DPRK DEMARCHE DELIVERY TO EU COUNCIL SECRETARIAT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 001532

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN, T, EAP, P, EEB/ESC/TFS, L, EUR/ERA, INL
TREASURY FOR TFI,
EMBASSIES PARIS, LONDON AND BERLIN FOR SANCTIONS OFFICER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2019
TAGS: EFIN ETTC EUN FR KCRM KHLS KNNP PINR UK UNSC
KN, XE
SUBJECT: DPRK DEMARCHE DELIVERY TO EU COUNCIL SECRETARIAT

REF: A. SECSTATE 115240

B. BRUSSELS 1374

Classified By: PETER H. CHASE, ECON MINISTER-COUNSELOR FOR REASONS 1.4(
b) AND (d).


1. (C//NF) SUMMARY: USEU discussed DPRK sanctions non-paper
with the EU's Council Secretariat. Staffers welcomed
non-paper but cautioned that EU Member States ("EUMS") were
unlikely to take suggested actions immediately. EUMS are
politically keen to differentiate their autonomous DPRK
program from other international efforts, at least for their
first round of sanctions designations, which will likely
include 13 individuals and 4 entities. But the EU's DPRK
program allows for frequent and flexible designation if
necessary. Contacts expect that our respective programs will
converge in the future, especially since the USG has
identified subsidiaries of UN-designated entities. They
recommend outreach to the incoming Spanish EU Presidency and
the yet-to-be-named EU High Rep for Foreign Policy, who will
have initiative on sanctions issues under the Lisbon Treaty,
to coordinate implementation. END SUMMARY.


2. (C//NF) USEU discussed DPRK sanctions non-paper (REF A)
with staff at the General Secretariat of the Council of the
European Union on November 13. Interlocutors included
Francesco Fini of the Directorate General for External and
Politico-Military Affairs and Stefan Rab of the Asia Policy
Unit.


3. (C//NF) Fini and Rab welcomed the USG non-paper but
cautioned that EU Member States ("EUMS") were unlikely to
take suggested actions immediately. This is partially for
political reasons, since EUMS have agreed to pursue
"autonomous" measures and want to be sure to differentiate
their program from other international efforts. Fini and Rab
also noted that only a few EUMS had visibly used the
non-paper in preparation for the November 11th Asia Oceania
("COASI") Working Group's discussion on DPRK sanctions.
(NOTE: This was likely due to timing, since the demarche
arrived at posts for delivery on November 9. It would have
been difficult for EUMS capitals to consider fully the USG
non-paper and forward resultant instructions to Brussels in
time for the meeting. END NOTE.)


4. (C//NF) EUMS have apparently reached consensus on a list
of 13 individuals and 4 entities for the initial round of EU
designations. Fini and Rab will not be able to share that
list before its publication, which should occur by the end of
this month. They indicated that there would be significant
differences between initial EU targets and those detailed in
the USG non-paper, although Rab indicated that there was at
least one target that would be the same. Fini and Rab also
emphasized that there was considerable potential for
convergence of our respective lists, especially where the
U.S. had identified subsidiaries of UN-designated entities.
They noted that U.S.-proposed targets were mostly new for
many EUMS, who view the USG non-paper as a strong foundation
for future EU discussions and actions.


5. (C//NF) USEU asked Fini and Rab when EUMS might consider
additional DPRK proliferation-related targets for
designation. Fini noted that the Council's Common Position
2009/573/CFSP, which implements UNSCR 1874, calls for
review/renewal "at least every 12 months." But he pointed to
a legal provision in the Common Position whereby designation
lists may be updated without the need for a new amending
Regulation and its associated legal and bureaucratic
processes. Instead, any Council decision amending the Common
Position to reflect new designations will automatically
update the implementing Regulation accordingly. Zimbabwe is
the only other EU sanctions context where such automaticity
exists.


6. (C//NF) Fini gave several reasons for the delay in EU
implementation of UNSCR 1874. Firstly, EUMS are now paying
close attention to potential legal challenges to any and all
sanctions that they impose. This has led them to create

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several distinct designation lists in the DPRK context, each
based upon specific criteria and legal standards. (NOTE: A
differentiated legal approach may consume more time, but it
will also allow the EU to designate more easily those
individuals sanctioned for a specific role that they play in
a proliferation network. We have seen in the Iran context
that, once a given position in an organizational chart is
slotted for sanctions designation, the EU will target
individuals occupying that functional role in the future
without many complications. See REF B, Para 2. END NOTE.)
Fini also underscored that Member State representatives in
COASI had had little background on DPRK sanctions. He feels
that they have learned much from the current EU process and
should be well prepared to undertake future designations.
Finally, Fini noted that Sweden had done little in its
capacity as EU Presidency to drive serious discussion within
COASI. He sees little point in engaging with them on DPRK
issues moving forward.


7. (C//NF) USEU asked Fini and Rab to describe important
diplomatic dynamics among EUMS. Fini stressed that the UK,
France, and Germany were the most important players in the
DPRK sanctions context. He also indicated that there was
room to work cooperatively with the incoming Spanish EU
Presidency, due to begin in January, potentially in the form
of a U.S.-EU experts meeting to discuss implementation
issues. Fini recommended outreach to the EU's future High
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who
will have initiative on sanctions issues under the Lisbon
Treaty. He then wistfully suggested that a Secretariat-based
Sanctions Unit to support the High Rep would strengthen
implementation across the range of EU sanctions programs.
Rab noted that some EUMS were reluctant to pursue sanctions
designations while simultaneously offering the DPRK
engagement via the Six Party Talks.


8. (C//NF) USEU welcomed the Council Secretariat's
willingness to consider USG non-paper and to work
collaboratively on DPRK sanctions. USEU and Council
Secretariat agreed that USG non-paper should serve as a
catalyst for longer-term communication between the United
States and EUMS on the DPRK sanctions file.

MURRAY
.