SLOVAK RESPONSE TO LONG-TERM STRATEGY ON GEORGIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRATISLAVA 000020

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/CE, EUR/CACEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2019
TAGS: PREL LO GG
SUBJECT: SLOVAK RESPONSE TO LONG-TERM STRATEGY ON GEORGIA

REF: 07 STATE 134559

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission, Keith Eddins, for reasons 1.4 b
and d.


1. (C) In a January 2 farewell call on departing Slovak
Foreign Minister Kubis, Ambassador foreshadowed reftel
points, emphasizing the U.S. desire for a united Georgia, but
acknowledging that we were engaged in a long-term process.
Kubis welcomed U.S. willingness to solicit European thinking,
and urged the new U.S. administration to be clear in its
non-recognition policy; the Russians won't change their
position, he argued, thus the need to ensure that no other
countries recognize South Ossetia or Abkhazia. Kubis, who is
leaving Bratislava for a UN post in Geneva, opined that the
time-frame for securing reintegration of the break-away
Georgian provinces may be akin to the 40 years it took the
Baltic States to achieve independence from the Soviet Union.


2. (C) Kubis was doubtful about a carrot-and-stick approach
working, but did believe that forcing South Ossetian and
Abkhazian officials to travel on Georgia passports would be a
useful signal. He emphasized that it wouldn't be enough to
simply prevent them from using their own passports, but they
should not be permitted to travel on Russian documents
either. Kubis was also doubtful that any progress could be
made until the political leadership changes in Georgia,
although he made clear that Slovakia still fully supports the
existing government. He was hopeful that the OSCE could
continue to remain engaged, even if the mission were closed,
and he noted that the EU mission would continue to offer a
useful diplomatic platform. Finally, he advised against any
moves to accelerate Georgian membership in NATO, suggesting
that sticking with the December 2008 Brussels NAC language
would help us avoid an unnecessary confrontation at the April
2009 NATO Summit.


3. (C) DCM followed up in greater detail with Stefan
Rozkopal, the MFA's Director for Russia/CIS, on January 8,
reviewing all of the talking points and emphasizing the U.S.
desire to consult closely with our allies on this important
subject. Rozkopal's preliminary response was positive, and he
expressed appreciation for the U.S. initiative to develop a
long-term strategy in consultation with NATO allies. With
respect to specific proposals, Rozkopal did not anticipate
any opposition from the GOS. He did, however, flag the
potential difficulty of preventing European investors from
flocking to Abkhazia to get a piece of the Sochi Olympic
construction bonanza.


4. (C) Rozkopal commented that in developing the strategy, it
would be particularly important to accurately gauge the
aspirations of the South Ossetians and Abkhaz. In that
regard, the Georgians would have to take the lead in reaching
out to both. Rozkopal expressed chagrin that Russia had come
out "ahead" (at least in its own estimation) in the aftermath
of its invasion of Georgia. While he acknowledged that the
war and the global financial crisis had weakened the Russian
economy, Rozkopal argued that Russia's leaders feel
emboldened and believed they were now being taken more
seriously be the U.S. and Europeans. Hence, Rozkopal was not
at all surprised by Russia's decision to cut off gas supplies
to Ukraine and Europe


5. (C) Rozkopal asked that we share with the MFA reactions
from other EU capitals as we move forward with the
consultation process.
OBSITNIK