Working with the EU to Spur Transatlantic

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 09 BRUSSELS 000078 SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE PASS TO USTR AND OIRA/OMB HHS FOR FDA COMMISSIONER E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ECON EFIN EIND EAGR ETTC PREL EUN SUBJECT: Working with the EU to Spur Transatlantic Economic Integration and Global Growth Entire Text Sensitive but Unclassified and Limited to U.S. Government Official Use Only Q Not for internet distribution. Introduction and Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) The United States and the European Union have the largest economic relationship in the world and remain the leaders in setting the global economic and regulatory agenda, and successfully managing this relationship will be critical as we address the economic downturn this year. U.S. and European (EU) firms have each invested over $1.5 trillion in the other's territory, their subsidiaries generate over $3 trillion in annual sales and employ some 12 million people, while trade in good and services stands at $1 trillion and short-term capital flows reach tens of billion dollars a day. Everything we do to facilitate further economic integration thus contributes directly to U.S., European and global growth. Further, the 27-member state European Union, with its 500 million consumers and $15 trillion economy, has growing influence over global economic negotiations, regulation and rule making; we need to ensure its policy directions are close to ours as new rules and approaches are fashioned in the wake of the global financial and economic crisis. ¶2. (SBU) The 2007 "Framework for Promoting Transatlantic Economic Integration" and the cabinet-level Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC) it created can be strengthened to help manage this relationship. The Framework, and the TEC, are the latest in a series of bilateral arrangements we have established since the early 1990s, but have a unique, top-down political character that has allowed us to achieve a number of successes since Chancellor Merkel, EU Commission President Barroso and President Bush signed the Framework nearly two years ago. The process has also highlighted some structural weaknesses, however Q including but not exclusively on the EU side that we should address. In particular we should use the EUQs eagerness to work with the new Administration to: -- focus the semi-annual meetings of the Council itself on higher-level, cross-cutting issues while increasing principalsQ attendance; -- ensure greater EU member state involvement; -- better engage the U.S. and EU legislative branches in transatlantic economic policy deliberations; -- expand yet rationalize Framework priorities, including by getting EU agreement to add energy/climate technologies and by strengthening the innovation agenda; and -- enhance and better coordinate management of Framework activities in both Brussels and Washington, including better utilizing our Embassies in EU member states. In addition, we will need to significantly improve the transparency and public awareness of the TEC process, both to guarantee continued business and consumer organization support and to promote our public image in Europe. The TEC has proven a useful instrument that we can improve to achieve measurable progress in integrating the transatlantic economy; if it didnQt exist we would need to create it or something like it. End Introduction and Summary. Background Q A Merkel Initiative -------------- ¶3. (SBU) The Transatlantic Economic Framework had its genesis with German Chancellor Merkel in 2007. Concerned the market-oriented democracies were losing relative economic power and influence to key emerging economies (especially China),she visited Washington four days into the German presidency of the EU and proposed to President Bush that we conclude an agreement to strengthen transatlantic economic relations. ¶4. (SBU) The Framework for Promoting Transatlantic Economic Integration was the result. Signed at the April 30 2007 U.S.-EU Summit by Chancellor Merkel, EU Commission President Barroso and President Bush, the BRUSSELS 00000078 002 OF 009 Framework was negotiated at MerkelQs insistence by her top economic advisor, Jens Weidmann, then NSC Senior Director for International Economic Policy David McCormick and Barroso economic policy advisor Antonio Cabral. In brief, the Framework: -- focused on ensuring better and more compatible U.S. and EU regulations, as unnecessary regulatory divergences rather than traditional trade barriers have become the main impediments to transatlantic trade and investment; -- emphasized both improving the way we approach regulating through cooperation on risk and cost-benefit analysis and impact assessments as well as addressing regulatory impediments in the food, drug, chemical, automotive, and electrical/electronic sectors; -- specified other priority objectives in the areas of promoting capital markets integration, investment, innovation, intellectual property rights protection and supply-chain security; -- established the Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC) of Cabinet Secretaries, Commissioners and Ministers to hold multi-disciplinary discussions of strategic economic policy issues and to oversee work on Framework priorities; and -- identified TEC co-chairs to manage the process and to provide a "top-down" political push to break through any bureaucratic problems that might arise. The EU named as its TEC co-chair Commission Vice President Guenther Verheugen (who leads on enterprise and industry policy and chairs the Commission Competitiveness Group); the first U.S. co-chair was National Economic Council director Al Hubbard, followed by Assistant to the President for International Economic Policy Dan Price. A Success in Many Respects but ... -------------- ¶5. (U) U.S. and EU agencies have made considerable progress on virtually all of the 40 or so priority areas listed in the seven Framework areas of cooperation (cooperation had begun in many areas prior to signing of the Framework),including: ¶A. Horizontal Regulatory Cooperation: OMB's Office of Information and Regulatory Analysis (OIRA) and the Commission's DG Enterprise and Secretariat General have issued new guidelines to ensure better consideration of external economic impacts of domestic regulation; OMB/OIRA, OSTP and DG SANCO (Health and Consumer Protection) have held workshops/conferences to enhance our approaches to risk analysis; OMB/OIRA and the Secretariat General completed a joint study on our respective approaches to ensuring the safety of imported products in the areas of pharmaceuticals, food, motor vehicles, cosmetics, toys and electrical/electronic products for consumer use; CPSC and DG SANCO now cooperate extensively in import product safety, and have worked jointly with China on this (they also have a new joint working group on toys); the U.S.-EU High level Regulatory Cooperation Forum (established in 2005 but now reporting regularly to the TEC) is discussing ways to better incorporate international standards into domestic regulation. ¶B. Sectoral Regulatory Cooperation: Drugs and Medical Devices: FDA and its EU counterparts have: concluded a confidentiality agreement on medical devices regulation; agreed significant steps to simplify procedures for U.S. and EU firms to seek approval for new drugs; streamlined approval applications for "orphan" drugs; and agreed to long-term staff exchanges between FDA and the European Medicines Agency (EMEA). FDA and its EU counterparts are finalizing the Terms of Reference for cooperating (with Australia as well) on inspections of third country providers of active pharmaceutical ingredients (and have done one joint inspection in China); FDA and EMEA have "clusters" of technical working groups on advanced therapies (new),pediatric drugs, vaccines, oncology drugs, drug safety, orphan drugs, BRUSSELS 00000078 003 OF 009 veterinary medicines and pharmacogenomics; and the Commission has just published a communication that will facilitate the use of the Internet to provide information on drugs to patients despite the general ban on internet advertizing of drugs. Autos: The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and DG ENT concluded a Memorandum of Cooperation in automotive safety and emissions standards in June, and have cooperated on establishing international standards for such products as electronic stabilizers; Electrical/Electronic Equipment: Labor's Occupational Safety and Health Administration has issued a "Request for Information" to consider the EU request to expand the scope of suppliers' declarations of conformity to U.S. workplace standards on electrical safety for a range of low-voltage/lower-risk products; Chemicals: WeQve had extensive discussion highlighting numerous concerns over the implementation and potentially trade-distorting effects of the EUQs massive QRegistration, Evaluation and Authorization of Chemicals (REACH) legislation; and have a Commission commitment to ensure that REACH does not disrupt our $2 billion in exports of cosmetics and personal care products to the EU (the Commission acknowledges that REACH is flawed in its treatment of imported cosmetic ingredients but is unwilling to re-open the legislation; its "pragmatic" approach to resolving this remains problematic); EPA has offered to cooperate with the EU Chemical Agency as EPA and its Canadian and Mexican partners review over 6,000 high-volume chemicals in NAFTA trade. Food Safety: Despite the high-profile failure to get EU acceptance of poultry cleaned with antimicrobial treatments, discussed below, we have collaborated on our approaches to the safety of products from cloned animals and FDA is working toward long-term staff exchanges with the European Food Safety Agency. Metrics: the EU has extended its acceptance of dual labeling (metric/standard) for units of measurement. ¶C. Capital Markets: These issues are worked primarily through the Financial Markets Regulatory Dialogue (FMRD),but agreement on accounting standards is considered a major TEC success. With SEC recognition of the use of International Financial Reporting Standards for foreign filers in the U.S., and EU acceptance in December of the equivalence of US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles for U.S. filers in the EU, the U.S. and EU have virtually eliminated the need for our firms to reconcile financial statements to our respective standards in our capital markets. This section also covers work on mutual recognition of compatible regimes for securities exchanges and brokers/dealers and several key insurance issues. ¶D. Investment: The May TEC recommended, and the June Summit issued, a joint statement on Open Investment principles; the year- old U.S.-EU Investment Dialogue has ensured transatlantic cooperation on IMF and OECD work on sovereign wealth funds and discussed bilateral regulations on investment and is now promoting collaboration on addressing third country barriers, notably in China, India and Russia. ¶E. Innovation: The Department of Commerce and DG ENT held expert exchanges on policies to promote innovation and innovation measurement (including in "green" technologies); we extended our Science and Technology agreement and expanded it to cover space policy and security technologies; joint workshops have helped guard against EU overregulation of nanotechnologies and radio frequency identification devices; weQre working toward compatible standards for e-Accessibility and electronic patient health records. BRUSSELS 00000078 004 OF 009 ¶F. IPR: Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and DG TAXUD (Taxation and Customs) have conducted a number of joint exercises against counterfeit products, including semiconductors; the U.S.-EU IPR Enforcement Working Group, established in 2005, has conducted joint customs training and public information workshops in China, Russia and other high-counterfeit markets. ¶G. Secure Trade: CBP and DG TAXUD agreed to and are implementing a roadmap to allow mutual recognition of our respective secure trader programs; CBP has hosted a number of EU officials in its National Targeting Center; the EU has used the TEC to raise its significant concerns with new U.S. legislation requiring by 2012 100 percent scanning of all containers prior to shipment to the U.S. ¶6. (SBU) In addition, the meetings of the Transatlantic Economic Council in November 2007 and May and December 2008 have provided an excellent forum for multi- disciplinary principalsQ-level discussion of key high- level strategic economic issues, those that have broad international implications and cut across economic sectors. These include how we can work together to manage the growing economic role of China, how to enhance reform in Russia, increasing our mutual energy security, and the impact of the financial crisis on the global economy. The discussion on China in particular led to important subsequent collaboration, including in Secretary PaulsonQs consultation with his counterparts prior to the subsequent U.S.-China Special Economic Dialogue, in a follow-up TEC principals DVC on China, in detailed USTR-led symposia sharing experiences and approaches to negotiating with the Chinese, and in collaborating in bringing disputes with China before the WTO. Our collaboration with respect to China on product safety, IPR and investment also benefited from this TEC discussion. Problems Remain Q the Role of the TEC Co-chairs -------------- -- ¶7. (U) Most of the progress in these priority areas under the Framework stems from extensive -- and organically growing -- cooperation between individual U.S. government agencies and their EU counterparts in a multitude of different working groups and arrangements. That said, the Framework serves to highlight and publicize the cooperation and, at times, provides a useful impetus when agencies are asked to report to the co-chairs on the status of their collaboration. Agency heads may quickly brief the Council on progress in various areas; this is also reflected more extensively in the QProgress ReportsQ issued at the TEC meetings. ¶8. (SBU) In a number of instances, however, the TEC co- chairs and the Council meetings themselves Q the "TEC process" Q have been instrumental in getting results, most notably on accounting, on finally getting a Commission proposal on poultry (however flawed),in re- opening consideration of the use of suppliers declarations of conformity, in obtaining an official Commission announcement to help deal with the problem REACH creates for imported cosmetics, in spurring cooperation on impact assessments and risk analysis, in initiating cooperation on import product safety, on establishing the Investment Dialogue and agreeing the Open Investment Statement, on concluding the roadmap on secure trade systems, on highlighting the problem of 100 percent scanning, and, most recently, in raising our political concerns with recent Commission initiatives on capital markets regulation (on credit rating agencies, commodity derivatives, and capital requirements). ¶9. (SBU) The lack of a final acceptable outcome in some of these areas and the high public profile surrounding some of the issues (notably poultry) has led some to question the ultimate effectiveness of the TEC process, especially in dealing with "politically sensitive" issues. But as Dan Price remarked to CEOs attending a Transatlantic Business Dialogue meeting on the margins of BRUSSELS 00000078 005 OF 009 the June 2008 U.S.-EU Summit, by definition only the difficult issues will come to the co-chairs and the Council. And these may, in the end, be too difficult to resolve. Improving the Chance of Success -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Our inability to fully resolve some issues stems from both systemic and structural differences in our systems; the former we will have to live with while certain steps may be able to address the structural problems. As much as the Europeans may want it, our Executive Branch cannot "control" Congress or our independent regulatory agencies; nor can the Commission control the Council (comprised of the individual member states) or the European Parliament (EP),or change the "collegial" nature of the Commission itself. But we should be able to enhance the meetings of the Transatlantic Economic Council, bring more Commissioners into the process, expand the involvement of the member states, promote greater collaboration between Congress and the EP, rationalize the priorities under the Frameork, and improve the way both Washington and Brussels manage the work on those priorities. Many of these changes can probably be addressed by amending the June 2007 TEC co-chairs' agreement on working methods. ¶11. (SBU) Commission Participation: Despite Commission President BarrosoQs personal investment in the Framework, relatively poor attendance by Commissioners at Council meetings (never more than five) has weakened the utility of those meetings. Indeed, only a few Commissioners other than Verheugen seem to actively support the TEC process: Mandelson and now Ashton (trade),Kuneva (consumer protection),Piebalgs (energy),McCreevy (internal market/financial services),Ferrero-Waldner (external relations, although she doesnQt attend Council meetings). Others Q including in particular Environment Commissioner Dimas and Health Commissioner Vassiliou seem to actively oppose the TEC, and have openly refused to attend Council meetings despite the inclusion of "their" issues on the agenda. ¶12. (SBU) Part of this opposition is bureaucratic: many Commissioners (even those, like McCreevy and Piebalgs, who support the process) dislike the idea of being "called to account" before the TEC on "their" issues (a feeling that may not be unknown in Washington),and the collegial nature of the Commission makes it virtually impossible for Commissioner Verheugen to command cooperation or attendance. Some of the opposition is substantive: Dimas and Vassiliou disagreed vehemently with Verheugen on poultry, and Dimas and Verheugen differ significantly on REACH. Some is political: Dimas in particular opposed bringing energy/climate change technologies further into the TEC with the outgoing administration, arguing it would affect the Poznan UNFCCC negotiations. Another part, however, is simple oversight: it apparently never occurred to Verheugen to invite the Commissioners in charge of agriculture, competition, science and technology and information technology, even though all have direct equities in the Framework and can contribute to the broader Council discussions of regulation, innovation and competitiveness. ¶13. (SBU) Commission participation needs to improve if Council meetings are to be effective. Although the EU installs a new Commission in November, the Administration should get President Barroso to commit to better attendance at any future meetings. We believe this can be done. DimasQs staff indicate he would be willing to attend a Spring meeting, as has VassiliouQs chief of staff if the issue of food safety can be addressed more broadly; the offices of Commissioners Kroes (competition),Potocnik (S&T),Almunia (economic and monetary affairs) and Reding (information technology) have all stated their willingness to consider attending as well. ¶14. (SBU) The Member States: Although the Framework was BRUSSELS 00000078 006 OF 009 a German (and thus member state) initiative, the Commission quickly took control, and indeed Commissioner Verheugen and his staff have resisted anything more than token member state participation in the Council meetings, preferring instead to occasionally brief ministers at meetings of the Competitiveness Council. As the poultry and REACH/cosmetic issues demonstrate, however, this is a recipe for failure: if member state ministers in the many areas the Framework covers feel blindsided by Commission commitments at the TEC, they will oppose Commission proposals for that reason alone. After the poultry debacle, when the French Agriculture Minister got all his counterparts to oppose the CommissionQs attempt to permit the use of anti-microbials, the French and other member states reportedly forced the Commission to brief more regularly on the TEC. (In part because of the dearth of Commission briefings, USEU staff are frequently asked to brief member state permanent representation officials on the TEC.) The semi-ironic aspect of this is that member state officials frequently participate in various workshops and other activities that fall under the Framework. ¶15. (SBU) We should recommend changes to further engage member states in the TEC process, with several options possible. As an example, Ministers of Economy of at least the current and next two presidencies should be "statutory" members and full participants at TEC meetings. Second, without changing VerheugenQs role as EU TEC co-chair, the economic advisors to the heads of state of the current and next EU presidencies or similarly high-ranking "Sherpa" sorts of officials could be occasionally included in TEC co-chair discussions, especially when those calls are oriented toward preparing the Council meetings and the broader strategic issues those meetings will discuss. Third, we should insist that the Commission invite member state experts to more of the activities under the Framework, especially in areas where the member states retain considerable competence Q IPR enforcement, investment and innovation principal among them. ¶16. (SBU) Council Meetings: The TEC meetings were envisioned as opportunities for U.S. and EU principals to oversee activities under the Framework and to have high- level, multidisciplinary discussions about economic policy issues that are strategically important, have broad international impacts and implications, and cut across numerous economic sectors. The three meetings thus far have done both, although in part because of the disagreement on poultry some in Brussels question whether a principals-level venue is appropriate for trying to resolve specific disputes. In addition, some here express impatience with an over-emphasis on "reporting back" to the Council on activities covered in the Progress Reports. ¶17. (SBU) Maintaining an appropriate balance in TEC meetings between broader discussions of the more strategic/cross-cutting issues and addressing the discrete, technical issues that have proven difficult to resolve elsewhere will always be difficult. Both types of discussions are important to maintaining TEC momentum, ensuring buy-in and continued interest on the part of TEC participants and producing the concrete results sought by stakeholders. The requirement to report back to the TEC does provide an incentive to agencies to make progress in their collaboration and can provide political profile to activities that sometimes deserve more attention; at the same time, subjecting specific problems to critical scrutiny by colleagues from different agencies can help break through impasses. But in general the preference should be for the co-chairs to resolve as many of the specific problems as possible; where an issue cannot be resolved the co-chairs should determine whether there is a broader underlying issue the Council should discuss. Poultry is one example: rather than focusing on the use of anti-microbials in poultry, the TEC might have discussed the broader issue of how to resolve the many food safety regulatory differences that disrupt agricultural and food trade between us. This was, in effect, the approach adopted in the December 2008 TEC BRUSSELS 00000078 007 OF 009 discussion of the CommissionQs recent financial services proposals. Another example could be to focus on practical ways to address legitimate national security while maintaining an open investment climate (the EU and many member states lack a CFIUS-like instrument). (The December 2008 TEC meeting adopted criteria to limit, to some extent, the issues brought before the Council.) ¶18. (SBU) Further, Transatlantic Economic Council deliberations of broader strategic issues Q those with significant longer-term, international ramifications and impacts -- should be expanded. The November 2007 discussion of China shows the potential in this Q issues like addressing the rise of key emerging countries, considering solutions to the financial crisis, managing energy challenges, continuing global momentum toward multilateral trade liberalization, and promoting cooperation on innovation can all benefit from multidisciplinary discussion via the exchange of ideas between TEC members from different agencies with widely differing viewpoints and interests. These groupings with the EU are rare and provide unique opportunities to generate new ideas. To avoid the TEC becoming a "talk shop," however, the co-chairs will need to ensure the discussions are results oriented by drawing out possible follow-up actions and ensuring follow-through. ¶19. (SBU) Legislators: Congress and the European Parliament can significantly affect transatlantic economic integration, although their roles differ somewhat. While the EP now has "co-decision" powers over virtually all economic and environmental policies, including many measures we would consider administrative/regulatory, unlike Congress it cannot initiate legislation. (That power is reserved to the Commission, although the EP is increasingly using reports, resolutions and other ways to pressure the Commission into acting.) Involvement of the legislators in the TEC process, however, is currently limited to representatives of the "Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue" (TALD, co-chaired by MEP Jonathan Evans and Representative Shelley Berkeley of Nevada) being included in the group of advisors to the Council, which also includes the co-chairs of the Transatlantic Business Dialogue and the Transatlantic Consumers Dialogue. ¶20. (SBU) This is generally recognized as inadequte, and Berkeley and Evans told the TEC co-chirs in December that they would try to significantly expand legislator engagement, specifically by facilitating discussions among legislators engaged in policy issues being addressed under the Framework and by expanding the involvement of Senators, who are not part of the TALD. The EP, which consistently wants to expand ties with Congress, is probably better organized to do the first of these, as the President of the EP regularly convenes Committee chairs to discuss transatlantic issues (largely economic policy, where the EPQs influence is greater) and each EP Committee has at least one staffer who follows activities in its U.S. counterpart. The Administration, and especially the NSC, should actively work with Representative Berkeley to support her efforts, including in particular by offering briefings on Framework activities to relevant committees, by seeing if we can facilitate issue-based discussions between legislators following, for instance, innovation policy, and by ensuring that the TEC co-chairs also meet with relevant legislators separately from the other Dialogues. (TABD and TACD recognize the difference in the role of the legislative branch and will not mind.) ¶21. (SBU) Improving the Framework: The range of activities under the Framework is robust, but it can be improved and better targeted. First, stakeholders have asked that more prominence be given to cooperation on energy and climate change technologies, some (biofuels specification, energy innovation) of which are scattered about under various Framework headings. The U.S. proposed, and the December 2008 TEC appears to have agreed in principle, to try to develop a new annex in this area for possible approval by the next Summit. In addition, one area of the Framework where progress seems BRUSSELS 00000078 008 OF 009 most disjointed is the Innovation annex; this can probably be made more coherent by focusing it on four basic areas of cooperation, innovation policy, advanced technologies cooperation (including nanotechnologies and other joint research under the S&T agreement),the application of information and communication technologies (which would include current efforts on RFID, e-health and e-Accessibility) and the health and energy sectors (although the latter would be part of the energy/climate change annex if adopted). ¶22. (SBU) Managing Framework Activities: This problem is far greater on the EU side than on ours. Currently, Commissioner Verheugen relies on an assistant-secretary level person in his Enterprise Directorate to coordinate EU activities, and if Verheugen has little sway over his counterparts in the College of Commissioners, DG ENT has none over the other Directorates. We need to encourage the EU to reconsider this arrangement. The Commission PresidentQs office would be far better placed to spur activities by all DGs, but his staff is spread far too thin. The Commission Secretary General, however, reports directly to the President, and she and her staff have considerable leverage over the DGs (not least in controlling the agenda of proposals that are put to the Commission). While the Secretariat General too is overworked, the Deputy SecGen who coordinates the CommissionQs work on the broad G-8 agenda would appear well-placed to coordinate TEC activities as well. ¶23. (SBU) On the U.S. side, the fact that the Framework is a Presidential initiative makes the NSC/NEC the appropriate locus for coordinating U.S. activities under it. NSC/NEC staff, however, must necessarily focus on the issues before the TEC co-chair and the preparation for the Council meetings, and cannot regularly monitor the many other activities under the Framework until problems arise. ¶24. (SBU) Identifying a suitable office within the interagency Q at State or elsewhere Q to staff NSC and serve as a Secretariat for the TEC and repository for TEC materials would ease the workload on NSC staff, ensure more consistent oversight of ongoing activities under the Framework, and provide additional impetus to implement TEC commitments. The Secretariat also could serve as a place for those outside the government to get answers or information on TEC activities, and be responsible for maintaining a comprehensive TEC website, with links to all relevant current and historical TEC documents. ¶25. (SBU) In addition, we should expand the involvement of our Embassies in member state capitals in the TEC, especially when it appears that the member states are the source of difficulty in resolving a problem on the TEC co-chairsQ agenda. A secretariat-type office, working with NSC/NEC staff, could mobilize our resources at EU member state posts more effectively, sending demarche requests to spur Embassy engagement with key member state governments that become "problematic" on TEC issues, and could ensure that our member state posts are kept informed of TEC developments. ¶26. (SBU) Transparency, Outreach and the Work Program: The Framework calls for the Council to adopt a work program for activities under it; the December Council committed to stakeholders to complete this expeditiously. All interested businesses and consumer organizations view this, and better transparency in general, as high priorities, and welcomed the TEC co-chairs commitment to developing a "TEC" website. The co-chairs and their staffs need to assign this task to appropriate U.S. and EU offices and should ensure that the work program and website include links to all major relevant documents (for instance, the U.S.-EU Action Strategy for the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights). ¶27. (SBU) We should consider additional steps to address business and consumer group transparency concerns by increasing the number of briefings before the TEC meets and making it a regular practice to offer briefings before/after official U.S.-EU meetings on issues that BRUSSELS 00000078 009 OF 009 fall under the TEC umbrella. As part of such efforts to improve transparency, we should make a special effort to facilitate greater involvement by consumer groups, which lack the resources business groups have employed in providing TEC input. TACD has complained consistently that its input into the TEC process goes unheeded. Regular meetings with consumer groups on the TEC, well before meetings occur, would help alleviate this problem. Not a Guarantee, but the Right Direction -------------- ¶28. (SBU) The strategic rationale for promoting transatlantic economic integration has not changed; if anything, the financial crisis has only increased the need to guard against and eliminate unnecessary regulatory divergences between the U.S. and our European allies. The TEC process can be a useful instrument in this, especially if we and the Europeans take the steps outlined above. Now is the time to do so Q the Europeans are eager to work with the new Administration, the EP elections in June and the upcoming Commission transition in November mean the Commission and Czech presidency will be free of new major legislative initiatives after early April, and setting things right before a new Commission comes into office will be important to avoid re-re- inventing the wheel. Even an improved TEC process will not be a panacea, however; the U.S. and EU will continue to have disputes which may need to go to the WTO and elsewhere for resolution. But the TEC mechanisms and the strategic discussions in the Council should serve to promote constructive engagement and to minimize problems in the future. Murray