SCENESETTER FOR VISIT TO SLOVAKIA OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRATISLAVA 000447 SIPDIS OSD PLEASE PASS TO ASD VERSBOW E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2019 TAGS: PREL NATO MARR AF LO SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT TO SLOVAKIA OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE VERSHBOW BRATISLAVA 00000447 001.2 OF 004 CLASSIFIED BY: Keith A. Eddins, Charge d'Affaires, a.i., State. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) Ambassador Vershbow: Your visit to Bratislava coincides with what could be Slovakia's most forward-leaning pledges regarding ISAF participation to date. At the NATO Informal Defense Ministerial, we expect the Slovaks to announce the deployment of Special Forces (20 in the near future, imbedded in a large unit, preferably U.S., and approximately 60 in 2011); an OMLT; and an EOD team. This would bring the Slovak troop strength to about 350, up from the current 246. At the same time, the Ministry of Defense's budget has been cut by 20 percent. The result: hundreds of MOD employees, uniformed and civilian, have been let go; modernization and acquisitions (including a transport aircraft tender),have ground to a halt; and training has been cut back drastically. GOS officials have repeatedly assured us that the budget woes will not affect overseas deployments, but it is clear that the Slovaks will not be able to fulfill their pledges without substantial U.S. or other Allied assistance. Their NATO-based commitments with respect to defense modernization and investment are also in jeopardy. ¶2. (C) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has taken a similarly draconian budget hit. As Slovakia moves full swing into a year of multiple elections (parliamentary voting will take place in June),the Fico government is trying to demonstrate to voters that its priorities are domestic and `social,' not foreign. Slovakia, like other countries in the region, has been hit hard by the economic crisis. Growth declined by almost 12 percent from 2008-2009; the EU has launched proceedings against Slovakia for breaching Maastricht deficit limits, and unemployment is on the rise. Against this backdrop, the Ministry is struggling to maintain current operations and its very modest foreign assistance program is mired in uncertainty. In 2009, the MFA declared Afghanistan one of its priority assistance targets, but its seems incapable of translating that commitment into action. In short, the current government, is unwilling to commit the resources necessary for the conduct of a strong defense and foreign affairs agenda. ¶3. (C) The MOD and MFA officials with whom you will be meet will be anxious to highlight any new Afghan-related pledges. The Slovaks are also deployed in UNFICYP and KFOR, although they are planning to withdraw or at least greatly reduce their KFOR contingent. You should be aware that Prime Minister Fico -- a frequent critic of U.S. foreign policy -- wants very much to meet with President Obama prior to the 2010 Slovak elections. He will certainly raise this with Secretary Gates, and you are likely to hear a similar request from your interlocutors. Increased Slovak deployments to Afghanistan are widely viewed here as the best way to boost Fico's chances. ¶4. (C) In addition to your participation in the Ministerial and bilateral meetings with GOS officials, you are scheduled to give the keynote address at the Slovak Atlantic Council's conference `New Challenges, Better Capabilities.' The Commission is the leading, transatlantic-oriented security and defense NGO in the country. SAC is now led by former Ambassador to the U.S. Rastislav Kacer, who is a strong supporter of NATO and relations with the U.S. Your presence will give a needed to boost to the small but influential group who want to pull Slovakia closer to the U.S. and to anchor it more securely in NATO. You should be aware, however, that there is a good deal of skepticism among this group (which includes several signatories of the CEE open letter) about the direction of U.S. policy. They believe we do not have a strategy toward Russia other than appeasement and they are worried. The current government, which is close to Moscow, is more sanguine. Slovakia in Afghanistan -------------- ¶5. (C) In 2008, the Slovaks transferred a 57-man engineering unit to Kandahar airbase. This move was only authorized after a visit by Prime Minister Fico to Afghanistan to ensure that Slovak troops would be operating in a secure environment, i.e., the likelihood of any Slovak casualties would be minimal. PM Fico had made a withdrawal of Slovak forces in Iraq a centerpiece of his 2006 campaign, and made good on that BRATISLAVA 00000447 002.2 OF 004 promise in 2007. In 2008-9, the Slovaks have increased troop strength, pairing with the Dutch in Uruzgan Province and the Canadians in Kandahar. The current mandate authorizes 262 troops in Afghanistan, subject to strict caveats. The current mandate also includes authorization for a 15-person OMLT. Given existing caveats, the Slovaks are interested in a garrison OMLT, preference within RC-South, where the majority of Slovak troops are operating. ¶6. (C) As part of our efforts to assist the Slovaks achieve their stated goals, e.g., to deploy combat forces, DAO and ODC have worked tirelessly to help secure needed training and assistance. However, without a firm Slovak commitment to deploy these forces to Afghanistan, many resources are out of reach, e.g., CRSP monies. The Slovak Military Delegation to NATO has received no instructions to engage with SHAPE on further deployment, and we have been told repeatedly by the MOD not to expect the mandate for participation in Afghanistan to be revised until after the 2010 elections. Defense Minister Baska and the military leadership are frustrated by the constraints of Fico's overweening political caution and evasiveness on Afghanistan, but express cautious optimism that firm commitments will be made at the NATO Defense Ministerial. ¶7. (C) The other area in which the Slovaks could contribute is in the realm of police training, reconstruction, and institution building. The GOS months ago stated that it would send police officers to Kabul, but to our knowledge no steps have been taken to activate this mission. The Slovaks are also moving at a glacial pace to identify and fund Official Development Assistance projects in Afghanistan and to make legislative changes that would enable civil servants to contribute to international reconstruction projects there. During a recent visit to Turkey, PM Fico was quoted as saying that the Slovaks needed to send `more doctors, engineers, etc. to assist with civilian reconstruction.' We agree and urge you to press FM Lajcak to step up participation on the civilian side. ¶8. (C) In short, the upcoming Ministerial presents the best and earliest opportunity for the Slovaks -- more specifically the Prime Minister -- to firm up commitments the government has been foreshadowing for more than a year. In your conversations with MOD and MFA officials, you should stress the need for the Slovaks to `sign on the dotted line,' so that the necessary training, equipping, and planning can take place in Mons, in Bratislava and in the U.S. State of the Slovak Armed Forces -------------- ¶9. (C) The Slovak military is being undermined by a political leadership that does not value its role. Last year, as the debate on the budget began to heat up, PM Fico stated that he did not intend to allocate another crown for soldiers `who don't know how to march.' The Finance Minister has told us that he doesn't see the need for a Slovak military (he was serious). In the past year, the Ministry has shed over 2000 civilian and military positions. The budget, which was 1.4 percent of GDP last year, has been reduced from 1.1. billion euro in 2009 to 880 million euro in 2010. Several key acquisitions have been stalled, including the procurement of sorely needed military transport aircraft. Most Slovak equipment is at or near obsolescence. Significant USG investments (amounting to 100 million USD since Slovak independence),e.g., in the joint training center at Lest, are going to waste because the Slovaks are unwilling to invest in needed personnel and maintenance. ¶10. (C) A small, but relatively influential cadre of Slovak policymakers and politicians, many from the NATO accession process, support greater Slovak engagement in NATO and its operations. This group, which also includes Foreign Minister Lajcak, Political Director and former NATO PermRep Slobodnik, and several members of the current opposition, has worked hard to bolster Slovakia's presence in Afghanistan and to build awareness and support for the mission here in Slovakia. The General Staff is also anxious to see the Slovak military do more, but it lacks influence and clout. The Slovaks need to hear from senior USG officials that we, as NATO Allies, expect the GOS to live up to its commitments to maintain a viable, well-trained and funded military. ¶11. (C) You will find Defense Minister Baska to be a straightforward and pleasant interlocutor who is committed to greater Slovak engagement in Afghanistan. Although he served as State Secretary (Deputy Secretary) at MOD prior to being tapped for his current position in March 2008, he does not have broad BRATISLAVA 00000447 003.2 OF 004 experience in security affairs or government (he is 34). He is not part of Fico's inner circle, however, and wields limited influence in the interagency, as evidenced by his Ministry's bleak financial outlook. Slovak Foreign Policy -------------- ¶13. (C) While Slovak foreign policy is necessarily anchored in the EU and NATO, it has undergone a negative transition during the three years of the Fico government. Fico, for your background, joined the Czechoslovak communist party long after a smart young lawyer like himself should have concluded that its time was drawing nigh. Fico made a smooth transition to the Party of the Democratic Left and then to leadership of his own `Social Democratic' party (called SMER),but his critics say he remains a `Bolshevik' at heart. Some features of his leadership style, e.g., his lack of tolerance for a free press, his statist tendencies, and his obsequious stance toward Russia and Cuba, are reminiscent of an earlier era. Fico has often made a point, at the same time, of distancing himself from U.S. foreign and economic policies. ¶14. (C) The Foreign Ministry has worked to keep relations with the U.S. on an even keel and to demonstrate that Slovakia is a constructive partner. Foreign Minister Lajcak, with whom you will meet, is trying to promote himself in the international community as a Balkan expert (he recently traveled to Sarajevo with Deputy Secretary Steinberg and FM Bildt.) Although some U.S. diplomats did not give him high marks for his service as High Representative to Bosnia, we have been told by several insiders that he hopes to parlay that experience into a senior EU position after his tenure as FM ends. ¶15. (C) Lajcak's focus on the Western Balkans can also be understood as an effort to distance himself from what has been described by many as the `worst relationship between two EU states,' i.e., the Slovak-Hungarian relationship. Tensions in the relationship reached a peak this summer after the Slovaks declared, via diplomatic note, that Hungarian President Solyom was persona non grata. After this embarrassing episode, the two Prime Ministers met and agreed on a series of steps to improve relations. Although the tensions in Slovak-Hungarian relations stem from problems on both sides of the border, the presence in the Fico government of a right-wing nationalist party, which is virulently anti-Hungarian, has been a decisively negative factor. We studiously avoid taking sides in this ongoing and multifaceted spat. The Fico Government -------------- ¶16. (C) Fico's choice of coalition partners -- Jan Slota of the Slovak National Party and authoritarian former Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar -- was a terrible one for the Slovak state. While Fico enjoys clear dominance over both junior coalition partners, it is clear that he has begun to view blatant corruption in which both are engaged as a political liability. Since the Fico government came to power in 2006, seven ministers have been dismissed for corruption, most from SNS and HZDS. Corruption is also rife within the Prime Minister's party and among its sponsors, but the over-the-top antics and colossal fleecing perpetrated by the other coalition parties distract attention from the slightly more subtle maneuvers of the PM's allies. High-level governmental corruption is but one example of this government's tendency to play fast and lose with the law. As we have previously reported, several Slovak officials who served in or worked with the former Czechoslovak intelligence services (StB) now hold security clearances for which they are, by Slovak law, ineligible. Among these individuals is the head of the National Security Office, which issues all security clearances, the Deputy Director of Slovak Military Intelligence, and a member of the Slovak Security Council. ¶17. (C) With the approach of elections, an already polarized political scene is expected to become even more divided. The upcoming commemorations of the 20th anniversary of the Velvet Revolution will throw into high relief the differences in the Slovak political elite: on one side are those who struggled for change and participated in the events of 1989, on the other are Robert Fico (who once famously stated that the events of November 1989 had made no impact on him) and many members of his government, who were also communists. BRATISLAVA 00000447 004.2 OF 004 18 (C) One way that Robert Fico seeks to burnish his election prospects is by meeting with President Obama. Your Slovak interlocutors are sure to raise the Prime Minister's wish for a White House visit, and will likely point to any new Afghanistan commitments as a justification. While Fico is almost certain to form the next Slovak government, we remain doubtful that a bilateral meeting in the coming months would further specific U.S. interests. Nevertheless, we enjoy and strive to maintain good cooperation with Slovakia on many practical levels, including in the area of security and defense. As NATO Allies and members of the UN, OSCE, OECD, we are anchored in many common institutions and agreements. Our perspective on Slovakia is a long-term one: although we may not see eye-to-eye with the current government, we will continue to work with the Slovaks to build capacity, to bolster commitment to these institutions, and to encourage Slovakia to play a constructive role in the region and beyond. EDDINS