INTERNATIONAL CIVILIAN EFFORT IN AFGHANISTAN:

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 001638 SIPDIS FOR THE SECRETARY PLEASE PASS TO GENERAL JONES E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2024 TAGS: AF EUN MARR MOPS PGOV PREL EAID PINS SUBJECT: INTERNATIONAL CIVILIAN EFFORT IN AFGHANISTAN: SRAPS AGREE NEXT STEPS BRUSSELS 00001638 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: USEU Deputy Political Counselor Mary T. Curtin for reaso n 1.4B/D ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: During Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke's December 2 meeting with NATO and EU SRAP counterparts he: -- Elicited a consensus among SRAPs that Afghan elections in May 2010 were neither possible nor desirable until electoral and constitutional reforms were achieved; and -- Explained options for improved coordination of the civilian effort in Afghanistan, with SRAPs voicing strong support for enhancing the roles of both UNAMA and the NATO Senior Civilian Representative. ¶2. (S) SRAPs agreed that Karzai should be consulted soon on a formula for replacing the planned elections with alternative consultative mechanisms while the conditions for adequate elections are put in place. This delicate task would require exceptionally careful coordination and sequencing. Holbrooke's SRAP colleagues reacted positively to the President's announcement (Ref A),however, Swedish SRAP Enestrom and UK SRAP Cowper-Coles asserted that the U.S. and its partners should Qrk to produce a comprehensive regional strategy involving Afghanistan's neighbors. END SUMMARY REACTIONS TO POTUS SPEECH ¶3. (S) Swedish Special Envoy Anna Karin Enestrom, acting as EU President, organized an informal meeting of most Special Representatives for Afghanistan at the EU Council's headquarters in Brussels on December 2. Our partners' reactions to President's speech the previous night were uniformly positive, although Enestrom and the UK's Sherard Cowper-Coles said that they had noted the absence of the mention of a regional strategy in the President's speech (in contrast with the President's address on March 27, 2009). Cowper-Coles also lamented that the speech lacked an "internal political strategy" for repairing the &broken Bonn Agreement.8 Cowper-Coles outlined his own concept for bringing Afghans together with a jirga-based consultative process that could -- after a delay for necessary constitutional and electoral reforms -- eventually be linked to local and national elections. Enestrom and other SRAPs also noted the importance of helping President Karzai to deliver on the commitments he made his inauguration speech. THE SPRING ELECTIONS ¶4. (S) There was a general consensus among SRAPs that the next round of elections must be delayed. Enestrom noted that Kai Eide had said it could take three years to create sufficient conditions for fair elections. Only Turkey initially advocated holding the elections in May as scheduled so that Afghans do not question the international commitment to supporting Karzai's program. Cowper-Coles responded that as elections were a "physical impossibility" there was no point in even considering that logic. SRAP Holbrooke noted that the U.S. had not yet defined a position on this question. (Although the Secretary had recently been informed by Karzai that he wanted to hold the elections in May.) He BRUSSELS 00001638 002.4 OF 003 emphasized how important it was not to repeat the experience of the most recent presidential elections, which had been an expensive setback. French representative Jasmine Zerenini said that Paris was inclined to support postponing the elections, however, it would be necessary to replace them with a "democratic counterpart." She said this needed to be discussed with Karzai. Germany and others agreed that it would not be desirable to repeat the experience of the recent elections. ¶5. (S) EU Special Representative Ettore Sequi noted that the decision to postpone the elections must be taken by Afghans. Karzai would need to be reassured, said Sequi. An "incremental approach" was needed, he advised, and SRAPs should consider the positions of India, Russia and China and figure out how to coordinate with them on this issue. Several SRAPs also noted that China, India and Russia, among others, would need to be brought into the process at some point. Holbrooke responded by noting that China was likely to take a fairly reserved position on this issue, while Moscow and Delhi might more actively support postponing elections. ¶6. (S) The European Commission's James Moran noted that the EU election monitoring mission's report is almost completed and will contain a lengthy list of deficiencies. Addressing them provides a clear technical rationale for delaying the elections, he suggested. Cowper-Cole brought the discussion of how to replace the elections with a suitable democratic structure back to his proposals for jirgas to take on constitutional reform while providing democratic legitimacy and a more stable political system. His ideas seemed to find some traction among SRAPs and Holbrooke hoped they could be further developed and clearly laid out in the near future. ¶7. (S) The pitfalls of trying to holailPsssiblQ to hold the elections in May; -- Postponin them must be an Afghan decision; -- A proces3 was need to address the "democratic deficit;" -- Electoral and constitutional reforms were required; -- A repetition of the 2009 election experience would have severely negative consequences for the international effort in Afghanistan. She described the next steps as discussing the issue and SRAP ideas with Kai Eide and General McChrystal, with a view towards a meeting of UNAMA SRSG Kai Eide, COMISAF General McChrystal and EU SR Sequi with Karzai to discuss the topic. This would be coordinated with the rollout of the EU elections observer mission's report and its list of needed electoral reforms. BRUSSELS 00001638 003.2 OF 003 IMPROVING INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION - CIVILIAN COORDINATOR ¶9. (S) Turning to the need for better coordination of civilian efforts in Afghanistan, Holbrooke said that this question was receiving attention at the highest levels of the USG. He explained three options for improving international cooperation by creating an empowered civilian counterpart to COMISAF: -- strengthen UNAMA and the role of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General; -- elevate the NATO Senior Civilian Representative and reinforce his small staff; or -- dual-hat the U.S. Ambassador as Senior Civilian Coordinator. ¶10. (S) The SRAPs preferred to enhance the roles of both the UN SRSG and the NATO Senior Civilian Representative. There was strong support from all who spoke for strengthening both UNAMA and the NATO SCR. Sweden expressed some reservations about how far to expand the role of NATO's SCR, but others were supportive. Australia asked that it be relabeled as NATO/ISAF Senior Civilian Representative so that some Australian civilians could be placed under the NATO/ISAF SCR's umbrella. ¶11. (S) Conversely, there was no appetite for double-hatting the U.S. Ambassador as an international coordinator of civilian assistance and, as expected, strong opposition from France. Zerenini, while supporting the idea of reinforcing the role of the NATO SCR, described the options of dual hatting either the U.S. Ambassador or the NATO SCR as ideas that "we are absolutely not comfortable with" due to the difficulty in engaging neighbors if the U.S. or NATO led the civilian effort. ¶12. (S) Coordination problems stemmed largely from countries' unwillingness to accept coordination, said France's Zerinini, acknowledging that France was sometimes reluctant to bring its development efforts in Afghanistan under an international umbrella. Norway's Janis Bjorn Kanavin made a similar point. There were several calls for better use of the JCMB, and a suggestion that it be expanded to be able to do more detailed work. The UK's Cowper-Coles also offered a number of ideas for better making use of coordinating committees and bodies. ¶13. (U) This cable was reviewed and cleared by SRAP Holbrooke. MURRAY .