BELGIUM: SECURITY EXERCISE TESTS POLICE RESPONSE

S E C R E T BRUSSELS 001725 SIPDIS STATE FOR ISN/NESS: JMENTZ AND DFENSTERMACHER DOE/NNSA/NA-243 FOR MELISSA KRUPA E.O. 12958: DNG: CO 12/09/2019 TAGS: ENRG KNNP TRGY TPHY EUN BE SUBJECT: BELGIUM: SECURITY EXERCISE TESTS POLICE RESPONSE TO MOCK ATTACK AT BR-2 NUCLEAR RESEARCH REACTOR REF: A: STATE 65457 Classified By: ACTING DCM Richard EASON, reasons 1.4 (b, d) ¶1. (U) Information in paragraph 4 about the Belgian Design Basis Threat for the BR-2 nuclear research reactor is classified SECRET by Belgian authorities, and is transmitted here to respect that level of classification. SUMMARY -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Belgian local and federal police and officials from the country,s nuclear research center (SCK-CEN) successfully carried out an exercise on December 3 to test the local police's ability to respond to an attack on the country,s nuclear research reactor BR-2, and 'freeze' the situation, thereby preventing the unauthorized removal of the nuclear material (highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel rods). An Embassy officer was invited to observe, along with officials from the nuclear regulatory agency (FANC),federal police, and an agent from the Belgian police CGSU--the special forces unit which would be called upon to respond to an attack. The exercise, the result of months of planning by Belgian officials representing various government and law enforcement agencies, was designed as part of an on-going Belgian response to recommendation G (reftel) of the U.S. physical protection team that visited the BR-2 reactor in May, 2009. In embassy's view, the exercise came off as well-organized, with 13 armed police units responding to quickly to ring the facility to "freeze" the situation -- keeping the attackers within and being on the alert for reinforcements from without. While this exercise was not planned to have a CGSU unit respond, the agent said first responders could arrive as early as 25 to 40 minutes following notification. A police helicopter was alerted as part of the exercise and reported that it could fly to SCK in approximately 24 minutes, but did not actually fly to the reactor site. ¶3. (SBU) Summary continued: Following the exercise, a FANC security official indicated that the police arrived in sufficient time to contain the attackers, according to the Path Delay Timeline (i.e., the amount of time it is assumed that attackers would take to reach their goal, calculated step by step as they work through barriers) that had been developed by police, SCK and CGSU leading up to the exercise. FANC, police and SCK believed improvements could be made, however, and FANC, the overall coordinator of the exercise, has asked all participating agencies to draw up recommendations for lessons learned, and suggested improvements. In Embassy's view, Belgian authorities have made substantial progress since the May 2009 visit in taking a good plan on paper and testing police response times, as well as in creating administrative and communication support that will enable the GOB to continue to improve physical security at the BR-2 reactor in the months and years to come. The nuclear regulator, FANC, has emerged as an important coordinator of the GOB response, something that was not so clearly defined in May 2009, and has shown strong commitment to continue to strengthen coordination of the various entities providing security to BR-2, and clearly sees the physical security of the HEU as a continuous ongoing goal and not something that can be set aside following the result of a particular exercise or exercises. Thanks to the constructive and positive relationship created with Belgian officials by the U.S. physical protection team during the U.S. visit in May, the Embassy considers the current state of physical security at BR-2 to be stronger than it has ever been since U.S. teams first began evaluations in 2003. End summary. Exercise 'Archibald': Basic Elements -------------- ¶4. (S/REL BELGIUM) The exercise, designed to test SCK,s security procedures, communications between SCK and police, and the police response, started at 10 a.m. on Thursday, December 3. For purposes of the exercise, it was assumed that an attack occurred shortly before midnight on a Saturday night was made by a team of assailants equipped according to assumptions of the draft design-basis threat (DBT) which Belgium expects to make official soon. Five attackers were assumed to arrive in a 4x4 vehicle, armed with rifles and carrying a sufficient amount of explosives to allow them to enter into the inner area where the fuel rods are stored. For purposes of the exercise, no vehicle was used, and two role players were attackers, mainly involved in triggered an alarm, one by going over the first of two fences on the southwest section that ring the facility, the second by staging a mock explosive device (it emitted smoke) on an outer door of the BR-2 building. It was then assumed that the five intruders continued towards the area where the HEU fuel rods are stored, through an emergency exit airlock. ¶5. (SBU) The guard at the BR-2 noticed the initial intrusion over the fence, alerting other SCK guard centers (four in all) and local police by pushing a 'silent alarm' button that also automatically locked all access points into BR-2. An audio alarm alerted the guard, and video cameras on the closed circuit system moved in response to the attacker,s movements and zoomed in; these systems appeared to work as designed (confirmed by authorities during the debrief). The guard spoke loudly and clearly, first indicating simply that he saw intruders at the fence wearing backpacks, possibly armed. Shortly after the first attacker went over the fence (with the aid of a ladder),a second attacker 'exploded' a device to gain entry into the BR-2 building; the guard was alerted to the smoke on his video screen and alerted the SCK guards and police (note: once the guard hit the silent alarm, the local police were able to hear everything said subsequently. End note.) For safety reasons this attacker, did not scale the second fence with concertina wire. Once the local guard initially triggered the alarm, the regional police dispatching service in Antwerp ("CIC") was automatically notified and responded within one to two minutes and began moving vehicles to the facility. ¶6. (SBU) After observing the initial alarm and subsequent explosion, and the local guard,s responses, embassy and FANC and SCK observers verified that doors and the regular entry/exits into the building were locked (at one point, an SCK employee not involved in the exercise came to the entry system but could not gain entry, and another employee also not part of the exercise but inside the building was not allowed by the system to leave). Observers were then taken inside BR-2 to one of the airlock entrances to the interior of the reactor, and shown that that system also would deny entry (by a SCK employee who had access normally but was denied). ¶7. (SBU) Observers then went to the guard station at the main entry gate to SCK at approximately 10:20 a.m., where local police officers had already gathered and were communicating with the CIC dispatcher and with the police vehicles that were arriving at the 13 checkpoints that had been identified before the exercise took place as being critical checkpoints or observation points, based on input from SCK, local police, and the CGSU. About 6 to 8 senior police officers were already in place and communicating via walkie-talkie with CIC Antwerp and arriving police cars going to their 13 pre-planned checkpoints around the several kilometers of road that ring SCK; the CGSU commando was also there and observing. There were a great number of well-armed police officers posted outside the main entrance (which was shut down). In addition, the police had a mobile command/communication vehicle (a very large van with telecommunications equipment and extra seating space) ready to be used as needed, although it was not used during the exercise itself except to give a briefing to the exercise observers. Some police officers had arrived in 8 to 10 minutes. Police were using maps and speaking on walkie-talkies. Communication seemed organized. The local police chief had alerted the mayor,s office very early on after hearing an incident was taking place at BR-2. ¶8. (SBU) A SCK security official involved in the exercise arrived in about 20 minutes (the amount of time it had been previously determined it would have taken him to arrive from his home) and began his role of passing information provided by SCK guards to the police officials at the main entrance. An additional SCK employee knowledgeable of the layout and the possible radiation risks of the nuclear research facility arrived in just over 20 minutes, called in to escort police and/or CGSU special forces inside the facility in the event needed. FANC informed the embassy observer that a police helicopter was alerted shortly after the initial alarm by the regional police center at CIC Antwerp and would have arrived at the site in approximately 24 minutes of being notified. The helicopter,s mission would be reconnaissance -- tracking movements of the attackers should they have exited SCK, or of any suspicious vehicles moving towards SCK, and the like. ¶9. (SBU) According to the CGSU representative, the first CGSU agent/s could arrive at the facility in approximately 25 to 40 minutes, via road from Antwerp, with others to follow via helicopter from either Antwerp, Ghent, or Brussels. CGSU units train for crisis situations, including hostage-taking, the CGSU agent said, and are trained and prepared to react quickly to events and could respond to one at BR-2. (Note: CGSU was involved in the planning of the Path Delay Timeline, the December 3 exercise, and in the preparation of the table-top exercise that preceded the December 3 event. End note.) ¶10. (SBU) The police and observers then left the Main Entrance to see the police units at the 13 pre-determined strategic points around SCK that CGSU and police had determined before the exercise as best for either observation of the facility by police or deterring any unauthorized incoming or outgoing vehicles. Each police car had at least two agents, armed (with what appeared to be automatic or semi-automatic weapons),and each also had devices to throw across the road to puncture tires in the event an unauthorized car attempted to enter or exit SCK grounds. Vehicles were at locations where they could easily block traffic in either direction. Police also monitored the BR-2 facility, as well as a bridge and a canal in the event the attackers tried to get away via boat; a locked gate barred passage under the bridge, and a police car was located just outside the bridge, in the event a boat nonetheless somehow made it through or a boat attempted to arrive from the outside trying to go in. Once the observers saw all 13 units, the exercise was ended and participants and observers returned to a room at SCK that was the designated operations center for a debriefing. DEBRIEFING -------------- ¶11. (SBU) In the debriefing, the local police chief indicated that although he was overall basically satisfied with the response of police vehicles/forces, he believed it possible through improved communication to gain some more time in bringing police assets to the SCK site. One policeman reiterated that the police understood full well the critical importance of responding/arriving quickly to SCK, under the assumption that intruders would move fast to get inside BR-2. (Note: in creating their projected Path Delay Time, officials told embassy observer that they have added certain unspecified features to increase the delay times, but are continuing to evaluate additional actions to take to create additional delays. End note). The federal police crisis planner (a briefer to the U.S. team in May) said he thought that local police did a good job in taking positions in an organized and timely manner to 'freeze' the situation until CGSU agents would arrive. FANC pointed out that based on how the situation might develop, the CIC dispatcher in Antwerp would be able to send more police units to SCK as needed, having specialized software and information available to track police resources and movements throughout the immediate area and the region (including bringing reinforcements to maintain public order to places where existing police had been summoned to SCK). Embassy observer was told that police vehicles coming to the BR-2 as part of the exercise for public safety reasons observed regular traffic safety precautions (i.e., did not drive at high-speed with sirens), and that therefore some of the units would have been able to get to the area even faster. ¶12. (SBU) A SCK security official indicated that the facility's technical alarm, cameras and guards also appeared to function well during the exercise. SCK will nonetheless be studying possibilities of improvements based on a more in-depth analysis of the equipment and guard responses to take place following the exercise. (Note: FANC indicated that all entities involved in the exercise will be preparing reports and analysis of their participation to share and/or submit to FANC. End note.) The SCK secuity official involved in the exercise said once he was notified that an incident was occurring, he had immediately called the SCK Director General and FANC security (this was verified by both FANC and the DG). FANC in turn verified that as part of the exercise its safety and security departments were also notified of an incident and put on alert (to deal with possible of public health issues/response in the event of a radiation-causing incident). The CSGU representative added that he thought police did a good job of sharing intelligence, specifically in informing that a dirty bomb could be created if rods put in contact with water. While this exercise was not designed to have hostages or sabotage, he said CGSU was equipped to deal with those issues; SCK has a system to identify the location of employees inside BR-2. He said CGSU participation in designing the Path Delay Time, in a table top exercise that preceded exercise Archibald, and in the December 3 exercise itself would improve the ability of the CGSU to respond to a threat to the facility, and improve the response of the police (for example, in determining where police units should go to secure the perimeter of SCK). Next Steps -------------- ¶13. (SBU) In a meeting with the embassy observer in the days following the exercise, a FANC official indicated that the agency has tasked SCK with drafting a follow-up report with details on the various parts of the exercise. Each participating agency, including the police force, is being asked to provide recommendations for improvement. FANC has also asked SCK to address the status of any open recommendations from the U.S. recommendations following the May 2009 visit, as well as from the table-top exercise from Fall 2009. ¶14. (SBU) FANC will continue to focus on implementation of further actions to increase delay times. FANC will also plan additional exercises with SCK, and will work with CGSU regarding involvement by the police special forces unit in an exercise at BR-2 in 2010 or 2011. ¶15. SCK Director General Eric Van Walle indicated that in 2010 SCK plans to hold a high-level security seminar in which the Prime Minister would be expected to take part, SCK having already briefed him on the matter. Van Walle also said SCK wishes to organize a high-level event with the USG to discuss HEU-related issues. ¶16. (SBU) Participating agencies included: SCK-CEN: BR-2 officials, Safety and Security Department, and Public Relations FANC: Observers (from Security and Safety offices), Public Relations Police: Local (from tri-town of Balen-Dessel-Mol); Federal (based in Turnhout),CIC Antwerp (dispatcher),CGSU (Special Forces--observer) ¶17. (U) The Director General of Belgium,s nuclear regulatory agency, FANC, Mr Willy de Rooveere, attended a luncheon/informal debriefing involving participants and observers, in a signal of the importance FANC placed on the exercise. Comment -------------- ¶18. (SBU) Since the visit in May 2009 of the USG physical protection assessment team, Belgian authorities have taken a number of important steps, including the December 3 exercise testing police response times, that are improving the Government of Belgium,s ability to protect the highly enriched uranium at the BR-2 facility. For one, the nuclear regulator, FANC, has taken the initiative in coordinating the overall GOB response to physical security at BR-2, improving communication within the GOB and with the USG via the Embassy. Besides coordinating the GOB interim response to the May 2009 recommendations of the USG physical protection team, FANC organized a multi-agency table-top exercise that preceded Exercise Archibald and highlighted improvements to be made as a result; it also coordinated input on the Path Delay Timeline. FANC also participated in study and elaboration of the Path Delay Timeline at BR-2. It is overseeing the SCK,s evaluation of the December 3 exercise and the multi-agency recommendations for improvements ( lessons learned,) and envisions additional exercises at BR-2 on a regular basis. Senior SCK and FANC officials are aware and fully supportive of the need for the increased attention to security at BR-2. ¶19. (SBU) Given the importance of BR-2 in the supply chain of global production of medical radio-isotopes, Embassy Brussels is encouraged that the GOB has diligently taken steps to strengthen the physical security of Belgium,s sole nuclear research facility since the May 2009 USG physical protection team visit by improving communication, planning and most recently testing police response. FANC plans to build on the December 3 event in future exercises, including at some point the involvement of a CGSU unit. DOE may wish to consider reminding Belgian officials of the open-ended invitation made in May 2009 by the visiting DOE force-on-force expert to observe a force-on-force exercise at a U.S. nuclear facility. Embassy observer verbally reiterated that invitation at the debrief of Exercise Archibald, but a more formal invitation, to include a calendar of possible exercises in the United States during 2010 and 2011, might be useful. Post believes in particular that FANC, CGSU and SCK representatives would most benefit from observing an exercise. GUTMAN .