EU RESPONSE TO US SUDAN STRATEGY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 001456

SIPDIS

// C O R R E C T E D C O P Y: ADDED ADDRESSEE //

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL SU
SUBJECT: EU RESPONSE TO US SUDAN STRATEGY

REF: STATE 109669

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Classified By: USEU POL MC Christopher Davis, for reasons 1.4 b and d.


1. (C) SUMMARY: EU Special Representative for Sudan, Torben
Brylle, welcomed the new U.S. Sudan Strategy. Given the
interlocking nature of the problems in Sudan, Brylle
applauded the strategy's holistic view, the importance placed
on the North-South issues in addition to Darfur, and the U.S.
willingness to engage the Sudanese. He hoped for a
continuation of the multilateral approach, and advocated
expanded coordination mechanisms that include regional
actors. Brylle also expressed concern about the deficit of
development in southern Sudan, the international community's
impatience to declare a problem fixed, the fragmented nature
of United Nations involvement, and the dangers of a narrow
ICC-focused discussion on justice. He plans to attend the 29
October meeting in Abuja, Nigeria, to discuss the results of
the Mbeki Panel. END SUMMARY


2. (SBU) POLOFF met with Special Representative Brylle and
his Political Advisor Catherine Uttenthal on 27 October to
deliver REF demarche and gauge the EU reaction. Brylle
welcomed the strategy, particularly its holistic approach.
He appreciated its emphasis on North-South issues, which he
views as frequently overshadowed by - rather than considered
together with - Darfur. He also applauded the U.S.
willingness to engage the Sudanese. He recognized the U.S.
has been criticized for this decision, but he sees no
alternative to engagement. Brylle laid out his views on the
complex and interlocking problems in Sudan, and the long-term
nature of any proposed solutions. He is concerned about the
tendency for international actors to become impatient and
want to declare the problems "fixed." This leads them to
look for administrative benchmarks and other more easily
attainable markers of progress, rather than insisting on
meaningful change on the ground.


3. (C) Brylle is deeply concerned about Southern Sudan and
the deficit of development. Previous attempts to address
this have been thwarted by a severe lack of absorptive
capacity, but it still requires action. He said the global
financial crisis had the effect of focusing the attention of
the government of Southern Sudan on the prospect that further
funds might not be forthcoming without action on their part.
He cautioned that we need to be wary of any moves by the
North to declare a state of emergency in the South, using
arguments about the inability of Southern authorities to
govern to justify greater intervention.


4. (SBU) Brylle said he hoped for a continuation of the U.S.
Administration's multilateral approach. He thinks several
existing coordination mechanisms work well: the Contact
Group; the E6 (discussions between the Special Envoys for
Sudan of China, the EU, France, Russia, the UK and the United
States); and various regular conference calls. When asked
whether other types of coordination would be fruitful, he
advocated developing a formula through which to engage
regional players. He referred to previously used models in
which a core group took action, while a larger circle of
stakeholders was able to monitor and participate when
appropriate. He also suggested exploring ways we can
approach the Sudanese parties jointly, to send a message of a
unified international community and thus reduce openings for
the GOS to play one actor off of another.


5. (C) Another point of concern to Brylle is the fragmented
nature of the United Nations presence in Sudan. The UN
Mission in Sudan (UNMIS),the African Union/United Nations
Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID),the UN/AU Mediation, and
the UN Mission in Chad, are all active and not fully
coordinated. He highlighted that the UN/AU Mediation and
UNAMID did not work well together. Acknowledging that it
would be extremely difficult to alter the mandate of these

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missions, Brylle advocated joint reporting to the Security
Council as one possible means to increase coordination.


6. (C) Brylle plans to travel to Abuja, Nigeria, for the 29
October discussion of the Mbeki Panel results. He said it
was clever of Mbeki to take the position that he was not
mandated to review the ICC as an institution. While the
initial AU response supported the report, Brylle thinks it
will be interesting to watch the open session in Abuja,
particularly the Sudanese reaction. He cautions against
getting into a narrow ICC-focused discussion on justice with
the GOS, as that can distract from other issues and block
possible alternative, African-generated solutions.

MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
MURRAY