Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BRUSSELS1494
2009-11-04 14:37:00
CONFIDENTIAL
USEU Brussels
Cable title:  

BRUSSELS DISCUSSIONS ON DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE TO

Tags:  EAID IR PREL EUN ECON 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8888
PP RUEHAG RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHBS #1494/01 3081437
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 041437Z NOV 09
FM USEU BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
RUEHRN/USMISSION UN ROME PRIORITY
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 001494 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/IR DWALTERS;
USUN NYC FOR DMERCADO;
USUN GENEVA FOR NKYLOH;
USUN ROME FOR HSPANOS;
USAID FOR RGOLD;

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/28/2019
TAGS: EAID IR PREL EUN ECON
SUBJECT: BRUSSELS DISCUSSIONS ON DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE TO
IRANIAN CIVIL SOCIETY

REF: BRUSSELS 1428

BRUSSELS 00001494 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: USEU POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR CHRISTOPHER R. DAVIS F
OR REASONS 1.4 (B,D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 001494

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/IR DWALTERS;
USUN NYC FOR DMERCADO;
USUN GENEVA FOR NKYLOH;
USUN ROME FOR HSPANOS;
USAID FOR RGOLD;

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/28/2019
TAGS: EAID IR PREL EUN ECON
SUBJECT: BRUSSELS DISCUSSIONS ON DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE TO
IRANIAN CIVIL SOCIETY

REF: BRUSSELS 1428

BRUSSELS 00001494 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: USEU POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR CHRISTOPHER R. DAVIS F
OR REASONS 1.4 (B,D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: On October 28 Danika Walters from State/NEA
and Ricki Gold from USAID/ME met with EU officials from the
Directorate General for External Relations (RELEX),EuropeAid
Development Cooperation Office, and Council of the European
Union's General Secretariat Unit for the Middle East to
discuss USG and EU development assistance programs in Iran.
Walters and Gold detailed USG assistance to Iranian civil
society groups, which passes through third country
non-governmental organizations (NGO) to support rule of law,
freedom of information, Iranian NGO capacity building, and
open political space. They emphasized that USG assistance no
longer funds opposition candidates or parties. EU
representatives highlighted their transition from providing
support almost exclusively through UN agencies to supporting
NGOs, with one grant directly to an NGO based inside Iran.
Commission and Council officials believe the change has
decreased Iranian government interference in their programs.
The EU and USG sides agreed to engage further. END SUMMARY


2. (C) Throughout their meetings, Walters and Gold outlined
the scope and objectives of USG Iran assistance, which was
roughly USD 20 million last year. They emphasized USG
efforts do not support opposition candidates or political
parties in Iran. Rather, assistance is focused on capacity
building for civil society and non-governmental
organizations, rule of law, freedom of information, and on
keeping the political space open. Due to concerns for the
safety of implementing organizations, USG assistance moves
through third parties to ensure a firewall between USG funds
and implementers inside Iran. This typically entails
awarding an initial grant to a U.S. or third country
organization, which then moves funding downstream to groups
inside Iran. This method helps to ensure anonymity for

funds, which insulates our partners and program participants
and gives them greater latitude and protection to carry out
their operations. USG programs also support bringing Iran
civil society activists, journalists, bloggers, and other
professionals outside Iran to recieve capacity building
training, to engage with international experts and
counterparts, and to receive web-based training.


3. (SBU) The primary meeting for the day was held at the
European Commission's Directorate General for External
Relations (DG RELEX). The Iran/Iraq desk officer from
EuropeAid also participated in the meeting. DG RELEX is
responsible for policy and programming for development
assistance in non-ACP (i.e., non-Africa, Caribbean, and
Pacific) countries, while EuropeAid is the operational and
implementation body for EC assistance. Given the
bifurcation, the RELEX/EuropeAid meeting provided Walters and
Gold with an overview of policy, programming, operations, and
implementation for the Commission's Iran assistance.


4. (C) RELEX's Iran desk cited technical and political
factors which limit its ability to expand assistance in Iran.
Primarily, the EC does not have a cooperation agreement in
place with Iran. An EC cooperation agreement establishes a
framework for EC development support and is a pre-condition
for delivering assistance to governments or non-government
partners. Also, the EC does not have a presence inside Iran
to monitor and evaluate programs. At the moment, the EC
relies on support from a number of EU member states which
have embassies in Tehran. Politically, RELEX maintains the
position that Iran do more to resolve on-going nuclear issues
before RELEX can consider increasing its level of support.
RELEX desk officer believes the prospect of further
assistance could be an incentive for Iran t resolve the
nuclear questions. (NOTE: WhileRELEX cited assistance as a
possible incentive Council representatives made no
connection between EC aid and on-going nuclear issues. END
NOTE) Additionally, RELEX reps noted that rcent arrests of
EU citizens and increased pressure on their Iranian
implementing partners following the elections (Reftel) make
program expansion both politically and logistically difficult.


5. (C) According to EuropeAid's desk, EC assistance in Iran
has gradually moved away from direct grants with United
Nations (UN) agencies to programs implemented through

BRUSSELS 00001494 002.2 OF 003


European and Iranian NGOs. While this might mean less
oversight by Iranian officials, who reportedly have close
ties to the UN offices operating in Iran, EuropeAid
acknowledged some difficulty in engaging partners and
beneficiaries. We were told their current programs generally
avoid human rights or reform content in favor of more
practical activities, in an effort to move toward programs
that are more acceptable to the Iranian government.
EuropeAid believes the risk to potential grantees limits the
pool of applicants to those organizations working within the
legal and political parameters set by the Iranian government.
EuropeAid believes these implmenters are more able to reach
beneficiaries. Also, there are stricter than normal
reporting requirements for doing business in Iran. Thus,
EuropeAid finds Iranian organizations to be well prepared and
professional. EuropeAid's one direct grantee in Iran was
previously a sub-awardee of an EU based NGO, an connection
which better qualified the Iranian organization for its own
EC grant.


6. (C) EuropeAid's programs rely on sector or thematic
budget lines under the Development Cooperation Instrument.
Specifically, EuropeAid utilizes either the Instrument for
Democracy and Human Rights or a line for Non-State Actors
(NSA),which is analogous to our NGO terminology. EC grants
to UN agencies -- mainly th`m and the
UN Office on `lve Iranian officials iuropeAid dmy from Iranian
official`aining UN grants are wieAid does not plan tong.
include a disaster riich pointed to
difficul4 EU engagement with and inside Iran because of he
unresolved nuclear issue. The Council SeQretariat contact
highlighted the diffQculty in delivering official messages to
Qranian Ministries, which must then be delivered to the
Iranian Embassy in Brussels. The conact noted that EU
member states ften rely on UN agencies for information about
Iran.


9. (C) The Council Secretariat has a small level of funding
for programs. Following recent elections, the Unit halted
work on a series of seminars on EU/Iran relations, one of
which was to have taken place in Tehran. Also, they are
pursuing creation of an internet site for multi-media news
source in Farsi to combat misperceptions about the European
Union. For the Unit's programs, the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs provides initial approval of their projects and if
approved moves down to lower level departments and agencies
to work with EC grantees to implement. The Council Unit has
found a willingness to cooperate in the secondary Ministries
that are closer to project operations on the ground. Lastly,
the Council desk questioned whether Iranian officials know
that the USG has halted working with opposition candidates
and parties. We noted statements to this effect in the past,
but that the Iranian government was not likely to believe
them.


10. (C) COMMENT: We should pursue discussion on assistance
to enable USG and EC experts to explore what is working in
Iran, to share information on partners, and to understand the
political and social factors that influence project impact.

BRUSSELS 00001494 003.2 OF 003


We would recommend this discussion be broadened to include EU
member states as well.


11. (SBU) State Department Foreign Affairs Officer Danika
Walters and USAID Program Analyst Ricki Gold cleared on this
cable.


MURRAY

.