EU RESPONSE TO US SUDAN STRATEGY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 001456 SIPDIS // C O R R E C T E D C O P Y: ADDED ADDRESSEE // E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL SU SUBJECT: EU RESPONSE TO US SUDAN STRATEGY REF: STATE 109669 BRUSSELS 00001456 001.4 OF 002 Classified By: USEU POL MC Christopher Davis, for reasons 1.4 b and d. ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: EU Special Representative for Sudan, Torben Brylle, welcomed the new U.S. Sudan Strategy. Given the interlocking nature of the problems in Sudan, Brylle applauded the strategy's holistic view, the importance placed on the North-South issues in addition to Darfur, and the U.S. willingness to engage the Sudanese. He hoped for a continuation of the multilateral approach, and advocated expanded coordination mechanisms that include regional actors. Brylle also expressed concern about the deficit of development in southern Sudan, the international community's impatience to declare a problem fixed, the fragmented nature of United Nations involvement, and the dangers of a narrow ICC-focused discussion on justice. He plans to attend the 29 October meeting in Abuja, Nigeria, to discuss the results of the Mbeki Panel. END SUMMARY ¶2. (SBU) POLOFF met with Special Representative Brylle and his Political Advisor Catherine Uttenthal on 27 October to deliver REF demarche and gauge the EU reaction. Brylle welcomed the strategy, particularly its holistic approach. He appreciated its emphasis on North-South issues, which he views as frequently overshadowed by - rather than considered together with - Darfur. He also applauded the U.S. willingness to engage the Sudanese. He recognized the U.S. has been criticized for this decision, but he sees no alternative to engagement. Brylle laid out his views on the complex and interlocking problems in Sudan, and the long-term nature of any proposed solutions. He is concerned about the tendency for international actors to become impatient and want to declare the problems "fixed." This leads them to look for administrative benchmarks and other more easily attainable markers of progress, rather than insisting on meaningful change on the ground. ¶3. (C) Brylle is deeply concerned about Southern Sudan and the deficit of development. Previous attempts to address this have been thwarted by a severe lack of absorptive capacity, but it still requires action. He said the global financial crisis had the effect of focusing the attention of the government of Southern Sudan on the prospect that further funds might not be forthcoming without action on their part. He cautioned that we need to be wary of any moves by the North to declare a state of emergency in the South, using arguments about the inability of Southern authorities to govern to justify greater intervention. ¶4. (SBU) Brylle said he hoped for a continuation of the U.S. Administration's multilateral approach. He thinks several existing coordination mechanisms work well: the Contact Group; the E6 (discussions between the Special Envoys for Sudan of China, the EU, France, Russia, the UK and the United States); and various regular conference calls. When asked whether other types of coordination would be fruitful, he advocated developing a formula through which to engage regional players. He referred to previously used models in which a core group took action, while a larger circle of stakeholders was able to monitor and participate when appropriate. He also suggested exploring ways we can approach the Sudanese parties jointly, to send a message of a unified international community and thus reduce openings for the GOS to play one actor off of another. ¶5. (C) Another point of concern to Brylle is the fragmented nature of the United Nations presence in Sudan. The UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS),the African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID),the UN/AU Mediation, and the UN Mission in Chad, are all active and not fully coordinated. He highlighted that the UN/AU Mediation and UNAMID did not work well together. Acknowledging that it would be extremely difficult to alter the mandate of these BRUSSELS 00001456 002.4 OF 002 missions, Brylle advocated joint reporting to the Security Council as one possible means to increase coordination. ¶6. (C) Brylle plans to travel to Abuja, Nigeria, for the 29 October discussion of the Mbeki Panel results. He said it was clever of Mbeki to take the position that he was not mandated to review the ICC as an institution. While the initial AU response supported the report, Brylle thinks it will be interesting to watch the open session in Abuja, particularly the Sudanese reaction. He cautions against getting into a narrow ICC-focused discussion on justice with the GOS, as that can distract from other issues and block possible alternative, African-generated solutions. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. MURRAY