IMPROVING HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN CHAD: JOINT

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 000540 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREF PREL SU CD EAID EUN SUBJECT: IMPROVING HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN CHAD: JOINT U.S.-EU RECOMMENATIONS ¶1. Summary: The European Commission DG ECHO) and the U.S. Government (State/PRM and USAID/OFDA) delivered joint recommendations in late March to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the UN Office for the Cordinator of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) for te improvement of assistance to refugees and iternally displaced persons (IDPs) in eastern Chad. Based on a field visit in late January,the 10-person team recommended changes in coodination structures and improved sharing of scurity information, as well as continued capacity-building for Chadian government officials and institutions. As the world's two largest humanitarian donors, the EU and USG joined forces to speak with one voice to key funding partners with the goal of making humanitarian assistance more effective and efficient. End summary. ¶2. As part of a continuing transatlantic partnership, the European Commission (DG ECHO) and the U.S. Government (State/PRM and USAID/OFDA) conducted a joint field mission from January 25-31 to examine humanitarian assistance in eastern Chad. ECHO and USG staffers had teamed up in previous assessments, including Burundi/Tanzania, Liberia/Guinea (2005) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2007). In Chad, the 10-member team looked at issues of coordination, humanitarian reform and clusters, shrinking humanitarian space, civil-military relations, security and protection, early recovery and transition to development, the role of the state, and other concerns. The text of the post-mission report, cleared by PRM DAS William Fitzgerald, follows. Darfur refugees in midst of Chadian poverty -------------- ¶3. Chad is among the world's poorest countries, ranked 170 of 177 countries in UNDP's 2007 Human Development Report. The fragile situation in eastern Chad turned into a humanitarian emergency in 2003 when Sudanese refugees driven by fighting in Darfur crossed the Chadian border. UNHCR erected 11 of the current 12 camps in a 9-month period in ¶2004. Two years later, Chadian internally-displaced persons (IDPs) fled violence within Chad. By January 2009, there were approximately 250,000 refugees in 12 camps and 185,000 IDPs in more than 30 sites in eastern Chad, according to UNHCR (note: this mission did not cover the estimated 52,000 refugees from Central African Republic in southern Chad nor the estimated 5,000 urban refugees in Ndjamena). The task of providing services for nearly a half-million people is complicated by the harsh and inaccessible terrain of eastern Chad, extremely low levels of local development, very few government services, threats from Sudanese and Chadian armed groups, and dramatically increasing crime and banditry. The presence of an international military force (EUFOR followed by United Nations) brought some security, but also additional layers of coordination. This report consists of observations and recommendations in five general categories: quality of assistance, coordination, civil-military relations, protection and security, and the role of the Government of Chad. Quality of humanitarian assistance high -------------- ¶4. Observations: With a few exceptions, the team observed no significant gaps in services to refugees and IDPs. Indicators show that assistance to refugees and IDPs is largely meeting internationally recognized standards in most sectors. There are, however, significant differences in services provided to refugees, IDPs, and local residents, a result, in part, of differing international mandates. This situation, which exists worldwide, is quite noticeable in eastern Chad where refugees and IDPs are sometimes co-located. In addition, competition for scarce resources is intensified by the addition of thousands of refugees and IDPs using firewood, water, land, and other local goods, thus increasing the potential for tensions among populations as well as negative environmental impacts. In the Koukou area, for example, 80,000 refugees and IDPs have dwarfed the local population of 5,000. ¶5. Humanitarian actors have overcome serious logistical hurdles, for example opening up a second overland supply route through Libya to complement the busy corridor from Cameroon. Most officials we spoke with said that there was no major shortfall in funding to address refugee and IDP needs in Chad. The $317 million CAP was 80 percent funded in 2008, making it one of the best-funded 2008 CAPs, according to OCHA. ¶6. Most camps and sites are firmly in the "care and maintenance" or "protection awaiting durable solutions" phase of delivery. Humanitarian workers, refugees and IDPs offered mixed views on whether the time was ripe for early recovery BRUSSELS 00000540 002 OF 004 and transitions to development. While justifiable in some areas of humanitarian operations, it is rendered difficult by limited access to natural resources and land, as well as ongoing insecurity. The UN system is under Phase IV security and armed escorts are increasingly used, making access to beneficiaries of assistance more difficult. Humanitarian workers rotate frequently due to the hot, isolated and dangerous conditions, as well as separation from family and friends. High turnover reduces institutional memory and makes continuity of program approach difficult. ¶7. Recommendations: While there is value in comparing different populations (and international funding streams sometimes support that),we recommend that new systems also be implemented to allow humanitarian actors to work across populations where feasible (e.g. humanitarian workers could address shelter or water for all populations). The close proximity of many IDP and refugee sites suggests the need for innovative approaches to harmonize services and approaches across sectors (water, sanitation, health, etc.). Humanitarian actors require flexibility to adapt to situations on the ground and develop approaches that make sense for the set of needs in their particular area. While large-scale return is not yet feasible, plans for early recovery and transitions to development need to be more actively discussed and prepared so that they can be implemented as conditions permit. ¶8. We recommend that OCHA fully roll out the early recovery cluster in Chad with UNDP playing an active and central role and including other relevant development actors, such as the Delegation of the European Commission and the Agence Francaise de Developpement. Due to high staff turnover, humanitarian agencies should institutionalize a "lessons learned" mechanism to ensure continuity. In addition, the Cluster System should be implemented with greater flexibility to allow for improved communication (e.g. between clusters) and better identification of response gaps. We note that the Cluster System was intended to be flexible in addressing gaps and adapting to country-specific environments. Clusters should make strategic recommendations by not only responding to immediate problems but also preparing for potential future gaps and building capacity (through training and information). Gaps in humanitarian coordination -------------- ¶9. Observations: As the number of refugees and IDPs has increased during the last five years, the field of humanitarian actors has grown larger and increasingly complex. There are at least eight UN agencies and some 52 NGOs/IOs (40 international, 12 indigenous) operating in eastern Chad, most with different mandates, contracts, donors, perspectives and organizational cultures. Coordination is therefore extremely complex and often repetitive and time-consuming, reducing its effectiveness. UN agencies coordinate among themselves, NGOs coordinate among themselves, the UN and NGOs/IOs coordinate with each other, the Government of Chad and humanitarian actors coordinate, and the entire humanitarian community coordinates with national and international security officials. Not surprisingly, gaps in information flow and leadership exist. While there are many levels of coordination and many actors empowered to coordinate, the system appears to lack an overarching structure and personality to pull it all together. Reports from the field suggest that coordination has improved in recent months. But we noted that the flow of information from field level through Abeche to Ndjamena and then back out has serious flaws. In general, we observed that coordination among agencies and actors functions better at field level than in Abeche and Ndjamena. Field-level actors noted that they send concerns, problems, and analyses up the coordination ladder for resolution, but often do not receive feedback. OCHA has not yet achieved its full staffing level. The role of Abeche seems to fall somewhere in between making policy and serving as an operational headquarters, and is seen by many actors as a hindrance. ¶10. Recommendations: We note an urgent need to improve vertical coordination so that information flows more openly from top to bottom and conversely. The joint mission also recommends both clarifying the role and position of the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) and Deputy HC and defining more clearly their relationship with OCHA, the SRSG and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC). The HC will soon complete his assignment, and we recommend that his replacement be a senior, experienced humanitarian official with strong leadership skills, an appreciation of the vital role played by NGOs and the ability to work cooperatively with a wide variety of other actors and organizational cultures (including UN, GoC, NGOs and military). An ideal HC BRUSSELS 00000540 003 OF 004 would be experienced in the management of a complex crisis where a multidimensional UN DPKO mission has been deployed. Given the increase in security incidents in Abeche, the central role of Abeche in the humanitarian organizational structure should be reassessed. The NGO Coordinating Committee (CCO) in Abeche serves an important role in coordinating humanitarian NGOs, but should seek a common voice with which to speak to multilateral organizatios and the Government of Chad. We noted that N and government officials often characterize the NGO community as a disparate group speakig with many different voices and each wanting different things. Civil-Military relationskey to security -------------- ¶11. Observations: The presence f EUFOR necessitated clear articulation of th relationship between military and humanitaian organizations. The mission noted that much progress has been achieved in that regard. EUFOR gained valuable experience working with the humanitarian community during its deployment. EUFOR set up a comprehensive system of liaison with humanitarian actors at the field level, which significantly facilitated effective civ-mil coordination. MINURCAT could benefit from lessons learned on coordination, relationships, and the questionable value of military implementation of civil affairs projects. The security problem has now shifted from one of armed conflict to one of daily criminality. Attacks on humanitarian workers by armed criminals and bandits increased sharply in 2008. Greater insecurity led organizations to centralize expensive vehicles and equipment in Abeche, which seems to have pushed Abeche's crime levels to new heights. NGOs remain frustrated with their inability to attend UN Security Management Team (SMT) meetings and believe they are not receiving sufficient and timely security information. UN officials remain irritated that many NGOs refuse to follow UN security guidelines, sign MOUs with the UN allowing sharing of sensitive security information, and provide requested information about personnel in the field. NGOs note that they do not have a central focal point to whom they can report security incidents, and that they cannot communicate by radio with EUFOR and UN officials because they are not on the same frequency. UN officials in Chad could also benefit on this issue from lessons learned by the international community in neighboring Sudan (Darfur and Khartoum). ¶12. MINURCAT I was slower than anticipated in training and deploying the Integrated Security Detachments (DIS),the first link in the security chain, a delay that contributed to the increasing insecurity. EUFOR and other security actors acknowledge that counting the number of IDPs who return to their homes is not an appropriate measure of mission success, and they are correctly, in our view, developing alternative ways to assess the impact of their operations. ¶13. Recommendations: MINURCAT II should be deployed starting March 15, with a smooth and effective transition from EUFOR/MINURCAT I to ensure no gaps in security. EUFOR officials should continue vigorously to transmit lessons learned to MINURCAT. MINURCAT should integrate lessons learned from the humanitarian community, including specialized training and implementation of civ-mil guidelines, such as those developed by OCHA. MINURCAT II's justice advisory unit, human rights unit and humanitarian liaison unit should be deployed quickly and effectively to enhance communication within the humanitarian community. The units must be established quickly at the field level, as well as in Ndjamena and Abeche, since coordination must occur at the Guereda, Iriba, and Goz Beida levels in order to avoid duplication of efforts on issues like salaries, incentives and hiring practices. Liaison between the UN and NGOs must be improved regarding the sharing of security information. Because of their field exposure and their role as UN implementing partners, NGOs should be allowed to participate in UN security meetings, receive UN security information, and be included in evacuation plans if desired. The mission recommends continuing an independent humanitarian air service in Chad. Rising insecurity is key concern -------------- ¶14. Observations: International humanitarian space has shrunk considerably in the last two years as insecurity has impeded the free movement of humanitarian workers. The Deputy SRSG and officials on the ground confirmed that militarization of camps and sites is becoming a serious issue. They confirmed the recruitment of soldiers, including children, takes place in Oure Cassoni, Am Nabak and many other camps. Camp leaders and NGO counterparts stressed the BRUSSELS 00000540 004 OF 004 need for secondary education to deter the recruitment of young people in camps and sites. ¶15. Recommendations: Banditry and crime are becoming more of a problem than armed conflict, and an adequately-resourced Integrated Security Detachment (DIS) is essential to enforce security. The DIS should continue to deploy to refugee camps as soon as possible. ICRC and UNHCR must continue their important protection role as MINURCAT II assumes a larger footprint in eastern Chad. To create options for teens who might otherwise be recruited by armed groups, organizations involved in child protection should coordinate their efforts and lobby the Government of Chad for the establishment of secondary education. Role of the Government of Chad -------------- ¶16. Observations: We recognize the Government of Chad's important support for the EUFOR and MINURCAT deployments and its facilitation of humanitarian work. In addition, local communities and governments have been generous in sharing land and resources with refugees and IDPs. ¶17. However, the Government of Chad has an extremely limited presence in much of the country outside of Ndjamena. Local residents receive few health or education benefits from the state. The Governor of Dar Sila province noted that public education first came to his region as recently as the 1990s. Against that backdrop, the Government has been neither willing nor able to provide services for either refugees or for its own IDP citizens. Inadequate or non-existent systems of law enforcement and justice lead to a climate of impunity for criminals preying on residents, refugees, IDPs, and humanitarian workers. The Government's establishment of the Commission Nationale d'Accueil et de Reintegration des Refugies (CNAR),Coordination Nationale d'Appui a la Force Internationale dans l'est du Tchad (CONAFIT),and the Direction des Organisations Non-Gouvernmentales (DONG) has the potential to provide important institutional liaisons with the humanitarian community that need to be strengthened and developed. ¶18. Recommendations: The mission stresses the need to involve the Chadian government more closely in facing the needs of people affected by crisis in eastern Chad. It is the responsibility of national authorities, not the international community, to provide services and protection for its citizens. The international community is not a substitute for national authorities, particularly in areas of governance, law enforcement and rule of law. The Government of Chad should support MINURCAT to facilitate a smooth handover from EUFOR to MINURCAT II. An open and regular channel of communication needs to be established with the DONG/Ministry of Economy and Planning and the humanitarian community. The Government has a right to receive information from NGOs, but in return it must be willing to facilitate humanitarian work by securing humanitarian space. Donors need to continue to build the capacity of Chadian officials and institutions. End of report. ¶19. Comment: These joint U.S.-EU recommendations were delivered to UNHCR and OCHA in Geneva in late March. PRM, OFDA and ECHO will follow up with the international organizations in a timely manner to ensure that recommendations are implemented. End comment. MURRAY .