BELGIUM AND THE DRC: RELATIONS RENEWED BUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRUSSELS 000125 SIPDIS STATE PASS EUR/WE, AF/C LAMORA, WYCOFF AND LEADER, AND INR E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM MOPS CG RW BE SUBJECT: BELGIUM AND THE DRC: RELATIONS RENEWED BUT CRITICAL OF RWANDA-DRC COOP REF: A. JOYCE LEADER EMAIL ON GREAT LAKES CONTACT GROUP OF JANUARY 26 ¶B. 2009 Classified By: Acting DCM Richard Eason for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). ¶1. (C) Summary: PolOff and PolIntern met January 28 with Belgian MFA Africa contacts to discuss the restoration of Belgium - DR Congo relations, mineral extraction issues, and the arrest of Laurent Nkunda. The PMs of Belgium and the DRC issued a statement January 24 that reestablished relations. Belgium has already received agrement for Ambassador Struye who should arrive in Kinshasa in mid-February. Foreign Ministers De Gucht and Thamwe are likely to meet in Addis Ababa at the end of the month. Belgium has not yet prepared its own position on mineral extraction, but will do so prior to the February 2 E.U. meeting now scheduled to adopt a common position. Belgium approves of a regional approach that would increase transparency in the mineral exploitation industry, but is not yet certain what organization is best suited to monitor the sector. Belgium is ready to support efforts through its intimate knowledge of mine sites and related information. The GOB is in a somewhat difficult position as two Belgian operated companies (one U.S. owned) were cited in the Expert's Report as failing on due diligence. The MFA would like to consider hosting the next Contact Group Meeting once leadership has been named in State AF if there were no objections. ¶2. (C) Belgium is very concerned by the lack of transparency and information supplied to the international community on recent DRC-Rwanda military actions against the FDLR. They noted two recent exercises, and commented that MONUC at least should have been informed. They asked if the U.S. had information, whether Washington was supporting such actions, and mentioned a possible statement supporting military action against the FDLR from a U.S. ambassador. The GOB strongly believes any military action will lead to severe civilian casualties as the FDLR is well integrated into local villages. Belgium also expressed concern on Nkunda's arrest and the likelihood of successful CNDP integration into the DRC military. They received a telephone call today informing them soldiers loyal to Nkunda abruptly left an integration ceremony this morning in Rumangabo. The EU will be very hesitant to participate in any meetings where the new CNDP leader Bosco is present, due to his indictment by the ICC for war crimes. End Summary. Belgian - Congo Relations Back to Normal -------------- ¶3. (C) Belgium and the DRC agreed to return to normal relations January 24, issuing a joint statement signed by both prime ministers. Belgian Ambassador Struye has already received agrement, and will arrive in Brussels from Washington next week and in Kinshasa the second week of February. FM De Gucht and FM Thamwe are expected to meet on the margins of meetings in Addis Ababa January 31 or February 1-2. The Belgians are waiting for the Congolese to name a new ambassador, a delay they attribute to internal issues in the GoDRC. Our contacts stated that it was obvious the Congolese had sought renewed ties for some time, a signal sent by early agrement. When queried on the PM-led rapprochement between the two countries, that apparently did not include FM De Gucht, our contact said it was indeed the PM's office and began with Leterme. Even though the Congolese had officially ended diplomatic relations in May 2008, the former Belgian ambassador did not leave Kinshasa until December 18, 2008. Belgian Position on Mineral Extraction Regime -------------- ¶4. (C) In response to ref email, MFA contacts said the GOB is gearing up for the rescheduled February 2 EU meeting to develop a coordinated response on the regulation of extractive resources in the DRC. The Belgians have not yet finalized their internal position, but said they would forward a brief to Ambassador Leader either prior to or on the day of the EU gathering. Our contacts said Belgium remains interested in some form of regulation, but were uncertain which international body could best manage this issue. Surprisingly, the Belgians thought the CPGL was not the appropriate body; they have always supported the CPGL as a pet project, but the CPGL is already involved in agriculture and banking, and more responsibilities would be too ambitious for the CPGL. They mentioned the International Conference of the Great Lake Region and COMESA as possibilities. They then added that the Tri-Partite Plus may have a place, noting there was enough work on this matter for everyone. The GOB wants to encourage information sharing and overall transparency, a task appropriate at a regional or international community level. ¶5. (C) What the GOB could best contribute in this discussion, s information and intelligence on the mining sites from their "treasure trove" of historical, geological, and geographical information. They also have NGOs on the ground mapping out who controls which mines. Belgium would like to see the legitimization of the mining and addedvalue in a Congolese refining industry. Our ontacts mentioned Belgian experience on the ground in Ktanga that may be applicable in the Kivus. One challenge for Belgium relating to extractive resources, is that two Belgian companies, Traxys (Note: U.S. pension fund owned. End Note) and Trade Met are operating in the eastern DRC. This is somewhat damaging to the Belgian reputation because they were named in the Expert's Report for not conducting due diligence. The GOB would like to see the companies involved and push them to be more transparent in their business practices. Humanitarian Concerns in DRC and U.S. Position? -------------- -- ¶6. (C) Our Contacts repeated previous concerns that joint DRC-Rwanda military cooperation against the FDLR would lead to humanitarian problems. Our contacts again asked if there was a U.S. position, and said they would instruct their Embassy in Washington to follow up. One of them asked rhetorically if our ambassador in Kinshasa had told the Congolese to aggressively take military action in eliminating the FDLR, vaguely referring to a US ambassador's statement to that effect. He then strongly cautioned that that any purely military solution would lead to significant civilian casualties, as the FDLR is integrated into civilian communities. Our contacts also asked if the U.S. had any information on two reported military actions against the FDLR that were not reported to MONUC nor other members of the international community. Belgium is concerned that MONUC is not involved or informed by the two governments. ¶7. (C) We asked about the Belgian take on Nkunda's arrest. Our contacts said they expected Nkunda to remain under house arrest for some time in Rwanda. The Belgians see Nkunda's arrest as a public affairs optic that might help assuage the negative press that could ensue from Rwandan soldiers on Congolese soil. The post-Nkunda CNDP led by ICC indicted Bosco will be a challenge for the Europeans; they will not participate in gatherings where an individual with an international arrest warrant is present. While we were discussing these issues, a call came in from an MFA contact on the ground in eastern Congo. He said a ceremony for disarmament and integration of a CNDP unit in Rumangabo ended when CNDP soldiers who remain loyal to Nkunda abruptly departed. The GOB is concerned with this apparent refusal to integrate and would welcome Washington's view. Next Contact Group Meeting -------------- ¶8. (C) Our contacts said they were not aware of information on the next Contact Group Meeting. They noted Washington was the expected host for the next meeting, and assumed we were probably waiting until State leadership had been named. The MFA Africa Director said he would like Belgium to hold the next meeting, once people were in place in Washington and interlocutors were ready. BUSH .