FLEMISH POLITICAL INSIDERS' ON REGIONAL ELECTIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 000813 SIPDIS STATE PASS EUR/WE E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/11/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL BE SUBJECT: FLEMISH POLITICAL INSIDERS' ON REGIONAL ELECTIONS Classified By: POL/ECON Counselor Richard M. Eason for reasons 1.4 (B) & (D) ¶1. (C) Summary: In the aftermath of the June 7 Flemish regional elections, Poloff and Polintern met with members of the four political parties that are likely to participate in the next Flemish regional government. The Flemish Christian-Democrats (CD&V) and current Minister-President Kris Peeters will have the lead in forming either a three- or four-party coalition, likely to include the Flemish nationalist N-VA and either one or both of the Flemish socialist or liberal parties. The CD&V views a four party coalition as more stable, but more challenging in reaching a coalition agreement. The main issues facing the next Flemish government are: state reform and the economic crisis. State reform is extremely important to both the CD&V and N-VA who did surprisingly well on June 7 and see the results as confirmation that Flemish voters demand state reform. This issue, which would result in more autonomy for Flanders, has been the key domestic political challenge in Belgium for some time. The Flemish government will pursue state reform, and a compromise must be found at the national level. If not, the CD&V predicts that the Flemish parties will finally allow the Belgian government to fall. End Summary. Introduction -------------- ¶2. (C) Poloff and Polintern met June 11 with party insiders to elicit their internal view of the June 7 Flemish regional elections. We met with Foreign Affairs Advisor Peter Gijsels of the Flemish Christian Democrats (CD&V),which won 23 percent of the vote; Flemish MP Helga Stevens of the New Flemish Alliance (N-VA),which won 13 percent of the vote compared to six percent in 2004; Flemish Socialist (sp.a) Vice President Dirk Van der Maelen whose party received 15 percent of the vote, a drop of almost five percent from 2004; and the Foreign Affairs Advisor at the Flemish Liberal (OpenVLD) think tank Filip Buntinx, whose party dropped 4.8 percent to 15.1 percent. The radical right Vlaams Belang fell 8.8 percent to 15.4, and will not be considered as a coalition partner by the other parties, due to their long standing cordon sanitaire agreement. The main challenge of forming a coalition falls on the CD&V, who can bring together either a four-party coalition that includes N-VA, sp.a, and OpenVLD, or a three-party coalition with two of the three (N-VA, sp.a, or OpenVLD). The different party constellations could effect the overall Flemish government program, its stability, and the national government. Possible Coalitions -------------- ¶3. (C) As the leading party, CD&V controls the negotiations for forming a governing coalition and wants to create a stable government that will last the five-year term under current Flemish Minister-President Kris Peeters. Gijsels said the CD&V prefers a four party coalition because it would prevent any one party from toppling the government by threatening to leave; they could continue with a smaller majority of the remaining three parties. He said it was almost inevitable the N-VA would be part of the next government, and added that its strong performance was a signal sent by the Flemish voters that its commitment to state reform had substantial appeal. The question for the CD&V is whether the N-VA would be a reliable partner, considering N-VA's willingness to break the CD&V - N-VA electoral alliance in July 2008 in the national parliament over failed state reform. The four-party solution might neutralize this concern. He admitted a four-party government would require skillful and delicate compromise in the governing agreement. Gijsels said his party was concerned about holding both the federal prime ministership and the regional minister-presidency; the two governmentshave different priorities, and its hard to saywhich is more important to the Flemish electorate. ¶4. (C) N-VA's Stevens said her party wanted to be part of government depending on the platform that could be worked out. She said her party was willing to work with the others, but was particularly hopeful OpenVLD would be part of the next government as the two parties share many economic platform views. Van der Maelen said a four-party coalition would be best because the larger grouping would dilute N-VA's influence, but noted sp.a's own influence would be diluted as the only leftist party in the coalition. He then said his party is split between those who want to go into opposition at the local level and rebuild after their seeming punishment BRUSSELS 00000813 002 OF 003 by voters at the polls and those who wish to govern. Van der Maelen also noted the wavering of the Liberals on whether or not to join. Buntinx said the OpenVLD would prefer a three-party coalition with N-VA, and without the Socialists. A coalition without sp.a would be more pragmatic, and mirror the national coalition that does not include sp.a. Two Real Issues: the Economy and State Reform -------------- ¶5. (C) Both Gijsels and Stevens focused on the two primary issues that confront the next Flemish government: state reform and the economic crisis facing Flanders (and Belgium). On the economic side, Gijsels called the budget a nationwide problem. His party is concerned with socio-economic issues, and noted a tension between the relatively wealthy Flanders and the insolvent national government. Regardless of the coalition, this would be a major issue. Stevens also listed tackling the economic problems as a primary issue for the N-VA. N-VA wants to push for a more efficient Flemish government, a reduction in personnel, and an elimination of provincial governments. Her party remains concerned with protecting the Flemish child and hospital allowance. N-VA supported Kris Peeters' refusal to return EUR 100 million to the federal government under the previous Flemish government, and is quite willing to do so again. Gijsels considered that the budget offered a great opportunity for compromise at the federal level on the second major issue facing the next Flemish government: state reform. ¶6. (C) Gijsels said that his party and Flemish M-P Kris Peeters were committed to advancing a program of state institutional reform that provides Flanders with greater autonomy. Poloff noted that both former CD&V PM Yves Leterme and Kris Peeters failed to find a compromise that would satisfy the Francophone parties. Gijsels said the better-than-expected performance of both CD&V and N-VA was a sign that Flemish voters want state reform; the parties received credit for working hard, even if they did not accomplish their goals. He said all Flemish parties signed on to the 1999 resolutions on state reform, and the next Flemish government would push them forward. Stevens underscored N-VA's great expectations on state reform; as a Flemish nationalist party, N-VA views a stronger Flanders as a step towards an independent Flanders. Van der Maelen said the sp.a signed on to the resolutions, but hoped the issues would fade away; he credited N-VA leader Bart De Wever for keeping the issue alive. Sp.a is quite concerned with social programming for all Belgians, and is close to its far stronger counterpart in Wallonia; sp.a supports transfers to the poorer Walloon region that are often provided as reasons to divide Belgium by Flemish nationalists. Buntinx said the OpenVLD did indeed support the resolutions, but noted they were quite vague, and N-VA has used the principles to recommend more concrete proposals. The Flemish Government's Need for a Compromise -------------- - ¶7. (C) Gijsels argued that a compromise had to found on state reform to prevent a collapse of the national government and to deal with Belgium's economic problems. He said the Francophone parties must be made to understand that real progress on state reform must happen, but admitted they had no inherent political interest in increasing Flemish autonomy. Gijsels offered a very sobering prediction that the federal government could fall in the short term if good faith discussions on state reform did not move forward soon. The serious complication is the division of the Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde voting district that allows Francophones living in the Flemish suburbs of Brussels to vote for Francophone parties in Brussels, rather than parties in the Flemish province of Vlaams Brabant where they reside. All Flemish parties voted in Federal Parliament in 2007 to separate the Vlaams Brabant suburbs from Brussels. Gijsels said it had been the first time there had been a straight Flemish - Francophone vote. The measure passed, but was blocked from going into effect by the Francophone community's use of the "conflict of interest" procedure. The review of the law should be complete by October, and will return to the Federal Parliament. Gijsels said another Flemish - Francophone vote would send the measure to the government, where Flemings and Francophones hold an equal number of votes in the Council of Ministers. Gijsels predicted the Flemish parties would sooner withdraw from government than lose on the B-H-V issue. Gijsels said the CD&V would look for a compromise to prevent this collapse. BRUSSELS 00000813 003 OF 003 Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) The Flemish government under the CD&V's Kris Peeters and his likely coalition partner Bart De Wever of N-VA has been given a strong hand to advance state reform. The economic crisis is also a serious problem for the two parties, their possible coalition partners, and for the Belgian federal government. Now more than ever, it is clear the Flemish majority expects greater autonomy for Flanders. Belgium's politicians have skillfully found compromises in the past, often with the Flemish taking the lead in making concessions. In this case, the Francophones will have to find a way to make concessions soon to keep Belgium together. They cannot continue to say Flemish extremism is to blame. Without a compromise giving Flanders greater autonomy, Belgium's government will fall and the next one will be even harder to form. BUSH .