THE STOCKHOLM PROGRAM: EUROPEAN UNION'S NEXT

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 000447 SENSITIVE SIPDIS TAGS: EUN PREL KCRM SNAR PGOV SOCI CVIS SUBJECT: THE STOCKHOLM PROGRAM: EUROPEAN UNION'S NEXT MULTI-YEAR PROGRAM FOR JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS REF: BRUSSELS 0218 SUMMARY ¶1. (U) The European Union (EU) will adopt a new five-year program in the area of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) in 2009, which will succeed the Hague Program in place since 2005. This program will outline EU-wide policy priorities and objectives for the years 2010-2014. In honor of the (July to December 2009) Swedish presidency, the agenda will be named the "Stockholm Program." The program is expected to provide recommendations and proposals in the areas of visas, asylum, immigration, and border control, as well as organized crime, terrorism, police and judicial cooperation, drugs and other areas. The policies will have important implications for the United States, especially for cooperation in such matters as terrorism and organized crime. END SUMMARY. STOCKHOLM PROGRAM PREPARATION ¶2. (U) The European Union (EU) will adopt a new five-year program in the area of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) in 2009. To prepare its draft of the Stockholm Program, the European Commission has solicited recommendations from two High-level Advisory Groups, member states, stakeholders, and EU citizens. The "Trio", with the leadership of the Swedish Presidency, hosted a two-day forum March 4-5 of JHA representatives from the French, Czech, and Swedish Presidencies, Council Secretariat, Commission, other EU institutions (EUROPOL, EUROJUST),member states, academics, and others (the U.S. and Canada) to discuss the vision, fundamentals, and objectives of the Stockholm Program. Public questionnaires, a "flash Eurobarometer" study, and stakeholder reports have been gathered and published by the Commission to highlight the public's expectations of future priorities in JHA. When the draft is ready, it will be sent to the Council for approval. The Swedish Council Presidency (which starts July 1, 2009) will take an active role in shaping the Program throughout the drafting process. ¶3. (U) In addition to addressing public opinion, the new program will need to remain flexible in the likelihood of EU institutional reforms stemming from the eventual implementation of Lisbon Treaty. Its adoption would have significant implications for the roles and responsibilities of the institutions charged with carrying out the new program. SOURCES OF STOCKHOLM PROGRAM ¶4. (U) The Tampere Program of 1999 was the first long-term plan developed by the Commission for JHA. This was followed by the Hague Program in 2004, which expires this year. JHA comprises policies in roughly eight areas, including: immigration and asylum, police and judicial cooperation, organized crime, terrorism, drug abuse, external borders, fundamental and children's rights, and access to justice. A "flash Eurobarometer" study examined the public's concern in those eight areas as well as the level of public support for EU-level actions in each. While the results show a majority of EU citizens have concerns in all areas of JHA, they were particularly worried about organized crime and terrorism, and drug abuse. These topics were followed closely by promotion and protection of fundamental rights, including children's rights. In these same areas, respondents indicated a high level of support for EU-level action, suggesting that they believe EU-wide actions would have an added value to purely national efforts. Even on topics where public concern was low (such as the exchange of judicial and police information between member states, and control of the EU's borders),the results showed support for EU-level actions. Recommendations by the Commission on asylum, border and migration policy are expected in May and will be considered at the EU JHA Ministerial meeting in Stockholm in July. THE SWEDISH PRESIDENCY PRIORITIES ¶5. (U) Hans Nilsson, a long-time Council Secretariat JHA official who is now Counselor for JHA affairs at the Swedish Representation to the EU, has said that the Stockholm Program will be a modest agenda. Instead of regulating for regulations sake, he said, the Program will emphasize evaluation and enforcement of current laws. At the most recent U.S.-EU JHA Informal meeting (Reftel) in Prague, the Swedish delegation indicated some of their priorities for the post-Hague Program. These included individual rights in criminal proceedings, trafficking in persons, asylum, and migration. Given that the results of the Commission's investigation showed similar interest among the European population, these are likely to be prominent subjects. Further, the Program is likely to be focused on comprehensive, coherent policies that more clearly define the external impact of regulation. Compared to the previous Programs, the new Program will be largely focused on individual rights and less focused on security policy. EXPECTED LEGISLATION ¶6. (U) Given the results of the Commission's investigation and the priorities laid out by the upcoming Swedish Presidency, the BRUSSELS 00000447 002 OF 003 following policy recommendations and initiatives are likely to be a part of the Stockholm Program; the High-level Advisory Group on the Future of European Justice Policy identified five clusters of policy recommendations. First, legislation for better protection of citizens will likely include a minimum set of rights for the accused, measures to combat child sexual abuse, and reinforcing the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Second, the program will seek to increase legal certainty in family, commercial, and civil law including by assessing impediments to marriage and inheritance recognition across states. Third, to improve access to justice, the program will prioritize "e-justice" and seek to build trust among judicial and legal authorities. Fourth, issues of organized crime could be addressed in the form of a strengthened European Evidence Warrant, cooperation with third states to gather evidence, and protection for those in danger because of their involvement in trials. Fifth, external dimension policies could include support for the European Judicial Coordination Unit (EUROJUST) and the European Police Office (EUROPOL) in their cooperation with third countries, strengthening assistance to candidate and potential candidate countries, and developing a consistent and coherent JHA external relations policy. ¶7. (U) The High-Level Advisory group on the Future of European Home Affairs Policy also identified five clusters of policy recommendations. First, in preserving internal security and external stability, the Group recommended merging the Schengen Information System (SIS),the Visa Information System (VIS),and Eurodac (a system that compares fingerprints of asylum applicants) into a single structure; evaluating the Joint Situation Center's coordination of information in the fight against terrorism; and establishing a Police and Customs Cooperation Center model. Second, in migration, asylum, external borders, and integration affairs, policies will likely focus on a common asylum policy with an advisory European Asylum Support Office, greater use of Frontex-the EU's external borders management agency-in threat analysis and cooperation among member states, and a comprehensive immigration policy including relationships with third countries. Third, to develop civil protection, the program might specify the development of a European policy on civil protection that maintains the state's responsibility and increases interoperability and training on civil protection. Fourth, the group recommends using new technologies and information networks, such as a European Security "Tool Box" of effective security tools and implementing an EU Information Management Strategy. Fifth, external dimension policies might include using a differentiated approach in dealing with third countries, strengthening ties with neighboring countries and strategic partners such as the U.S. and Russia, and intensifying cooperation among ministers of Home Affairs. FEW POLITICAL OBSTACLES ¶8. (SBU) Few, if any, political obstacles should hinder preparation and approval of the Stockholm Program. Officials of the Czech Republic had wanted to write and have the program adopted by the end of their presidency in June 2009, thus having the honor of naming it the "Prague Program"; however, the June 2009 date was unrealistic. Nevertheless, the Czechs have pushed to temper the ambition of the Stockholm Program, suggesting it should be limited to only those policies and objectives that they know can be fulfilled. The final agenda will likely be a balance of ambition and pragmatism. EFFECTS OF LISBON TREATY ¶9. (U) BACKGROUND: The Treaty on European Union (aka Maastricht, effective 1993) originally set out three pillars of the EU's main policy areas: 1) the "European Community," 2) the "Common Foreign and Security Policy," and 3) "Justice and Home Affairs." Of particular importance to JHA are the first and third pillars. The first pillar concerns those areas of Community competence, such as Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) and social policy, where decision-making is by qualified majority. The third pillar is more intergovernmental and, at the time, covered such areas as visa, asylum, combating terrorism, drug trafficking, and other areas of criminal and judicial cooperation. Decisions in the third pillar require consensus agreement among all 27 member states, thereby giving each member state a de facto veto. ¶10. (U) BACKGROUND CONTINUED: The Treaty of Amsterdam (effective 1999) moved visa, asylum, and immigration from the third pillar to the first pillar of EU structures, thus bringing those areas under Community competence and implying more powers for the Commission and European Parliament to define EU-wide policies. The original third pillar established under the Treaty on European Union was then renamed "Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters" and, therefore, currently covers cooperation in fighting crime (illicit drugs and arms, terrorism, trafficking and sexual abuse, fraud, etc.) and continues to be governed by an inter-governmental approach where member states have most authority. However, the phrase "Justice and Home Affairs" (also known as Justice, Freedom, and Security-JLS) now refers to all areas covered under the third pillar as well as those transferred to the first pillar under Amsterdam. BRUSSELS 00000447 003 OF 003 END BACKGROUND ¶11. (U) Under the Treaty of Lisbon, ratification of which is still pending, the current three-pillar structure of the EU will formally disappear and new roles for the various EU bodies will be defined. In JHA, police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters-policies under what is now the third pillar-will become subject to the "Community" method, much in line with the other JHA policies under what is now the first pillar. This will essentially include expanding the scope of application of co-decision, meaning greater involvement of the European Parliament on an equal footing with the EU Council. More so, the renamed Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFUE) will increase recourse to qualified-majority voting (instead of unanimity) in the Council and grant jurisdiction by the Court of Justice (ECJ) over areas of JHA. Many previously intergovernmental projects will move under the competency of the Commission and the European Parliament will be more involved. Member states will retain the possibility of blocking measures threatening "fundamental aspects" of their judicial systems and of proceeding with arrangements for "enhanced cooperation" among a limited number of countries. That is to say some member states (UK, Ireland, and Denmark) secured the right to "opt-out" from EU measures, while a cluster of nine or more member states will be allowed to "differentiate," or, to choose to increase their level of cooperation beyond that agreed upon as EU-wide action. COMMENT ¶12. (SBU) The Swedes appear to be more confident about pushing through a somewhat ambitious Program agenda during their presidency. Nevertheless, compared to the previous Programs, this one will also be more pragmatic, emphasizing enforcement of current laws and regulations over passage of new ones. It will build upon the principles of "mutual recognition"; i.e., confidence in each other's justice systems, and of "availability"; i.e., making information and evidence held in one member state available to another where it is needed. Although the Program emphasizes the rights of the individual, including the rights of the accused, it appears to be lacking on the rights of victims. However, the Swedes may be likely to insert more language to this effect as the drafting process proceeds. Because of the scope of changes already in store for 2009 in the EU-European Parliament elections, election of a new Commission, and a change to the institutional structure of the Union, should the Lisbon Treaty be adopted-it is likely many reforms, including those in JHA, will be implemented cautiously. MURRAY