SRAP HOLBROOKE, EU HIGH REP SOLANA DISCUSS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 001071 SIPDIS NOFORN E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/05/2019 TAGS: PREL ENRG MOPS PGOV XD IR EUN SUBJECT: SRAP HOLBROOKE, EU HIGH REP SOLANA DISCUSS PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN, IRAN BRUSSELS 00001071 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Pol M-C Christopher Davis for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S//NF) Summary: On July 28, SRAP Richard Holbrooke and EU High Rep Javier Solana discussed their respective trips to Afghanistan and Pakistan, further support to the Pakistani government, the Afghan presidential elections, and Solana's impressions of the situation in Iran. During the meeting, SRAP Holbrooke pressed the EU to support the Pakistani electricity sector, and to do more to alleviate the humanitarian situation in the Swat Valley. He made clear to Solana that a discredited election in the mold of Kenya or Iran would deal a severe blow to international support for the Afghan Government and that pre-election speculation about fraud is not helpful. On Iran, Solana warned that Ahmadinejad could become a figurehead for a military dictatorship. He anticipated a written response soon to the P5 1 and U.S. offers to dialogue, but said the response would not answer the critical questions about Iran's nuclear program or a freeze-for-freeze. Despite Iran's public line on Afghanistan, Solana said the IRGC was acting at odds with our goals for the country. End Summary. WILL PAKISTAN'S PM GAIN MORE POWER? ¶2. (C) Solana led off the Economics David Lipton to discuss Pakistan,s economy and future EU support to the electicity sector. Solana said this kind of technQcal support is not part of his remit as forein policy chief, but said he would relay the request to the relevant EU institutions and officials. Holbrooke also encouraged the EU to povide further aid to alleviate the humanitarian situation in the Swat Valley, beyond the 485 million euros pledged to Pakistan in Tokyo in April and the boost in June of humanitarian funding to 72 million euros. AFGHANISTAN: BEYOND THE ELECTIONS ¶4. (S) Turning to Afghanistan, Solana said he had met with FM Spanta, who made "dramatic" accusations about Pakistani support for the insurgency. He also met with President Karzai, who he described as "very nervous" and agitated, and who expressed concerns about U.S. military operations in Helmand Province. SRAP Holbrooke cautioned against taking Karzai at his word. He said Karzai had not expressed his concerns about U.S. operations to the USG. Those operations, Holbrooke said, had uncovered and destroyed large Taliban drug caches. The U.S. no longer supports poppy eradication efforts with military forces, but is targeting traffickers, networks and bazaars. SRAP Holbrooke also described Karzai's allegations that 30 percent of Pashtuns will not be able to vote in the August 20 BRUSSELS 00001071 002.2 OF 002 elections as Karzai laying the groundwork to contest the elections if he loses. Holbrooke described candidate Abdullah as a figure who crosses ethnic lines and therefore seeks to be a unifying force, but who may in fact be just the opposite. ¶5. (S) Solana said that the U.S. and EU should consider how to react if the presidential election is discredited, sparks protests, or results in the need for a runoff. Holbrooke replied that our principal concern is an election that results in a Kenya- or Iran-like situation, undermining the legitimacy of the government. Such a situation would weaken U.S. and international support for the government and deal a blow to our efforts to strengthen governance. Solana said that during his visit, the head of the EU election monitoring mission, Philippe Morillon, suggested that a decisive first-round election, oy against such pre-juon pollinid net on Qt the ShQm he has had the most contact, calling him "a moderate radical." He said Larijni "despises" Ahmadinejad, but has not spoken /ut since the election. Jalili, Solana said, does not seem to have the same clout with the Supreme Leader as Larijani. Holbrooke noted that Iranian officials at international meetings in The Hague and Tokyo had been reluctant to engage with the U.S. even briefly, perhaps, he said, because they were caught off guard. ¶8. (S) Speculating on the Iranian response to the U.S. and P5 1 offers to negotiate, Solana anticipated a response from Iran in mid- to late-August. The response, he said, would probably come in the form of a long document in Farsi, "which will take a month for us to translate," and which would address all issues except the P5 1 offer of a freeze-for-freeze. When asked if Iran takes a September/UNGA deadline seriously, Solana said they take December more seriously, alluding to President Obama's expressed desire to see progress before the end of the year. ¶9. (S) Describing Iran's role in Afghanistan, Solana said Tehran's official line is that Iran opposes the Taliban, combats the drug trade, and wants to cooperate with the West. The IRGC, however, which Solana described as a "state within a state" that is awash in money, is acting at odds with our goals in Afghanistan. ¶10. (U) This cable has been cleared by SRAP Holbrooke. MURRAY .