Counter-Narcotics on our Eastern Caribbean Third Border:

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 BRIDGETOWN 000219 SIPDIS SENSITIVE STATE FOR WHA/CAR AND INL E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: SNAR KCRM ECON PGOV XL SUBJECT: Counter-Narcotics on our Eastern Caribbean Third Border: Drug Flows Rise as Resources Decline -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (SBU) The countries of the Eastern Caribbean are seeing a steady increase in narcotics trafficking and the attendant problems of gun and gang violence in their communities. Trafficking is on the rise as drug runners look for alternate routes to compensate for successes under Plan Colombia and the Merida Initiative. Local law enforcement, while receptive to training and aware of the growing threat, is under-resourced and plagued with antiquated legal codes and corruption in the ranks, sapping their ability to fight the growing problem. At this critical juncture, the donor community seems to be retreating in the face of competing priorities elsewhere -- despite the fact that the drugs are bound for their own shores. Additional resources for the thinly-stretched law enforcement agencies in the region, to include a robust regional maritime entity -- possible under the Regional Security System, will be a pre-requisite for gaining any real ground against narco-traffickers along the Third Border. End Summary. -------------- AWASH IN A SEA OF DRUGS -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The island nations that make up Embassy Bridgetown's area of responsibility -- Barbados, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines - have seen a steady increase in the volume of narcotics transshipment in recent years. The drugs, destined for both the North American and European markets, have begun to flow through the Caribbean at greater levels, as the launch of Plan Colombia and the Merida Initiative appear to have pushed traffickers to seek alternate routes. Last year, local law enforcement with the help of DEA and other international partners interdicted some 5,291 kilograms of cocaine, 35,297 kilograms of marijuana, and 3,302 units (pills) of MDMA (ecstasy),along with approximately $1.8 million in currency. Local law enforcement made over 200 trafficking-related arrests. These volumes are large -- especially for a region that is home to only about one million people -- but they represent, by DEA estimates, less than five percent of the flow through the region. ¶3. (SBU) According to JIATF and DEA intelligence estimates and projections for drug flows through the region in 2009, approximately 1450 metric tons of cocaine will flow from South America. Roughly one third of that will transit from Venezuela, with over 220 metric tons predicted to flow through the Eastern Caribbean. These projections are a significant increase from past years. ¶4. (SBU) These expectations for increased flow through the Eastern Caribbean are based on the assumption that continued counter drug successes in the Eastern Pacific, Mexico and Western Caribbean will continue to force traffickers to find paths of lesser resistance. They also are predicated on the assumption that drug runners do not feel threatened by interdiction efforts and capabilities by regional law enforcement. Some also believe that political ties between some Eastern Caribbean islands (notably St. Vincent and Dominica) and Venezuela may facilitate narcotics trafficking through the region. Already, DEA has seen evidence of increased use of these islands as stash and distribution locations by Venezuelan Trafficking organizations. More disturbingly for these small, thinly-stretched police forces, increasing demand in Europe and sustained U.S. demand is starting to be matched with developing local demand due to "spillover" from trafficking operations. -------------- INTERDICTION CAPABILITY LAGGING -------------- ¶5. (SBU) While the senior leaders in all these countries recognize the threat posed by narcotics trafficking, they face several hurdles to mounting a robust defense: lack of funding and equipment, corruption within the ranks and among some in government, and competing demands from the need to project a tourism-friendly image all sap at the political will needed to admit to and tackle the trafficking problem. ¶6. (SBU) All the countries in the region have a basic level of competence in regards to Counter Drug (CD) interdiction capacity, and have demonstrated willingness, even an eagerness, to engage in training to build capacity. However, the lack of basic investigative, prosecutorial and judicial tools, coupled with a lack of equipment and training for the equipment, are impediments to better interdiction. These deficiencies have limited complex conspiracy investigations and prosecutions necessary to dismantle modern Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTO) (i.e. surveillance, use of undercover and informants, recorded calls, controlled buys and deliveries, judicial wire intercepts, plea bargaining, the BRIDGETOWN 00000219 002 OF 004 establishment of cooperating defendants, financial analysis, asset forfeiture). Training to date by U.S. and international partners to mentor and train the local agencies in these skills has been somewhat effective, but hampered by lack of funding for follow-up and lack of coordination within the donor community. -------------- WHAT'S IN THE CUPBOARD -------------- ¶7. (SBU) DRUG SQUADS: Each of the countries in this area of responsibility has its own police force with a designated drug squad with primary responsibility for conducting drug investigations. These drug squads tend to operate reactively rather than proactively. Intelligence gathered is used solely to identify when/where a load of drugs might be intercepted. When a vessel containing drugs is intercepted, the only persons arrested are the actual crew members on the vessel and the investigation typically terminates at this point. The principals running the organizations are not arrested. Cooperation by arrested crew members is rare due in large part to a lack of plea bargaining tools and minimalist penalties for trafficking offenses. Although some islands have conspiracy, money laundering and asset forfeiture laws, the prosecuting and judicial authorities have yet to use them - the notable exception being St. Vincent, which in a landmark event made its first arrest under such provisions in January, 2009. For the most part, drug squads do not know how to marshal evidence against those not found in "actual possession" of drugs. ¶8. (SBU) SPECIAL UNITS: In addition to drug squads, each island may also have other agencies or units (i.e., Financial Intelligence Units, Intelligence Units, and Special Branch Units) that support the CD efforts of the drug squad. These specialized units operate within the same criminal justice system that lacks the institutional will or capacity to arrest or prosecute anyone other than the person found in possession of drugs. Although many of those assigned to the drug squads and specialized units are extremely dedicated, they have inadequate facilities, and are poorly paid, trained and equipped to carry out complex and long term investigations. There also exists very little inter-island cooperation in terms of CD targeting and/or coordination, unless carried out under the umbrella of a U.S. DEA or British SOCA-led investigation. ¶9. (SBU) CUSTOMS AUTHORITY: Each of the seven island nations has a Customs authority or ministry responsible for controlling the goods and persons moving through the ports and airports. In addition to uniformed officers, some agencies dedicate a small number of persons (1-2) to conduct more in-depth investigations including illegal drug importation. With the possible exception of St. Lucia, though, none of the local Customs authorities have been significant contributors to CD efforts in the region. ¶10. (SBU) PORTS: The consensus among CD partners, both local and donor community, is that there is a very high probability that large quantities of drugs are being moved through the maritime ports of the island nations of the Eastern Caribbean (including Martinique and Guadeloupe). Virtually no effort is made to verify what cargo is passing through unless specific intelligence exists to conduct further inquiry. The majority of the agencies lack the manpower, technology and basic tools to perform their duties, such as centralized databases and/or drug detector canines. Moreover, corruption in the ports is believed to be rampant. Numerous customs officers and guards working at the ports were arrested this past year. DEA has identified drug sources of supply (SOS) who utilize corrupt brokers at the port to aid in their trafficking efforts as well as sources of supply who were actually brokers themselves. ¶11. (SBU) AIRPORTS: With the exception of Barbados, security at airports in the Eastern Caribbean is lax, and the use of technical support such as cameras, computer automation and centralized databases is lacking. DTO's employ couriers or corrupt baggage handlers to place bags containing drugs onto airplanes. Couriers are also used to smuggle drugs into the U.S., UK and Canada. Commuter airlines between the islands are frequently used to move drugs and proceeds. DEA has provided examples of swallowers coming from Jamaica or other mules with marijuana in their luggage on a weekly basis to all islands in our AOR. Cocaine is also coming in from Guyana and Trinidad, and cash is regularly transported from Barbados to Trinidad. Investigations and intelligence have uncovered airline employees putting drugs on inter-island flights that have been transferred to U.S.-bound aircraft destined for JFK airport. TSA has initiated a program in St. Lucia to improve airport security at one of the country's two airports, but there are reports that significant drug transshipment activity continues unabated at the other airport. ¶12. (SBU) COAST GUARD/POLICE MARINE UNITS: Each island has either a Coast Guard or a marine police unit or both for patrolling coastal BRIDGETOWN 00000219 003 OF 004 waters and supporting CD interdiction efforts. Their effectiveness has been minimal due to poorly maintained or inoperable assets, lack of discipline, poor communication and/or operational protocols, incompetence and/or corruption. The Barbados Coast Guard has the best maritime assets in the region; however, concerns about corruption have relegated the agency to being a virtual non-entity in CD planning and operations. Recent evidence suggests that persons within the agency actively assist the DTO's in their drug trafficking activities, as reflected by the December, 2008 arrest of a Barbados Coast Guard officer who was on board a vessel that was returning to St Vincent after delivering approximately 423 pounds of marijuana to Barbados. In that case, the Barbados drug squad contacted the St Vincent Coast Guard, not the Barbados Coast Guard, to intercept the transporting vessel. -------------- RSS: UNDERUTILIZED POTENTIAL -------------- ¶13. (SBU) The sole aviation asset in the region with capacity to provide aerial support of CD interdiction operation is the Regional Security System (RSS) Air Wing, based in Barbados. The RSS is the common military defense force that is shared and in theory contributed to by all seven of the Eastern Caribbean partner countries. The primary mission of the RSS air wing is to provide detection and monitoring capacity with their two Fairchild C-26 twin engine turbo-prop aircraft that were manufactured in 1989 and donated by INL to the RSS in the 1990's. Unfortunately, since that time the avionic and navigational systems of these aircraft have become dated or obsolete, and resources to repair or update them has dwindled with the continued reduction in INCLE assistance funds. The staff is extremely professional, experienced and generally successful in detecting and monitoring suspected trafficking vessels, especially during intelligence-driven CD operations. Unfortunately, they must rely upon inept, incompetent or corrupt local coast guard or marine police units to conduct the actual interdiction. The predictable result is that the RSS is far more likely to watch a drug runner sail off into the sunset than to coordinate an apprehension. A competent and capable surface interdiction capacity is necessary for the full benefit of their services to be realized. -------------- DONOR COMMUNITY ACTIVITY -------------- ¶14. (SBU) At present, the only consistent presence of international or NATO CD capacity within the region is provided by the French, a serendipitous byproduct of the proximity of the French island departments of Martinique and Guadeloupe. In June, 2008, the commander of the French forces in the French Antilles and the Director of the U.S. Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATFS) signed a memorandum of agreement establishing a JIATFS counter-drug task group and regional counter-drug coordination center under leadership of the French in Martinique. ¶15. (SBU) Based on the ineffectiveness of maritime assets in the region, international agencies (DEA and SOCA) have increasingly sought to utilize French assets during maritime interdiction operations. In coordination with JIATFS, the French will bring additional assets into the region to participate in periodic CD maritime interdiction surge operations, to include long range detection and monitoring aircraft, interdiction helicopters and high speed surface assets with special forces tactical support. During these operations, the U.S. and NATO allies will also typically divert some surface assets to the region to participate. Unfortunately these operations are conducted on an infrequent basis (bi-annually) and generally for a short period of time (2-3 weeks) during which many of the DTO's quickly notice the beefed up LE presence and cease operations with the knowledge that they will not last long. ¶16. (SBU) Our British and Canadian partners have been subjected to a reduction in manpower and funding. The British had traditionally funded a marine training center in Antigua via the RSS for Coast Guard members but were forced to close the project due to lack of funding. On March 31, 2009, a UK program for vetting/polygraph of police and coast guard personnel with whom they worked was also terminated because of funding issues. In addition, the UK Security Advisory Team, currently assigned to the British High Commission in Bridgetown, will cease to exist on March 31, 2010, barring any change of policy from their new Home Secretary. The Canadians are in the process of re-deploying their RCMP assets in the region and will be served by one officer in Jamaica, two officers in the Dominican Republic and one in Trinidad. The European Union, with a budget of approximately 6 million Euros for counter drug initiatives in the region this coming year, is focusing their priorities towards West Africa and their partners are not optimistic about an increase BRIDGETOWN 00000219 004 OF 004 of funding for the Eastern Caribbean. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶17. (SBU) The level of cooperation among the various international partners involved in CD activities in the region (U.S., UK, and France) as well as select elements within the regional partner nations to include the RSS/Air Wing is outstanding. The quality of intelligence being generated by the regional and international partners regarding the DTO's is extremely high and generally includes precise information regarding planned shipments. The missing piece to achieve successful interdictions is competent and non-corrupt surface asset interdiction support. A common solution proposed by CD donor countries is to allocate funding to establish a highly trained and vetted maritime interdiction strike force equipped with one or more surface intercept vessels which would be under the leadership of and directly coordinated with the RSS/Air Wing. With an RSS surface group -- a regional coast guard -- to complement the RSS air assets, the region could be a capable partner for U.S. counter-drug efforts. As we move forward with the Security Dialogue with the Caribbean, the development of an RSS Regional Coast Guard should be a priority. Other donors, such as the EU, recognize the need for such a force and may be willing to work with us to explore how to move toward that goal. HARDT