EU MAKING THE "COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH" ITS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BRUSSELS 001561 SIPDIS NOFORN S/CRS FOR JSTACEY E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2019 TAGS: MARR MOPS PREL EUN CD IZ AF SO SUBJECT: EU MAKING THE "COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH" ITS TRADEMARK IN CRISIS RESPONSE REF: A. USEU BRUSSELS 401 ¶B. USEU BRUSSELS 463 ¶C. USEU TODAY OCTOBER 20 2009 ¶D. USEU BRUSSELS 692 ¶E. USEU BRUSSELS 810 ¶F. USEU BRUSSELS 878 ¶G. USEU BRUSSELS 1346 ¶H. USEU BRUSSELS 1344 ¶I. USEU BRUSSELS 1480 ¶J. USEU BRUSSELS 1414 Classified By: Pol M-C Christopher Davis for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C//NF) Summary: The EU's added value to international security is its ability to apply a broad range of developmental, humanitarian, civilian, and military instruments. The UN is the only other multilateral organization to do that, according to the European Commission Director for Crisis Platforms and Foreign Policy Coordination. Despite the EU's resources, EU officials concede practice often falls short. Successfully employing what the EU calls the "European Comprehensive Approach" requires bringing a sometimes elusive combination of political support and planning efforts to unique missions. European Commission officials say they can work closely with the Council to design programs that complement EU military operations, but they acknowledge the difficulty in applying the Comprehensive Approach in all cases. The EU cites the recent operation in Chad and ongoing efforts for Somalia as successful examples, whereas deep divisions stovepiped and weakened its efforts in Iraq. Where the EU applies the Comprehensive Approach, something it may do more often under the Lisbon Treaty, we could have a coherent, well-funded partner in the field. Even where EU efforts are splintered and stovepiped, however, we can capitalize on Commission coffers as well as the will of Member States to apply their expertise in particular areas to advance joint efforts. End Summary. -------------- Chad: A Coordinated Effort -------------- ¶2. (C) EU officials frequently cite Chad, where the EU employed a mix of short, medium and long-term development instruments to complement an EU military operation, as its most successful use of the Comprehensive Approach (REF A). The European Commission developed a response plan by working in close concert with counterparts in the Council Secretariat, thereby overcoming the institutional stovepiping that often typifies the EU's erstwhile three pillar system, which separates developmental, foreign policy, and judicial issues. In this case, EU officials say the Commission's action was planned and executed in concert with the year-long European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) operation. ¶3. (U) From March 2008 until March 2009, an EU military mission (EUFOR TCHAD) was deployed to Chad to protect internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugee camps, to facilitate humanitarian aid, and to increase support and deployment of African Union/ United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID). According to EU public documents, EUFOR TCHAD was effective in providing medical treatment to the local population, establishing water purification facilities, distributing food aid, and supporting the voluntary return of 10,000 internally displaced people to 22 Chadian villages. Its efforts were complemented by the generous and effective employment of othe2n Commission's quick rement for Stability, underQRCAT efforts to train Qe forces for refugee #ct return zones for he same time, the EuropQ development fund, the EuQd (EDF),provided almossupport good governancl settings, public finances, democratic process and institutions, decentralization, the rQduction of poverty, and the absorption of petQol revenue. ¶4. (C) In a meeting with PolOff3 on November 5, Commission official Pierre Seailles described EU efforts in Chad as a BRUSSELS 00001561 002 OF 005 good example of the application of the Comprehensive Approach. The Council took the initiative by preparing a military operation, he said, while the Commission's crisis management unit planned the complementary program to support MINURCAT's police training. The EU's military operation was therefore planned with the understanding that EU funds would support policing in the IDP and refugee camps, allowing the EU to address both the military and police aspects of security. Seailles indicated further that funding for UN police efforts may soon become part of the EU's longer term development aid through the EDF, after initially being funded through the short-term crisis response tool, the Instrument for Stability. -------------- Somalia: A Current Example -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Somalia is an important current example of how the EU is using European Commission tools to complement military operations, and where the EU is thinking comprehensively across EU institutions about next steps. The European Commission has historically provided funds for aid, primarily humanitarian activities including nutrition, water, and sanitation. The Somalia Portion of the 9th EDF provided funds to Somalia in an attempt to improve governance and security support systems, provide support to both the social sector, such as education and health systems, and the agricultural sector. However, the Commission confronts the same challenges that hamper other international community efforts: persistent insecurity, government incapacity, and the politicization of aid. ¶6. (C) Complementing its development and humanitarian aid, the Commission funds the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) peacekeepers from its African Peace Facility (APF). Although the APF confronts persistent difficulties in AU absorption capacity, APF funds have thus far provided 35.5 million euros to support AMISOM salaries and non-lethal aid (REF B). At a meeting on October 29, Commission officials told us that they had reached an agreement with the AU to disburse the 60 million euros pledged at the April Somalia donors' conference and to make that support retroactive to pay the months-long backlog in AMISOM troops' salaries. ¶7. (C) On the Council side, the EU's growing interest in Somalia began with its ATALANTA anti-piracy naval operation. This mission is working with interested non-EU countries such as Norway and Croatia to patrol the waters off the Horn of Africa, and has developed a widely praised system to network with merchant shippers and provide advice and guidance on reducing susceptibility to piracy. EU officials tell us it is now contemplating expanding the mission to include capacity building training for regional coast guards, or providing funding and expertise to the information exchange and coast guard training centers envisioned under the IMO Djibouti Code of Conduct, an internationally-agreed, regional, maritime capacity building plan. These Council efforts would build on the 14-16 million euros to be provided via the Commission's Instrument for Stability for the creation of these centers (REF C). ¶8. (C) To tackle the thorny problem of pirate prosecutions, the EU signed agreements with Kenya in March and the Seychelles in October of 2009 that enables the EU to take captured supects to those countries for trial. Complementing these agreements, the European Commission launched a 1.75 million euro program to support Kenyan judicial capacity ) perhaps the clearest recent example of the Comprehensive Approach (REF D). This initative was expanded to Seychelles BRUSSELS 00001561 003 OF 005 through an agreement signed in November 2009. ¶9. (C) The EU is now contemplating future action in Somalia along six lines of action from security forces capacity building to increased development assistance and the appointment of a Special Representative for political relations (REF E-G). EU officials have repeatedly told us that in considering future efforts, Council Secretariat and Commission RELEX personnel have worked closely and collaboratively. Some even see the cooperative work on Somalia is setting an example for the merger of EU institutions under the Lisbon Treaty into the European External Action Service (REF J). The high political priority placed on greater EU action in Somalia has also contributed to the willingness of EU officials to work across institutional lines. ¶10. (C) However, legal restrictions on European Commission funds limit the extent to which the Commission can support an ESDP mission to train Somali forces. As EU Member States contemplate such a mission, they confront the difficult issues of salary payment, airlift and transport, and the provision of weapons and equipment for Somali forces. While EU African Peace Facility funds can be used to provide non-lethal aid to AU peacekeepers, they cannot be used for Somali national forces. Nor can Instrument for Stability money be spent providing direct support to the Somali National Security Forces. Indeed, Commission officials tell us any direct support to the Transitional Federal Government(TFG) is problematic, as the TFG has not ratified the Cotonou Agreement that governs the provision of EU development assistance to African governments. The Commission is discussing initiatives to complement an ESDP operation, but the restrictions on its development instruments limit the EU's ability to apply the Comprehensive Approach without asking Member States, which are themselves feeling the burden of the economic crisis. -------------- Iraq: When Politicized Differences Interfere -------------- ¶11. (C) By contrast, the EU has had difficulty in developing a consensus on what it wants to accomplish in Iraq, and about maintaining a presence on the ground in Baghdad. The European Commission's Capacity Building Program for Iraq 2009-2010 describes Iraq as being in dire need, but acknowledges, "it is clearly impossible to encompass all areas that international support would be needed." Instead of acting comprehensively, therefore, the EU has selected a few areas where it is applying its development assistance. ¶12. (U) In 2008, the Commission announced a 72.6 million euro Special Measure for Iraq under EuropeAid's Development cooperation instrument. However, in the Commission's January 2009 State of Play report, while this money had been allocated to projects in eight sectors, these programs had not yet begun. When they do, they will be facilitated by international organizations such as the WHO, UNICEF, and UNHCR, as well as neighboring states including Jordan and Syria. ¶13. (U) The EU is addressing the humanitarian situation through its contribution of 17.8 million euros for humanitarian aid, provided by the European Commission. Commission support also includes 65.8 million euros for the period from 2009-2010, money allocated towards supporting good governance, fostering a culture of civil society, improving the capacity of Iraqi institutions for social services, and additional funds for aiding refugees. The EU is also focused on protecting human rights, women, children, and populations at risk. Commission funding is implemented on the ground by partner organizations including NGOs, UN agencies, and the Red Cross/Red Crescent. ¶14. (C) The EU's Rule of Law mission, EUJUST LEX, which launched on July 1, 2005, is working to strengthen the rule of law, promote a culture of respect for human rights, and provide professional development opportunities for senior Iraqi officials from the criminal justice system. Specifically, the mission has, to date, provided training for BRUSSELS 00001561 004 OF 005 Iraqi judicial officials outside of Iraq. More recently, the EU has sought to initiate training activities in Iraq, but those efforts are hampered by the EU's security concerns. Most notably, any training venue must gain the approval of the UK embassy security officer, EUJUST LEX security and the EU Council Secretariat Security Office. This excessive, built-in caution means that while the EU has developed plans to hold 18 additionarea howeverap0se in political will of the international community. The Commission has pledged an additional 700 million Euros to the region for 2007-2010. This includes funds pledged at the April 2009 donor conference in The Hague for strengthening governance and rural development as well as additional funds for protection activities, water and sanitation, and response to small scale natural disasters. However, the Commission has had difficulty in the region because of the lack of security. Roadside bombs have particularly hampered the effort, killing 28 aid workers in 2008 alone. ¶17. (C) The European Union has lacked cohesion in the civilian sector, appointing both a Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan (from the Council Secretariat) and a European Commission delegation. The EU has contributed over 200 million euros to the Law and Order Trust Fund which pays the running costs of the Afghan National Police. Militarily, the EU launched an ESDP mission, EUPOL Afghanistan, which is training Afghan police and specialized law enforcement officers. However, this mission has failed to reach its mandate of 400 international officials. The Comprehensive Approach has been difficult to implement overall because of security concerns, bilateral interests, and other military commitments from member states to the region such as NATO troops. ¶18. (C) The EU is now seeking greater coordination of its various instruments in Afghanistan and Pakistan, adopting an Action Plan toward that end at the October 27 Foreign Ministers' meeting in Luxembourg. The Action Plan presents a unified focus for further EU engagement in Afghanistan and Pakistan. While it does not contain significant new commitments, it does offer the potential for greater coordination and cohesion within EU efforts on the ground. Additionally, the European Union has announced it intends to increase assistance to Afghanistan and Pakistan, but European Commission (EC) contacts note that these increases will be modest. (REF I) BRUSSELS 00001561 005 OF 005 -------------- Comment: -------------- ¶19. (C//NF) The EU is working to implement the Comprehensive Approach in all its missions through careful planning between the European Council and European Commission. This has seen success particularly in Chad and Somalia, although limitations on Commission instruments are frustrating future plans in Somalia to some extent. Where Member States are divided or have separate bilateral efforts, the EU collectively has had less success. Additionally, institutional stovepiping the has made it difficult holistically to implement tools. EU efforts are also impeded by a profound avoidance of failure, which has led Member States to limit the mandate and demands on military missions in order to ensure success. Because of this wariness, the EU is hesitant to work on the ground in areas of uncertain security such as Iraq. It also means Member States often prefer shorter mandates for military operations, which limits the EU's ability to apply longer-term development tools alongside military actions. ¶20. (C//NF) We should expect to see the Comprehensive Approach applied more often under the new Lisbon Treaty structures, since many of the Commission's funding mechanisms will be placed under the same bureaucratic structure that supports Member State consultations. On the other hand, we need not wait for the EU to complete its institutional restructuring and implementation to begin harnessing EU resources to support U.S. interests. Even in Iraq, where EU efforts are splintered and stovepiped, we can capitalize on the millions of euros in Commission coffers as well as the will of Member States to apply their expertise in particular areas, such as judicial training. Fully leveraging these tools, however, will take comprehensive engagement with the EU across the whole of the U.S. Government. MURRAY .