BELGIAN VIEWS ON NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 000250 SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/WE, PM AND ISN/MNSA NVIE FOR IAEA GENEVA FOR CD DELEGATION USUN FOR POL USNATO FOR POL USEU FOR POL E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2019 TAGS: AORC CDG ENRG KNNP MNUC PARM PGOV PREL UNGA IAEA, NPT, BE SUBJECT: BELGIAN VIEWS ON NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY REF: STATE 6970 Classified By: Acting DCM Richard Eason, reason 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Belgium's main objective for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 2010 Review Conference is making progress not only on non-proliferation but also disarmament, showing concrete results. The GOB would like to see the United States engage Iran on a bilateral basis. The USG should abandon its "aggressive" stance in the NPT and find the proper tone for advancing its arguments. It should make every effort to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty before the 2010 Review Conference. Belgium wants the Review Conference to reach a consensus, and fears that a second failure will doom the NPT process. A successful outcome would include clearer rules for failure to comply and statements of rights and responsibilities of parties. It would also advance disarmament with reductions in nuclear weapons and implementation of the "thirteen practical steps." Belgium supports "deepening" of sanctions on noncompliant countries through more effective targeting of existing kinds of sanctions. It believes sanctions can be effective in changing Iran's behavior. It believes that non-members like India and Pakistan can be drawn into the NPT through deals like the recent U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement. U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty would put pressure on other countries to ratify the agreement and create a positive atmosphere for the 2010 Conference, it says. Belgium is willing to continue diplomatic pressure on Iran to give up uranium enrichment and reprocessing. Creation of a multilateral fuel bank would be helpful in that regard as well. Because of its own doubts about nuclear power, Belgium is not eager to use the NPT to promote peaceful development of nuclear power in other countries. End Summary. ¶2. (C) On February 9, Poloff met with Werner Bauwens, Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Office of Non-Proliferation and Export Controls, to discuss the questions raised reftel regarding the NPT review process. Bauwens said that he was familiar with informal ideas on nuclear non-proliferation coming out of Washington in recent articles by experts such as Henry Kissinger and Max Kampelman. He said that Belgium is eager for consultations with Washington on NPT issues. Summarizing, Bauwens said that Belgium seeks a results-oriented approach addressed to both state and non-state actors. Progress in all areas covered by the NPT is desirable. In addition, the root causes of conflicts that generate non-proliferation concerns should be considered as policy is formulated. Belgium will help to create and support common EU positions to increase Europe's impact on the process and will continue to promote implementation of the EU's action plan based on its strategy announced in 2003. ¶3. (C) On Iran, Bauwens said that a workable plan of action is needed. Such a plan cannot include bombing, he said, but must be based on diplomacy. He said that the Iranians should be offered a dialog on regional security if they drop their enrichment program. Additionally, the Iranians must be pressured to stop their cooperation with terrorists. The tools to accomplish these ends include both dialogue and sanctions. Belgium is willing to support sanctions in both the EU and UN contexts. It is also willing to support sanctions implemented by the USG in coordination with those bodies. Bauwens believes that sanctions have a reasonable chance of success in Iran. While others in the EU are reluctant to press forward with sanctions, Bauwens said Belgian officials are ready to promote a consensus among EU member states, which will be important to obtaining a consensus in the UN. When Bauwens speaks about sanctions, he prefers to talk about "deepening" them, rather than "widening" them. In Bauwens's view, "widening sanctions is too off-putting for some NPT signatories (such as Austria), while "deepening" refers to ensuring that sanctions hit the right entities and transactions, which is more palatable. For example, although a bank may be named by the UNSC for sanctions, it is necessary to target other banks to which funds may be shifted after the first bank is publicly identified. ¶4. (C) Bauwens applauded USG intentions to engage the BRUSSELS 00000250 002 OF 003 government of Iran and said that Belgium welcomes an EU/Belgium/USG dialogue on how to make that successful. He offered the good offices of the Belgian Embassy in Teheran to assist. Bauwens believes Iran can be influenced by a prudent sanctions policy. The clerics in Iran have many commercial interests that would be affected by sanctions, he said. The focus should not be on regime change, however, because that risks turning the whole population of Iran firmly against the West. The regime will change as it realizes it is creating problems for itself, he predicted. Bauwens mentioned that Belgium has purchased air time on BBC broadcasts to Iran to inform the population that the EU is not opposed to Iran's article 4 right to develop peaceful nuclear power, and therefore Iran is wasting resources on uranium enrichment. He continued that Iranians are not well-informed and need to know there is an alternative to Ahmadinejad's way. ¶5. (C) The NPT conference should establish clear rules about the costs of non-compliance, a clear statement of rights and responsibilities and their linkages to each other, and the price of quitting the NPT when a country is in non-compliance, Bauwens said. His advice to the USG is that the U.S. and Belgium should stick together as we have for years. We have the right approach, he said, and we need work hard together to convince others of that. The USG needs to remain consistent and formulate a new and effective presentation of its policies. Before, NPT states saw the USG as "overly aggressive", hurting not only the U.S. but the EU as well, he said. It is a question of finding the right tone, not a change of message, in Bauwens's opinion. ¶6. (C) Belgium sees a need to advance disarmament with reductions and caps on strategic nuclear weapons. Attention is also needed to tactical weapons in Europe, Bauwens said. At the conference in 2010, the nuclear weapons states need to show progress on disarmament to blunt arguments by non-nuclear states that they do not need to give ground on non-proliferation issues. Bauwens said that it is important not to repeat the failure of 2005, and it is important to reach agreement. A second failure could kill the entire NPT process, he believes. He hopes the outcome will be something concrete on disarmament, in fulfillment of the 2000 document "Thirteen Practical Steps," little of which has been implemented, he said. ¶7. (C) Bauwens said that Belgium will be pleased if the United States ratifies the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The U.S. should act before the NPT conference, Bauwens said, because it would have a desirable, concrete and immediate effect on the conference's atmospherics Other countries which have not signed would come under "immense" pressure to join the CTBT and will not have the USG's refusal to ratify to hide behind. ¶8. (C) Bauwens would like to see an innovative approach to achieve universality of the NPT. Besides the usual diplomatic persuasion, he sees deals like the recent U.S.-India agreement on nuclear cooperation as useful guidance. Bauwens was impressed by political assurances given by India in that agreement. Similar efforts could pay off with Pakistan, he thinks, and move that country closer to NPT membership. However, he thinks it is almost impossible to convince Israel to join the NPT. Bauwens suggests that getting countries to work toward signature of the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty is a possible way to bring the remaining non-members into the NPT. ¶9. (C) Belgium and the United States share the same policies regarding safeguards and the IAEA additional protocol, Bauwens said. Belgium has successfully developed its nuclear energy sector under the additional protocol and finds the process non-controversial. It is necessary to keep pressing countries that have not yet signed to do so, he added. At the same time, Bauwens says that it is not correct or helpful to accuse countries that have not signed of supporting proliferation. He also doubts that it will be possible to make signing the additional protocol obligatory at the 2010 conference. Efforts should nonetheless be made to discourage countries to opt for enrichment and reprocessing of uranium, he said. He applauds the idea of establishing a multilateral fuel bank that would guarantee that countries get the fuel they need at market prices and at the time it is needed. BRUSSELS 00000250 003 OF 003 Such a program would strengthen oversight of where nuclear fuel is going, he said. Care must be taken that it does not undermine the market for fuel and increase prices. A blueprint for a global fuel bank exists in EURATOM, according to Bauwens. Alternative proposals by Russia to supply nuclear fuel worldwide are not acceptable to Bauwens. He worries that they would create an even stronger Russia and raise issues of strategic concern. ¶10. (C) Finally, Bauwens said that Belgium is concerned about using the NPT to promote nuclear energy projects in the world. Belgium itself is divided on nuclear power and has not decided about expanding its own nuclear power sector. BUSH .