DE LAROSIERE REPORT ON THE FUTURE OF EU FINANCIAL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 000290 SIPDIS NOT FOR INTERNET DISTRIBUTION E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EFIN ECON ETRD EIND EINV EUN SUBJECT: DE LAROSIERE REPORT ON THE FUTURE OF EU FINANCIAL REGULATION AND SUPERVISION ¶1. (U) In November 2008, EC President Barroso tasked Jacques De Larosiere with leading a group to make recommendations on the future of EU financial regulation and supervision. The group released their report on February 25. The report addresses four issues: causes of the financial crisis, policy and regulatory repair, EU supervisory repair, and global repair. ¶2. (U) The report proposes a framework for moving the EU towards: a new regulatory agenda (reducing risk; improving systemic shock absorbers; reducing pro-cyclicality),stronger coordinated supervision (both macro-prudential Qd micro-prudential),and effective crisis management. The key recommendations are: --Basel 2 should be reformed to increase minimum capital requirements and reduce pro-cyclicality; --Mark-to-Market rules should be reviewed and IASB's governance should be further opened; --To improve macro-prudential supervision, a European Systemic Risk Council (ESRC) should be created. Focusing on systemic risk, the ESRC will include all EU 27 CB governors and be chaired and staffed by the ECB. --To improve micro-prudential supervision, a European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) should be created. The ESFS will bring together national supervisors - who will continue to do day-to-day supervision - with enhanced level 3 committees. The enhanced level 3 committees will be given the power to pursue binding mediation in case of disagreement between supervisors. Chapter I: Causes of the Financial Crisis -------------- ¶3. (U) The report notes that ample liquidity and low interest rates - amplified by financial innovation - were the major factors behind the current crisis. In the U.S., very low interest rates, unregulated mortgage lending and insufficient oversight of the GSEs led to a widespread housing bubble. Low U.S. savings rates, accompanied by the accumulation of huge global imbalances, led to a rapid expansion of credit in the U.S. and depressed yields as surplus countries recycled their surpluses into U.S. assets. ¶4. (U) In this environment of high liquidity and low yields, investors sought higher returns through increasing leverage and investment in more risky assets, leading to a mispricing of risk. Both financial institutions and supervisors overestimated the ability of firms to manage the risks they faced, leading them to underestimate the amount of capital they should hold. This was exacerbated by: a lack of transparency and increase in the size of the "shadow" banking system, which made it difficult to identify the size and location of credit risks; failure of model based risk assessments to estimate exposure to common shocks and tail risks; and, the perverse incentives created by the originate-to-distribute model. ¶5. (U) When tightening U.S. monetary policy from mid-2006 led to the bursting of the U.S. subprime bubble, the pro-cyclical nature of the regulatory framework led to a downward spiral of prices as mark-to-market rules led to increasing asset sales at ever lower prices. A lack of market transparency, combined with the sudden downgrade of credit ratings and the U.S. decision not to save Lehman Brothers, led to a breakdown in trust and a crisis of confidence in the markets. The EU's regulatory response was weakened by an inadequate infrastructure for crisis management. Chapter II: Policy and regulatory repair -------------- ¶6. (U) Given that global financial services regulation did not prevent the crisis, a profound review of regulation is required. The main recommendations of the report are: --Basel 2: The BCBS should urgently amend the rules to: (1) gradually increase minimum capital requirements; (2) reduce pro-cyclicality; (3) introduce stricter rules for off-balance sheet items; (4) tighten norms on liquidity management; and, (5) strengthen the rules for bank's internal control and risk management. --Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs): The underlying economic model of CRAs needs to be reviewed in order to reduce conflicts of interest - particularly from the "issuer pays" model. The use of ratings in financial regulations should be significantly reduced over time. CESR should be put in charge of registering and supervising CRAs in the EU. --Mark-to-Market (MTM): Given the strongly pro-cyclical impact of MTM, IASB needs to work towards an international consensus on when MTM should - and should not - be applied. To successfully promote financial stability, IASB needs to open up more to regulatory, supervisory and business views and its oversight and governance should be strengthened - particularly by giving the regulatory community a seat on its board --Hedge funds: Regulation should be extended to all entities of a BRUSSELS 00000290 002 OF 003 potentially systemic nature. Registration and information requirements should be imposed internationally on hedge funds. --Over the Counter (OTC) derivatives: OTC derivatives should be simplified and standardized to reduce risk. At least one Central Clearing Counterparty (CCP) for CDS should be located in the EU, supervised by CESR and the ECB. Chapter III: EU supervisory repair -------------- ¶7. (U) The current structure of EU supervision places too little emphasis on macro-prudential supervision. A European Systemic Risk Council (ESRC) should be created and given responsibility for macro-prudential supervision. Operating under the auspices and with the logistical support of the ECB, the ESRC would be composed of the members of the ECB/ESCB General Council (President of ECB, VP of ECB, Governors of the 27 Central Banks),Chairs of CEBS, CEIOPS and CESR and one representative of the EC. ¶8. (U) The ESRC would collect and analyze all information relevant for financial stability. It would work closely with - and ensure information flow with - micro-prudential supervisors. The ECB should not, however, be given a role in the micro-prudential supervision of cross-border or systemically important financial institutions, as some have suggested. ¶9. (U) To improve micro-prudential supervision, a European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) should be created. The ESFS would be an integrated system of European financial supervisors working with enhanced level 3 committees. The level 3 committees (CEBS, CEIOPS, and CESR) would be eventually transformed into new "Authorities": a European Banking Authority, a European Insurance Authority, and a European Securities Authority. ¶10. (U) Under the ESFS, existing national supervisors would carry out day-to-day supervision. The enhanced level 3 committees would coordinate application of supervisory standards, guarantee cooperation between supervisors, and guarantee that the interests of host supervisors are properly safeguarded. Colleges of Supervisors would be set up for all major cross-border institutions. The ESFS would have a binding mediation mechanism - run by the new "Authorities" - to deal with cross border supervisory disagreements. ¶11. (U) The introduction of the ESFS would follow a two-stage process: --Stage 1 (2009-10): focusing on preparing for the transformation of the level 3 committees into "Authorities" and upgrading the qualit of supervision --Stage 2 (2011-12): estabishing the "Authorities" and giving them the power to pursue legally binding mediation between national supervisors, directly supervise some EU-Wide institutions (such as CRAs),and represent the EU internationally with third countries on supervision. Chapter IV: Global repair -------------- ¶12. (U) The EU has an interest in the worldwide consistency of regulatory standards. The Financial Stability Forum (FSF) is the body best placed to coordinate the work of international standard setters in achieving international regulatory consistency. To be able to play this role, the FSF needs more resources and a stronger governance structure. It should be made more accountable by reporting regularly to the IMF and by enlarging its membership to include all systemically important countries as well as the European Commission. The FSF should report regularly to the IMFC and the IMFC should be transformed into a decision-making Council. ¶13. (U) The IMF should be put in charge of developing and operating a financial stability early warning system, accompanied by an international risk map and credit register. FSAPs should be made compulsory for all IMF members. ¶14. (U) The EU's representation in international organizations and bodies is currently fragmented. It is essential to organize coherent EU representation. Regarding the IMF, in the context of an institutional and quota reform constituencies could be rearranged and the number of EU Executive Board members reduced to no more than two. Outlook - EU G-20 position and FSAP III -------------- ¶15. (U) The European Commission is currently preparing a response to the De Larosiere report, which will be discussed at the ECOFIN on March 10 and the European Council on March 19-20. The Commission is BRUSSELS 00000290 003 OF 003 expected to endorse much of the report. If Member States support the report's conclusions, Barroso reportedly hopes to use its principles to form the kernel of a common EU position on reforming financial services at the G-20 Summit in London. ¶16. (U) Assuming Member State support, the Commission will work on turning the report's proposals into draft legislation over the summer, with the intention that the new Commission entering office in Fall 2009 would seek to have it enacted into law. These regulatory and supervisory proposals would form the core of a new Financial Services Action Plan - or FSAP III. MURRAY