U/S BURNS TO EU: NEED TO INCREASE THE PRESSURE ON

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 BRUSSELS 001562 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/2019 TAGS: PARM PREL ECON EUN UNSC IR ETTC SUBJECT: U/S BURNS TO EU: NEED TO INCREASE THE PRESSURE ON IRAN BRUSSELS 00001562 001.2 OF 005 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Christopher Murray for reasons 1 .4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) Summary: On November 20, Under Secretary Burns pressed upon EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) Ambassadors a sober outlook on Iran's nuclear program and policies. We are rapidly reaching the limits of what existing pressure measures on Iran can achieve, he said. Burns noted that despite unprecedented U.S. engagement, openness, and flexibility, Iran had continued to ignore its obligations aand EU Council Director-General Robert Cooper reinforced U/S Burns' points. Other delegatQons asked questions on pending U.S. legislati/n related to Iran, on the effectiveness of sanctions, and on the likelihood of an Israeli miliary attack against Iranian nuclear sites. U/Q Burns also updated the PSC on U.S. relati/ns with Russia. End Summary. -------------- WORKING BREAKFAST WITHPSC AMBASSADORS -------------- Q -------------- ¶3. (S) The EU Political and SecurQty Committee (PSC) hosted a working breakfQst of EU PSC Ambassadors with U/S Burns on November 20. This exchange preceded subsequent EU3 1 and P5 1 political directors meetings. Spanish PSC Ambassador Carlos Fernandez-Arias Minuesa, acting in place of the traveling Swedish Ambassador Olaf Skoog, opened the breakfast by asking U/S Burns to review the Obama administration's policy towards Iran and to suggest next steps for the international community. U/S Burns responded by congratulating the EU on the previous day's selection of a new Council President and High Representative. He then announced that he had come to Brussels with a sober message on Iran. Calling attention to the President's statements in Asia, U/S Burns said the United States since the beginning of the Obama administration had taken a new approach by offering to engage directly with Iran, and by working with our partners to develop a series of creative proposals that would permit Iran to begin to demonstrate the peaceful intentions of its nuclear program. Burns said our commitment to this approach was reflected in the President's Nowruz message, as well as in private messages to Iran's leaders, and had been articulated consistently throughout the year. It was reinforced further by our readiness, for the first time, to become a full and active participant in the EU3 3's efforts to engage Iran on the nuclear file, including via a bilateral meeting with Iran on the margins of the talks on October 1 in Geneva. During the past ten months, Burns said, the U.S. had stated clearly our support for Iran's right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, provided Iran meets its international obligations and carries out its responsibilities within the NPT framework. He noted that the United States also gave active support, with Mohammed ElBaradei and our French and Russian partners, to the IAEA's efforts to provide fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). This approach had presented Iran with an opportunity to reassure the BRUSSELS 00001562 002.2 OF 005 international community about its intentions for its nuclear program. But, as the President had noted in Asia, it now seems increasingly clear that Iran is not going to respond to this opportunity. -------------- A PACKAGE OF CONSEQUENCES -------------- ¶4. (S) U/S Burns called particular attention to Iran's inability to accept the balanced proposal for the TRR, Iran's refusal since the Geneva talks to participate in further discussions on its nuclear program, and Iran's continued development of a nuclear program regardless of international concerns and IAEA and UNSC requirements -- most starkly in its construction of a secret uranium enrichment facility at a military base near Qom. These developments force us to begin consideration of a package of consequences for Iran that will indicate our serious concerns. The two tracks of our strategy -- engagement and pressure -- were always intended to run in parallel. Without a credible threat of consequences, it is unlikely that Iran will make a strategic or even a tactical change in direction. Burns said our emphasis in 2009 had been on outreach rather than pressure. But unfortunately, the international community has little new to show for it. -------------- HOW WE GOT HERE: THE TRR PROPOSAL -------------- ¶5. (S) Burns, in reviewing how the international community arrived at this juncture, began by discussing the October Geneva talks. In Geneva, the EU3 3 had sought Iran's commitment to three concrete actions: supporting the IAEA's proposal for refueling the TRR; facilitating the IAEA's full investigation of the previously clandestine uranium enrichment plant at Qom; and agreeing to a follow-on meeting between P5 1 Political Directors and Iranian representatives by the end of October, explicitly focused on nuclear issues but open to discussion of any issues raised by any party. On the TRR, Burns said all parties except Iran had agreed to the IAEA's good and balanced proposal, which offered Iran the opportunity to convert most of its stockpile of low enriched uranium (LEU) to higher-enriched uranium fuel with the help of Russia and France. The U.S. supported this arrangement despite the risks because Iranian agreement to the proposal would help build confidence in Iran's nuclear intentions. It would also buy time to pursue diplomacy further. When Iran expressed concern about elements of the proposal, Burns said the United States offered to join the deal formally, the EU3 3 as a whole offered to guarantee the deal through a political statement, and the U.S. said it was willing to support safety upgrades to the TRR once the LEU left the country. The U.S. also offered to move the LEU to a third country outside of Iran and place it in escrow as a guarantee of the fuel's ultimate delivery. Nevertheless, FM Mottaki's recent comments made clear that Iran probably will not accept this proposal, thus raising serious questions about Iranian intentions. -------------- THE QOM FACILITY -------------- ¶6. (S) U/S Burns talked next about Iran's Qom facility. Iran had agreed to grant IAEA inspectors access to the facility, and an inspection had occurred from October 24-29. That inspection, Burns said, revealed a facility that makes no sense in the context of Iran's civilian program: i is too small to support a civilian power program but suitably sized for a weapons program. Meanwhile, Iran had misrepresented the timing and details of the facility's construction, and had not fulfilled all of the IAEA's requests for access to information and personnel. IAEA Director-General ElBaradei's November 16 report makes clear that this facility and the circumstances surrounding it raise the specter of additional such undeclared facilities. Iran has not responded clearly BRUSSELS 00001562 003.2 OF 005 to IAEA questions about such facilities. Compounding these concerns is the continued pace of Iranian enrichment, Iran's steadfast refusal to abide by the UNSC's requirement to suspend all such work, and the open questions that surround credible evidence about Iran's past efforts to develop a nuclear warhead for missile delivery. -------------- THE FOLLOW-ON MEETING THAT WASN'T -------------- ¶7. (S) U/S Burns called attention to Iran's refusal to accept a follow-on meeting, as it had agreed in the October 1 Geneva meeting, with an agenda that includes the nuclear program. Burns said the United States appreciates EU High Rep Solana's efforts to arrange a meeting, and called Iran's rebuffing of these offers a setback to where. began active outreach positive path set in Geneva. -------------- THE NEED FOR PRESQURE: AN APPEAL TO THE EU -------------- ¶9. (S) U/S Burns asserted that pressure is not an end in itself Rather, pressure is a means to encourage Iran to recalculate costs and benefits and to begina course of constructive engagement at the neQotiating table. Without unmistakable and meaingful consequences, however, there seems to be little prospect for such a development. Burns defined the EU as our most important partner in these efforts and noted that the EU has been effective and forward-leaning in implementing the existing UNSC sanctions regime and the Financial Action Task Force's recommendations. More can and must be done under existing authorities. As our efforts to engage remain fruitless, we need to prepare to take more steps on the pressure track. ¶10. (S) Burns said the first opportunity to increase the pressure on Iran will be next week's IAEA Board of Governors meeting. This meeting should send the message to Iran that it must immediately bring its nuclear program into line with international requirements. Beyond that meeting, if Iran remains uncooperative, we should look by the end of the year to additional action from the UN Security Council. The U.S. would work closely with EU Member States and other partners in devising appropriate UNSC measures. ¶11. (S) Burns told Ambassadors that the U.S. and EU must be prepared to amplify the efforts of the UN Security Council and take additional measures to complement an UNSCR. The United States would look to work together with the EU in the weeks ahead to begin to devise the necessary steps both inside and alongside the UNSC process, building on the statements from the European Council meetings in April and BRUSSELS 00001562 004.2 OF 005 October. The European Union could help this process enormously by sending a clear political message at the next heads of state European Council on December 10. The Council should highlight Europe's determination to set serious consequences for Iran's continued refusal to engage with the international community. At this stage, more pressure appears to be the only way to bring about the diplomatic solution that we all seek. President Obama has tried hard to find creative diplomatic paths to a solution, and the U.S. will remain open to engagement, but the time has come to demonstrate to Iran the consequences of continuing to refuse to take up the opportunities before it. -------------- ASKING QUESTIONS, FEW POLICY STATEMENTS -------------- ¶12. (S) Incoming Spanish EU Presidency Ambassador Fernandez-Arias thanked U/S Burns for what he called a "very sober assessment." He said the EU was following the issue closely and was seeking to arrive at an EU-wide position by the end of the year. European Commission Director for Crisis Management and Foreign Policy Coordination, Richard Wright, also noted the "sobering" character of Iran's nuclear activities. He asked about the outlook for several legislative bills pending in the U.S. Congress, including one that would impose restrictions on Iranian trade in refined petroleum products. U/S Burns said there was a very real chance that some kind of legislation would move forward. The Obama administration was in close touch with Congress and the administration would be in a stronger position to make effective arguments if the international community is seen as acting to impose consequences. He noted that, to be effective, sanctions require the widest possible international support and enforcement. Dutch Ambassador Marjanne De Kwaasteniet said the Dutch Embassy in Tehran had reported that Iran is talking to Russia about Iran simultaneously receiving fuel rods when Iran ships out its LEU. U/S Burns responded by describing the admirable unity among partners behind the core elements of Mohammed ElBaradei's proposal to take 1,200 kg of LEU out of Iran by January 15 for further enrichment and Russia returning fuel to Iran. ¶13. (S) Greek Ambassador Themistoklis Demiris asked about U.S. contacts with China, Russia and Israel, questioning specifically whether Washington was encouraging Israel to take a "less kinetic" approach. U/S Burns said the U.S. had been in close contact with China and Russia, including discussions this week between the President and Chinese President Hu. He called attention to Russian President Medvedev's own statement of concern about Iran's lack of a response to the TRR proposal. He expressed guarded optimism about another UNSCR if Iran continues to refuse to negotiate and fulfill its obligations to the international community. On Israel, he asked the EU not to underestimate the pressure that the Israeli leadership feels as Iran continues to flout nuclear obligations. ¶14. (S) The French deputy PSC Ambassador, Didier Canesse, said Paris "fully shares your assessment that it is time to increase the pressure on Iran." He asked about the importance of the Iranian elections on Tehran's approach. U/S Burns said we should exercise humility when trying to evaluate Iranian politics. But, he said, the instability and divisions within the Iranian elite seemed to have contributed to the regime's inability to respond constructively to the IAEA and other proposals. For many Iranians, Burns said, opening up to the West is attractive, but the leadership's infighting in the wake of elections, including over who would get credit for any opening to the U.S., makes it difficult for the regime to develop coherent and constructive responses to P5 1 and other proposals. ¶15. (S) Luxembourg's Ambassador, Michele Pranchere-Tomassini, asked about Turkey's role. Burns said the U.S. and others would be willing to have Turkey act as a third-country escrow site for the 1,200 kg of LEU for the TRR. The Turks seem willing, he said, but Iranian FM Mottaki BRUSSELS 00001562 005.2 OF 005 indicated that he opposes the idea. Hungary's deputy PSC Ambassador, Zoltan Varga, asked again about the U.S. role in the TRR proposal. U/S Burns answered that we had clearly signaled our willingness to contribute in three ways: 1) be a party to the agreement with Iran; 2) support a third-country escrow site; 3) even support safety upgrades of the TRR through the IAEA after the LEU is transferred. ¶16. (S) Robert Cooper, EU Council Secretariat Director-General for External and Political-Military Relations, offered that the TRR proposal could buy time and build confidence, but it would not remove the international community's concerns about the Iranian nuclear program. He asked for the U.S. assessment of the prospects for further UNSC sanctions, questioning how the U.S. and EU could ensure others do not step in to fill the void if the UNSC cannot reach a new resolution and the U.S. and EU need to act independently. U/S B revived serious disarmQment talks, and we hope for a successful concQusion to the START negotiations, which will l!y a positive foundation for the NPT RevCon. Burns noted that the U.S. and Russia are also cooerating on Afghanistan, especially with thQ agreement to transport lethal material to Afhanistan through Russia. ¶18. (S) UK PSC Ambassador Tim Barrow said the PSC had visited Gergia last week, where he was struck by GeorgianQ sensitivities and fear of renewed conflict. Barrow speculated Russia could simply be usQng rhetoric to inflame the Georgians. U/S Burns said he did not think that either the Russian or Georgian leadership wanted to move towards conflict. Even so, Burns noted that the international community must remain wary about certain volatile factions. Burns said the Geneva process is helping to tamp down aggressive rhetoric, and expressed appreciation for the EU's own monitoring efforts. ¶19. (U) U/S Burns has cleared this cable. MURRAY .