Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BRUSSELS227
2009-02-18 10:48:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Brussels
Cable title:  

CENTCOM'S GEN. PETRAEUS MEETS WITH BELGIAN FOREIGN

Tags:  BE IR MARR MOPS PREL IQ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO5301
OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW
DE RUEHBS #0227/01 0491048
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 181048Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8591
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 000227 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA
CENTCOM FOR CG CJTF-82 AND POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2029
TAGS: BE IR MARR MOPS PREL IQ
SUBJECT: CENTCOM'S GEN. PETRAEUS MEETS WITH BELGIAN FOREIGN
MINISTER DE GUCHT

Classified By: CHG WAYNE BUSH, REASONS 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 000227 SIPDIS STATE FOR SCA CENTCOM FOR CG CJTF-82 AND POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2029 TAGS: BE IR MARR MOPS PREL IQ SUBJECT: CENTCOM'S GEN. PETRAEUS MEETS WITH BELGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER DE GUCHT Classified By: CHG WAYNE BUSH, REASONS 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: CENTCOM Commander David Petraeus gave Belgium's Foreign Minister Karel De Gucht a tour d'horizon of political-military challenges in the CENTCOM AOR, engaging De Gucht on Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Petraeus contrasted the situation in Iraq with that in Afghanistan, noting that trends in Afghanistan were moving in the wrong direction, and that prevailing in Afghanistan, as NATO must, would require a sustained military, civilian, and economic development commitment. De Gucht was very interested in Petraeus' assessment of Afghanistan and noted that he had met most of the leaders in the region surrounding Afghanistan, including those of Iran. De Gucht said he did not trust Iran's leaders but felt there was popular support among Iranians for Iran's nuclear program. Petraeus concurred with many of De Gucht's assessments of regional leaders and of the challenges ahead. Visits such as that of Petraeus are invaluable in building political capital with the Belgians, and to the Embassy's efforts to press for greater Belgian support for the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan and our policies and initiatives in the Middle East, South Asia, and beyond. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) During a meeting on February 12, visiting CENTCOM Commander David Petraeus told Belgium's Foreign Minister Karel De Gucht that Afghanistan and Pakistan present difficult challenges. He noted that Iraq had been extremely challenging in 2006 but is now "vastly better" than it was. He judged the recent Iraq elections were successful from both a security perspective and in terms of the outcome. The level of attacks had dropped from 180 attacks/day in mid-2007 to only 10/day now, including criminal activity and tribal justice. There were still elements of Al Qaida and Sunni extremists and elements of Iran-supported militias operating in Iraq, but he noted the Jaysh Al-Mahdi had been defeated in April 2008. In response to De Gucht's inquiry, Petraeus explained the successful tactics of the March-April 2008 Battle of Sadr City that caused the leadership of the Jaysh Al-Mahdi to flee, primarily to Iran. When asked whether there had been progress in developing the Iraqi Army, Petraeus sa
id the Army was greatly improved and the Iraqi Special Forces were the best in the region. There are now over 600,000 Iraqi security forces. ¶3. (C) Petraeus said car bombs and suicide vest attacks remain a concern in Iraq but their numbers have dropped substantially as have the numbers of civilian deaths. Nevertheless, the situation is Iraq is still fragile: Al Qaeda in Iraq is down but has not given up and there are still malign influences from Iran in the country. However, elections are well under way, with provincial elections completed and district and federal elections coming over the next year. He offered that Iraqi President Al-Maliki deserves a lot of credit for the progress. ¶4. (C) Turning to Afghanistan, Petraeus said that the campaign there would have to be done differently than in Iraq but that the principles were the same as had animated the surge. He described how key counterinsurgency concepts, particularly that of protecting and serving the people, should be operationalized in Afghanistan with the additional forces--NATO must be seen as helping the Afghan people and as a guest in the country. Unlike in Iraq, he noted, the security trends in Afghanistan are spiraling in a negative direction. In 2008, violence there worsened, although still at a level generally lower scale than that until recently in Iraq. Growth in the Afghan National Army has been slow. Afghan President Karzai does not have the same level of central control over his country as does the government in Iraq. Karzai does, nonetheless, have gravitas, presence, and is well-educated. Outsiders also cannot overlook the progress in health care, education, and roads. Also, the narco-economy went down in 2008, and 70% of attacks occurred in 10% of the districts, mainly in the south and east of the country. Petraeus thanked De Gucht for Belgium's deployment of an Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT) to Afghanistan. ¶5. (C) Turning to the tribal areas in Pakistan, De Gucht noted that a Belgian citizen had been kidnapped in BRUSSELS 00000227 002 OF 003 Baluchistan in 2007 but that the Belgians had negotiated his release without paying a ransom and had been helped by the Iranian government. De Gucht believed that much of Afghanistan's opium production goes to Iran and that Europe, the U.S., and Iran have a shared interest in eliminating that trade. However, our targets should be the factories and traffickers, not the peasants and small growers. Petraeus acknowledged that there are shared interests with Iran as the Iranians also do not want the Taliban to rule in Afghanistan again. ¶6. (C) De Gucht, however, said he had doubts about a regional approach to the problems in Afghanistan. He had met Afghan President Karzai several times and found him "erratic." Petraeus replied that a regional approach means that there will not be progress in Afghanistan until there is also progress in Pakistan. De Gucht then asked why the U.S. had "let Musharaf fall." Petraeus stressed that Pakistan now has a popularly-elected government which is still young but gathering itself. Musharaf had made some efforts to gain control over the tribal regions, but they were insufficient and, as a a result, Musharaf had resorted to cutting too many deals that allowed the extremists to expand into the settled areas of Pakistan. The attacks in Mumbai also have had a very negative impact on Pakistan as they drew Pakistani focus, both military and diplomatic, away from Afghanistan and back toward the more comfortable position of taking an adversarial approach to India. Petraeus stressed that Pakistan's position is made more difficult by the fact that 50% of its population is below the poverty line. Nevertheless, Pakistani President Zardari has done better than was expected: he has established himself and sidelined a popular leader, Nawaz Sharif. When De Gucht said he saw Zardari as a puppet, Petraeus responded that Zardari had sacked his national security advisor and is asserting himself. Petraeus added that the West must make a substantial, sustained commitment to support Pakistan. The West must also continue to pay attention to Central Asia and find common ground with Russia, especially over the shared challenges of extremism and the flow of illegal narcotics. ¶7. (C) With regard to Iran, De Gucht said he had met Iranian Speaker of the Parliament Ali Larijani. Noting a difference between Larijani's cleared, vetted public statements, and his private conversations, De Gucht assessed that Larijani is more moderate than other Iranian leaders and is intelligent although there are, in effect, "no moderates in Iran." However, he did think that Larijani had been ousted for being too moderate but that he continues to become more realistic over time. De Gucht said that Iran also has common interests with the West with regard to narcotics. But Iran continues to struggle with finding a balance to pursue these common goals while continuing to make life harder for the U.S. in the region. ¶8. (C) De Gucht believes that Iran will never give up its nuclear weapons program. It is a regional power and both Pakistan and India have nuclear weapons. He believes there is broad popular support in Iran for the nuclear program. Yet, he added, Iran remains an amazing place, an Islamic state where only 5% of the population actually goes to the mosque regularly. ¶9. (C) De Gucht returned to the issue of Afghanistan, noting that it is not easy to find something to replace the income from narcotics. He was in Kunduz a year ago visiting the German PRT there and had been dismayed that at the 3,000 student girls' school there, all the students were wearing chadors and birqas. Petraeus asserted that it remained vital that Afghanistan not become a transit route for international extremists again, and some crops such as wheat and pomegranate may be viable alternatives to the poppy. ¶10. (C) De Gucht cautioned that the West should not underestimate the tribal basis of the society in Afghanistan. He asserted that the majority of the insurgency is Pashtun but they are under-represented in government. The division of power between the communities in Afghanistan must be revisited. Petraeus agreed, saying the U.S. had a clear-eyed view of the task ahead and was aware that it would not be cheap, easy or quick. He noted that Iraq had been hard too. BRUSSELS 00000227 003 OF 003 ¶11. (C) De Gucht said that the Afghan National Army must also be strengthened and that the ANA soldiers must be paid more than what the Taliban pays. Controlling the narcotics trade and the borders are also crucial. De Gucht said that Belgium supports a project focused on Iran's borders and that the OSCE is carrying out similar projects in Tajikistan. Europe's concern is that the drug trade from Afghanistan to Europe passes through Iran. Petraeus concluded the meeting by stressing that Belgium can be proud of what its soldiers and airmen are doing in Afghanistan. ¶12. (C) COMMENT: Over the past year, there has been a sea change in Belgian policies regarding Afghanistan. Belgium has increased its military presence in the country and deployed an OMLT and 4 F-16s. The Belgians are debating sending another OMLT and perhaps participating in a PRT, all this despite severe budget restrictions affecting the defense budget in Belgium. The Belgians have also just lifted their objections to expansion of the Afghan National Army trust fund, an objection which had been based on fear of the budgetary impact of such an agreement. This visit has helped post build substantial good will with the Belgians and should pay dividends down the road. Post hopes to continue to have similar high-level exchanges in the coming months. BUSH .

Share this cable

 facebook -  bluesky -