U.S.-EU TROIKA CONSULTATIONS ON DISARMAMENT AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BRUSSELS 001301 SIPDIS DEPT FOR ISN/RA, EUR/ERA, NEA/IR. GENEVA FOR CD DEL E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2019 TAGS: KNNP MNUC PARM IAEA IR PREL AORC PTER EUN XF ETTC SUBJECT: U.S.-EU TROIKA CONSULTATIONS ON DISARMAMENT AND NONPROLIFERATION (CODUN/CONOP) Classified By: DEPUTY POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR MARY T. CURTIN FOR R EASON 1.4 B/D ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The semi-annual U.S.-EU Troika consultations on disarmament and nonproliferation took place on September 9, 2009. The two sides were generally on the same wavelength on key armation issues. ISN DAparticular that the EU crt in this area, so that Egypt could not say nothing had been done. The EU wQs planning to organize a seminar through its Qnstitute on Security Policy in Paris on WMD in the Middle East and nuclear energy. The EU hoped Egypt would attend and was trying to work closely with the Egyptians. Giannella also expressed the opinion that the way the Middle East issue was dealt with at the IAEA's General Conference (GC) -- taking place the following week -- would have implications for the RevCon. ¶5. (C) Kang picked up on the references to the Middle East and the GC by noting that the way things were playing out in Vienna regarding the IAEA GC's treatment of the Middle East was not promising for the RevCon. He expressed frustration that our senior-level meetings with Egyptians were positive but then the "arms control bureaucrats" seemed willing to play chicken with us over Middle East. He pointed out that the United States was doing all it could to see if we could make headway with Egypt on this issue, and he urged colleagues to pull every lever possible. ¶6. (SBU) Giannella continued in the same vein, concluding that the developing countries did not seem to realize how the situation had changed. She thought it would take time, but also argued that if the Israelis showed greater flexibility in Vienna, agreement might be possible. IAEA ¶7. (SBU) The NPT discussion led directly to a more complete consideration of the IAEA, where both sides recognized that there were three key issues before the BRUSSELS 00001301 002 OF 005 organization: dealing with the Middle East at the GC, the establishment of a fuel bank, and the Agency's budget. Asa Gustafsson, Deputy Director, Department for Disarmament and Nonproliferation, Swedish MFA, said that Sweden was consulting in Vienna to try and find a compromise text acceptable to all. She thought there had 
been no progress at the June Board on the fuel bank question and assessed the NAM statement on that subject as discouraging. Since the issue would be considered only under Any Other Business at the September Board, the next opportunity for action was the November Board. On the budget, she noted that several EU members advocated zero real growth and no one would like a large growth in spending. Gonzalo de Salazar Serantes, Deputy Director General, Department for Nonproliferation, Spanish MFA, raised his concerns that the Iranian resolution on attacks on nuclear facilities would contaminate the Middle East debate and have a negative influence on the RevCon. 8.(SBU) Kang thought that the Iranian resolution at the GC would be less of a problem than some other issues. On the other hand, the United States was concerned with getting Israel and the Arabs to negotiate on a resolution; that issue could have implications for the NPT RevCon. As for the fuel bank, the State Department office that follows those issues thought in fact that the June Board evidenced some progress, as even states that did not support a fuel bank raised substantive questions. According to Kang, this issue was a longer term challenge. We had a good story to tell on civil nuclear cooperation; we're getting interest in peaceful uses from around the world; and we're listening to and trying to understand the concerns of the developing states. ¶9. (U) Turning to the IAEA budget, Kang said the United States had advocated a substantial increase and was satisfied for now by the agreement to some increase. He stressed that the U.S. position represented a political commitment to the Agency, and while recognizing the agency's inefficiencies, we had to make needed investments now. He would make a strong plea for reforms when he visited the IAEA the following day, but Kang emphasized that the greater demands on the Agency required greater investment. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty -- CTBT ¶10. (SBU) Leading off the discussion, Ahlstrom expressed strong EU support for the CTBT and noted that Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt would speak on behalf of the EU at the CTBT "Article XIV" Conference in late September to encourage entry into force. In response to EU questions about the CTBT debate in the United States, Kang said that verification and the reliability of the U.S. nuclear arsenal would be the focus of the Senate debate and stressed the improvements in both areas since the Senate rejected the Treaty in 1999. He did not think allies could do much to positively influence the domestic debate although Giannella suggested that a dialogue between UK and French parliamentarians and their U.S. counterparts might be helpful. Giannella also noted that the EU had projects to support the CTBT International Monitoring System. Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty -- FMCT ¶11. (SBU) Kang highlighted the interagency reviews currently being undertaken by the U.S. government, as evidence of U.S. seriousness concerning the issue. He stated his optimism regarding this review process, but he was concerned about the diplomatic process and asked whether there was anything more to be done to persuade Pakistan to agree to a work program in the Conference on Disarmament including FMCT negotiations. ¶12. (SBU) Ahlstrom said the EU was pleased that the CD's BRUSSELS 00001301 003 OF 005 program of work had been approved; now it was important to put maximum pressure on Pakistan to stop blocking the start of negotiations. He reported that Sweden, as EU Presidency country, had raised the issue with the Pakistani Foreign Minister. Global Nuclear Security Summit ¶13. (SBU) Kang said the Summit was central to the Obama Administration's goal of securing nuclear material throughout the world. The Summit would not launch a new program but would raise awareness of the important issue of nuclear security at the highest levels of government. In addition, the Summit is not designed to be a pledging conference. Participants may discuss the need to expand existing programs or increase spending in some areas related to nuclear security, but that is not a specific goal of the meeting. Giannella questioned whether the EU was invited, and Kang promised to inquire. (Note: The invitation cable sent September 11 -- State 94449 -- included an invitation to the EU High Representative.) START Follow-on ¶14. (SBU) After noting that there was not much to say at this point beyond what Under Secretary Tauscher had described to EU interlocutors the previous week, Kang expressed his personal view that the negotiations were in a good place if the two sides did not get distracted by other issues. In response to an observation by Ahlstrom that the developments in this area would play positively at the NPT RevCon, Kang said that he worried that our message was not being received in the proper historical context -- that representatives of the non-aligned countries did not appreciate the extent of reductions already taken and being considered. Biological Weapons ¶15. (SBU) Ronnie Nilsson, Senior Adviser, Department for Disarmament and Nonproliferation, Swedish MFA, said that the EU would like to work with the United States to prepare for the Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference in 2011. Kang agreed that such consultations would be a good idea. He also made clear that the United States continued to oppose any verification mechanism because of the nature of BW. Nilsson urged the development of confidence building measures and hoped the United States could be convinced of the importance of verification. Chemical Weapons 16, (U) Ahlstrom said the EU was supporting outreach to work towards the universalization of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). He alance it attached to comphn accordance wits choice. He noted that legal barriers would prevent the United States from meeting its destruction cQmmitment and our concern that this inability ould provide others with excuses for not m%eting their nonproliferation or disarmament commitments. Finally, Kang noted that while we hav made demarches urging adherence to the CWC, Qach case presented problems. For example, EgQpt pointed to regional concerns, and we had many issues with Burma and North Korea apart from CWC membership. BRUSSELS 00001301 004 OF 005 North Korea ¶18. (SBU) Kang gave a thorough description of the current situation regarding the DPRK. He emphasized that the United States was willing to engage in bilateral talks if necessary and in the context of the 6-Party negotiations, but all relevant states had to be involved in the overall process. He also noted that the United States was pursuing the sanctions track and had appointed Ambassador Goldberg to approach countries where the North Korean proliferators have been active to stress the importance of enforcement of UNSCR ¶1874. He argued that sanctions are having an effect, even if it is hard to measure. Iran ¶19. (SBU) Giannella began the discussion by speculating about the promised Iranian response (comment: which was received September 9) to the P5 plus 1 negotiating offer. She recalled the recent Frankfurt meeting of the P5 plus 1 Political Directors, noting that unity was hard to maintain. The EU shared the U.S. view that the stalemate could not last forever. Russia and China argued that recent turmoil in Iran made decision making difficult there, but Giannella said that could not justify the lack of a response for more than a year. She emphasized that the EU countries attached great importance to cooperation with Russia and China and would do their utmost to keeping the group alive. They did not agree with President Ahmedinejad's statements that the nuclear issue was closed; in their view it was not closed. ¶20. (SBU) Kang replied that the United States was flexible; it wants a diplomatic solution but if that does not work, it is committed to the sanctions track. He said that the United States was preparing more robust sanctions if diplomacy fails and is concerned that others' economic interests in Iran may lessen their support of sanctions. The lesson learned from the DPRK is that sanctions are useful for exerting leverage. Stressing that we cannot keep the pressure on Iran if the international community is not together, he said that greater unity would have a greater impact. ¶21. (SBU) In response Giannella said the EU had a similar line and that while there were some EU states that had close economic ties with Iran, there was a "deep unity" in the EU's assessment of Iran's threat to regional stability and to the nonproliferation regime. The EU, she asserted, was implementing the UNSC resolutions and the EU Political and Security Committee had held a good discussion the previous day on Iran. Members greatly favored UN sanctions because otherwise non-EU countries would fill the void of EU exports, although the EU was prepared for unilateral sanctions if the Security Council did not move ahead. ¶22. (SBU) Kang said he appreciated the importance of UNSC resolutions but ultimately their value was based on the will of UN member states. If there was no political will to enforce sanctions, we will fail. We have to make it clear that states will experience consequences if they do not enforce Council resolutions. The Obama Administration was carrying out a dual track strategy; we have to make both tracks meaningful. Joint U.S.-EU Summit Declaration on Nonproliferation ¶23. (U) The two sides exchanged papers on the elements for a declaration to be issued at the U.S.-EU Summit in November in Washington. The EU agreed to review the U.S. proposals and respond by email (Note: the Presidency did so the following week). Ahlstrom requested U.S. comments on the EU proposals by September 25. In a brief discussion Kang said the United States was open to a mention of space although the precise language would BRUSSELS 00001301 005 OF 005 depend on the outcome of the review of U.S. space policy. More generally he observed that the Summit language could be useful for the NPT RevCon and thought it might be valuable to highlight not only common nonproliferation policies and ideas but also commitment to institutions, namely the IAEA. Lars-Gunnar Wigemark, Head of theSecurity Policy Unit, Directorate General forExternal Relations, European Commission, saidhe could only agree with that approach. He thought the statement could also highlight U.S.-EU cooperation in this field. Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) ¶24. (SBU) Nilsson made clear that the prospective arms trade treaty was an important issue for the Swedish Presidency, which would work hard on an ATT resolution at the upcoming UN General Assembly session. Kang said that the U.S. was still reviewing its policy, but two fundamental principles remained clear: 1) any ATT should not deal with internal transfers of weapons and 2) U.S. support would hinge on whether an ATT enhanced current export controls. Fabio Della Piazza, Administrator in Ginannella's office, said that the world looked to the United States on these issues. NATO Partnership for Peace Project to Destroy Small Arms/Light Weapons in Ukraine ¶25. (SBU) Kang reviewed the situation created by the Ukrainian decision to "demilitarize" the weapons being dealt with under this program, rather than destroy them. He stressed that the United States would shut down the project if a demilitarization method could not be agreed with Ukraine, which was unlikely. He urged the EU, which is a substantial contributor to the project, to use its engagement with Ukraine to emphasize the importance of making the weapons available for destruction, so the project does not fail. Della Piazza responded by asking whether there was any thought of reconsidering the U.S. plan to stop the project in 2010, and Kang agreed to raise that question in Washington and get back to the EU. Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) ¶26. (SBU) As in many similar meetings, the EU, led by Giannalla, argued that the EU should be invited to participate in the PSI. Kang repeated previous arguments that since PSI was an operational activity, the EU did not really fit in. It did not, for example, have its own frigates or intelligence capabilities. The EU side asserted that the PSI was developing beyond interdiction activities and considering, e.g., the legal bases for action. The EU also pointed out that it was taking initiatives on maritime surveillance and forensics and thought these capabilities could be useful. After some further discussion, the U.S. side agreed to look into the possibility of holding a U.S.-EU working-level session to consider EU capabilities and whether the EU could make a contribution. Group of 8/UNSC Resolution 1540 ¶27. (SBU) Both sides expressed uncertainty about the reasons for Russian objection to inclusion of UNSCR 1540 Committee representatives in the projected G-8 experts' meeting on UNSCR 1540, but were pleased it would proceed. ¶28. (SBU) DAS Kang cleared this message. .