburse funds until the African Union indicates what the funds will be used for. The AU, Moeller said, will make a specific request to the Commission once it determines what needs will be met by the UN,s funding mechanism. Moeller indicated, however, that funds from the APF can be used to fund troop allowances, vehicles, communications gear, medical equipment, and other support material, but not rifles, ammunition, or other purely &military8 equipment. ¶11. (C) The Commission,s support to the AMISOM planning unit is funded separately through the EC's Instrument for Stability. Michael Doyle described to us how the Instrument for Stability supports a strategic planning unit for AMISOM in Addis Ababa. The project, launched in 2007 with 4.75 million euros, was weakened by the AU,s inability to recruit enough African personnel to staff the unit. The Commission, which, because of these problems, had not spent all the money initially allocated, extended the term of support for this planning unit and is supplementing that support by recruiting and paying for four military planners from EU Member States to deploy to Addis to help stand up the unit. BUILDING REGIONAL COAST GUARD, LAND FORCE CAPACITY ¶12. (C) Both the Council and Commission are considering how to support regional coast guards in order to reduce the burden on European naval forces. The Council,s Lenoir suggested that the EU could help train regional coast guard forces, mentioning Kenya, Yemen, and Somalia specifically. Improved coast guards would not replace naval fores, he argued, but they could take over some counter-piracy tasks, allowing naval forces to concentrate on high-risk areas. (Note: Lenoir has expressed concerns in the past that some coast guards could use their training to engage in piracy themselves. End Note) Meanwhile, the Commission plans to allocate 14 to 18 million euros from 2009 to 2011 for its CriticalMaritime Routes initiative (Ref G). Commission desk officer Pierre Cleostrate has told USEU that, among other projects, the program could help fund the coast guard training center in Djibouti and the information exchange center in Yemen, both envisioned under the Djibouti Code of Conduct. ¶13. (C) In the latest development in the EU,s comprehensive approach to piracy and Somali security, Member States are discussing providing training support to Somali land forces by launching a new European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) security sector reform mission. As reported in Ref H, the French began this discussion by circulating a non-paper recommending the &Europeanization8 of France,s pledge to train Somali military forces in Djibouti. Commenting on the proposal, Lenoir stressed the need for an BRUSSELS 00000878 004.2 OF 004 overarching security sector reform strategy for Somalia. France,s proposal is a good start, he said, but that initiative alone will not solve the Somali security problem. ¶14. (C) The EU effort to consider how to do more in Somalia appears to be a "top-down" effort, not driven by Secretariat defense planners. Didier Lenoir, who was initially skeptical about the EU taking on the anti-piracy mission, asserted that successful security sector reform could require an &Afghanistan-like8 commitment on the part of the international community, including an increased international footprint in Somalia. AMISOM, he argued, does not have the capacity to provide for security while the Somali security institutions mature. Lenoir questioned whether the EU or the international community has the political will to provide a serious on-the-ground commitment, but said that any options paper circulated to Member States would make clear the magnitude of commitment required for success. SEEKING U.S.-EU COOPERATION AND DIVISION OF LABOR ¶15. (C//NF) Given the size of the problem, Lenoir opined that the EU cannot successfully address the root causes of piracy on its own, even if it increases its commitment to the problem. He informally suggested exploring a joint EU-U.S. effort to train, equip, and transport Somali security forces that would allow the U.S. and EU to unify efforts and capitalize on one another,s strengths. He floated the idea of a cooperative program whereby the EU would provide training to Somali forces in Djibouti while the U.S. would equip and help transport those forces. The Commission's Michael Doyle has also repeatedly stressed the need for international cooperation, including U.S.-EU coordination, to address the shortfalls in the region,s judicial and military planning capacity. Both the Council Secretariat and the Commission expressed interest in consultations with U.S. officials, either in Brussels or via video-conference, to ensure that our efforts are coordinated and mutually reinforcing. MURRAY .