A/S CARTER'S APRIL 23 MEETING WITH BELGIAN MFA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 000750 SIPDIS STATE PASS AF/FO, AF/C, AND EUR/WE E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/22/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM CG BE SUBJECT: A/S CARTER'S APRIL 23 MEETING WITH BELGIAN MFA AFRICA TEAM Classified By: Charge Wayne Bush for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) ¶1. (C) Summary: The Charge hosted a breakfast April 23 for visiting Acting A/S for African Affairs Phillip Carter and NSC Senior Director for Africa Michelle Gavin with the Belgian MFA Africa Team. The Belgian guests were Deputy Chief of Cabinet to FM De Gucht Jean-Luc Bodson, Africa Director Guy Trouveroy, Great Lakes Envoy Karl Dhaene and Congo Desk Officer Koen Adam. Carter and Gavin said the Obama Administration's Africa policy would include more openness and cooperation with partners, and President Obama has a deep interest in Africa. The Belgians were primarily interested in challenges facing the DRC. They were pessimistic that recent Rwanda - DRC cooperation would lead to a real rapprochement between the two countries. The GOB is opposed to foreign troops operating on DRC soil outside of a UN mandate. Belgium approved of neither the Rwandan effort against the CNDP nor the Ugandan operation against the LRA. Carter raised the role of former DRC Parliament Speaker Kamerhe; the Belgians said he may be the only plausible opposition leader, but his democratic credentials are uncertain. Carter said the U.S. wanted to renew focus on security sector transformation (SST),rather than mere security sector reform (SSR),and would push for a strong systematic approach with all partners that included the army, the police, and the justice sector. Carter signaled strong concern about the EU reaction to coups in Guinea Mauritania, and Madagascar. The U.S. supported the African Union's (AU) call to condemn the coups, and is dismayed by EU willingness to interact normally with the new regimes. Carter argued that the U.S. and EU should oppose changes of government by military force. Carter also asked about the EU's large grant to the regime in Eritrea. Trouveroy said that the countries in Europe who are truly interested in Africa are limited in number and often disagree with each other, confusing EU policy. He said a new scramble for influence might be coming, with France and the U.K. trying to set policy for the EU without consulting other members of the Africa Group. End Summary. New U.S. Africa Team and Policy -------------- ¶2. (U) Acting A/S Carter suggested the Belgians watch for A/S for African Affairs-designate Johnnie Carson's confirmation hearing on April 29. He said it would offer an excellent opportunity to understand the trajectory of the Obama administration's Africa policy. He predicted a strong commitment to working with partners in Africa, both African and non-African. He stressed the Administration's desire to work together with allies in Europe in particular. He also mentioned the creation of a new Envoy for Sudan, retired Air Force General Scott Gration. NSC Senior Director for Africa Michelle Gavin emphasized President Obama's interest in Africa, and explained that Congo had been a particular focus of his efforts as a Senator. She said the President cares deeply about tackling corruption and the role of civil society in Africa. Belgium's DRC Political Analysis -------------- ¶3. (C) Africa Director Guy Trouveroy said Belgium appreciated the new openness and recent U.S. - Belgium discussions. He observed that the recent DRC - Rwanda dialogue may obviate the need for Belgium to mediate between the two countries if dialogue continues. Belgium would like to see real rapprochement and the reopening of embassies and normal relations between Kinshasa and Kigali. However, Trouveroy made it clear that Belgium was preoccupied with the DRC's overall weakness and vulnerability. In the eastern DRC, he noted the FDLR was regrouping and continued to threaten regional stability while the Congolese army lacked food and logistical support. 4.(C) Great Lakes Envoy Karl Dhaene said FM Thambwe told the GOB that DRC - Rwandan relations would improve if joint military actions were successful. He then observed that no steps towards reopening embassies have been made since the joint FRDC - Rwanda offensive against the FDLR. A large part of the CNDP had been integrated into the army, but remained unpaid, and another faction had rejected reconciliation. BRUSSELS 00000750 002 OF 004 South Kivu was of particular concern. ¶5. (C) Acting A/S Carter asked for Belgium's analysis of the dismissed Parliament Speaker Kamerhe and his role in democratic governance. Deputy Cabinet Director Bodson commented that the parliament was the only working institution in the Congo and the only place where an active political debate took place. He feared that Kamerhe's replacement, Kabila loyalist Boshab, might diminish an important check on the government's power. Bodson then suggested Kamerhe's popularity could allow him to become leader of the opposition. Carter agreed Kamerhe could consolidate the opposition, but questioned Kamerhe's credentials as a democrat. Bodson described Kamerhe as a thug. He admitted the proclivity of "democratic" African opposition leaders to revert to thuggish behavior after obtaining power. The GOB had considered making a statement about Kamerhe's dismissal, but did not want him to appear weak as a result. Trouveroy was doubtful Kamerhe had a future role unless something happened to Kabila. Trouveroy listed Kamerhe's weakness as lack of funds to mount a campaign, his departure from the main party, and his background in the eastern DRC. Adam interjected that Kamerhe was charismatic and spoke all the major languages well and could obtain support in Kinshasa and the western DRC. He offered praise for Kamerhe's insistence on ensuring the opposition was heard when he presided over parliament. He viewed Kamerhe as the most formidable potential opponent against Kabila in 2011. LRA --- ¶6. (C) Trouveroy said Belgian army intelligence thought the Ugandan - DRC operation against the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) was a failure. The small LRA bands were regrouping and Kony had a core group of about 200 loyal fighters who were preparing for a recruitment drive. Belgium's intelligence predicted the LRA would move north into Ituri and Sudan from its present location on the DRC - CAR border to recruit among the Acholi there. Carter said the estimated 200 remaining LRA fighters were hard core LRA members, and likely the deadliest cluster in recent history. U.S. information suggested that some LRA lieutenants had split and retreated into the bush. Adam offered that internal dissension could disrupt the LRA; he suggested Ojemba could become a rival to Kony if fighters could be lured by offering a package to leave the LRA. Eastern Congo and SST -------------- ¶7. (C) Trouveroy agreed that something had to be done to stop Kony, but said troops from neighboring countries on Congolese soil reminded Belgium of the early part of this decade when several neighboring armies had invaded during civil strife. From the Belgian perspective, when Rwandans intervene, they are trying to send a signal of their discipline and ability to the DRC. Trouveroy argued that the Congolese people pay the greatest cost when foreign armies are present on Congolese soil. Gavin said she understood the Belgium view, but noted there were few alternatives. She said Belgium knew the Congolese forces and the challenges of getting them to deal effectively with insurgencies. Trouveroy called for another option, the reinforcement of the Goma Process, and building up the DRC. He pointed out the DRC had no army, no administration, and no real state, making intervention by neighbors too easy. ¶8. (C) Carter said the USG was ready to hold a serious discussion with donors and partners on SST. He said the current model with different countries training different battalions was inefficient. SST should be addressed globally in terms of reforming the army, the police, and the judiciary. He cautioned that failure to address these issues would result in problems during the 2011 elections. Carter acknowledged that all donors had specific skills, but called for a system of coherent and systematic contributions. Bodson said Minister De Gucht was interested in better SST coordination, but noted there were differences between the EU, the MFA, the BelgianQrmy, and the UN on SST and disarmament, Qmobilization, and reintegration (DDR). He BRUSSELS 00000750 003.5 OF 004 admitted the Belgian Army preferred a piecemeal approach to a global approach because it made the challenges more digestible. Carter said the USG worried that money had been wasted on DDR and the Congolese army. Bodson said the DRC should be pushed to endorse SST, but said he doubted whether Kabila supported a strong army. He said the GOB was considering closer internal coordination on Africa, and said that FM De Gucht and Development Minister Michel would be visiting Congo together. He said Belgium's limited assistance money is currently focused on roads and agriculture, but he believed the Belgian army and Development could coordinate on projects. Carter emphasized that a real transformation could not occur without reform of the justice system and police. ¶9. (C) Adam described a Belgian project in Kindu, where the Belgian Army and Development Agency are following the "Afghan" security and development model. The Belgian military retains a presence in Kindu and the Development Agency finances projects such as family housing. He cautioned the model could only succeed if the Congolese kept their commitments. Trouveroy said the MFA is now paying for encampments, and added that ensuring families are fed, and people are paid is an important precedent, and moved beyond simply handing out money and weapons to officers. He also observed the DRC is better at playing its weaknesses than its strengths; rather than committing to building an army, it will ask neighbors to come and take care of problems. ¶10. (C) Dhaene provided insight into the most recent EUSEC discussions on the Congo. The Europeans will continue their efforts on SST, but only with clear Congolese buy-in. The EU intends to proceed while setting benchmarks, obtaining Congolese commitment at the highest level, and moving forward only after agreement on goals has been reached. He said natural resources extraction played a role as well. He suggested that as long as the army was weak and not supported by the Congolese state, local commanders would stay focused on profits from regional mines. He mentioned a CNDP mine that was given to Rwanda in exchange for its recent intervention. Carter asked how the natural resources tracking process could be made more efficient. Bodson said Belgium would continue to push for an Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) solution at upcoming meetings in Washington and London. The GOB hoped the World Bank would take over the funding, even if there is little African interest. Problems of U.S. and EU Coordination in Africa -------------- - ¶11. (C) Carter expressed dismay at the IMF loan given to the GoDRC with no conditionality, when the Congolese state collects less than eight percent of potential revenues. He asked how the international community could hold other governments accountable when the DRC was given USD 50 billion with no strings attached. Carter predicted more such grants from the IFIs if partners do not insist on accountability. ¶12. (C) Trouveroy mentioned European concern with Senegal's difficult geographic location, surrounded by problems in Niger, the Sahel, and the Gulf of Guinea. Acting A/S Carter explained the U.S. intended to place pressure on the regimes that come to power after coups, such as Guinea, Mauritania, and Madagascar. The U.S. pushed for tough sanctions with the support of the African Union. He expressed dismay at European decisions to avoid confronting the regimes. Carter hoped the international community would support AU calls for sanctions. He also questioned the wisdom of giving EUR 122 million to aregionally-destabilizing pariah regime in Eritrea. Trouveroy said the gift to Eritrea was a personal initiative of EU Commissioner for Development Louis Michel, without elaborating further. Gavin rejoined that President Obama supported forward engagement and talking to difficult regimes, but not writing checks of that type. Carter suggested engagement with principles, and said coups were a red line. Bodson agreed with Carter's argument and said he would take his message to FM De Gucht. He admitted Belgium could play a stronger role in EU deliberations. ¶13. (C) Carter said the broader question for the United States would be how to engage with the EU on Africa. He said BRUSSELS 00000750 004 OF 004 the U.S. and EU should come together on these issues, but have not yet found common ground. The U.S. is willing to stand alone against coups and in supporting the AU. He again expressed disappointment with the EU position, and noted that coups begat coups. Dhaene asked whether the U.S. was working with Uganda at the UN on the anti-coup resolution. Carter said the resolution was unfortunately having difficulty passing. Trouveroy offered a cynical view that the six countries with interests in certain parts of Africa were working against each other. He said that the British and French foreign ministers would travel to Africa together soon, but have not told the other members of the Africa Group what their plans were. ¶14. Comment: This is the fourth high-level dialogue between senior U.S. and Belgian officials since January. The Belgians clearly welcomed Acting A/S Carter's comment that the new Administration's Africa policy would be based on openness and cooperation with partners. Belgium has already shown it is receptive and open to coordinating more closely with the U.S. on SST in the DRC. End Comment. BUSH .