GASPAROVIC ON AFGHANISTAN, ASAD, ROMA, AND THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRATISLAVA 000190 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/24/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM NATO OPDC LO SUBJECT: GASPAROVIC ON AFGHANISTAN, ASAD, ROMA, AND THE JUSTICE SECTOR REF: A. STATE 36155 (NOTAL) ¶B. BRATISLAVA 185 ¶C. BRATISLAVA 182 ¶D. BRATISLAVA 177 ¶E. BRATISLAVA 166 Classified By: Charge Keith A. Eddins; reasons 1.4 (b/d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Charge delivered President Obama's congratulatory letter to newly reelected Slovak President Gasparovic on April 22. In the course of their subsequent hour-long discussion, Gasparovic voiced worries about the Slovak economy, underscored his continued personal commitment to Slovak engagement in Afghanistan, reiterated his willingness to deliver a coordinated message to Syrian President Asad, and expressed somewhat ambivalent sentiments regarding Roma and the recent torture incident in Kosice. On the Slovak justice system, Gasparovic urged Charge not to be too concerned about proposals to concentrate greater power in the hands of the head of the Supreme Court. Given the chance to highlight his potential final-term independence, Gasparovic instead offered no suggestion that he intends to stray from the policy lines of the ruling coalition to counter some of the negative trends -- such as treatment of Roma and problems in the judicial section -- evident in Slovak politics. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Charge met one-on-one with recently reelected President Gasparovic April 22 to deliver President Obama's congratulatory letter (ref A). Gasparovic was appreciative and recalled their brief introductory chat on the margins of the Strasbourg NATO Summit, where Gasparovic said they discussed the global financial and economic crisis. Gasparovic expressed his worries that the recession was now being felt more and more deeply in Slovakia, with its export-driven economy. He was pleased that the Slovak government was addressing the social needs of the population and that the government's Economic Crisis Committee -- on which he sits -- includes an opposition representative who, he asserted, generally supports the government's initiatives. -------------- Afghanistan -------------- ¶3. (C) Gasparovic said that prior to the NATO Summit, he had sought approval from the government to offer additional troops to the Alliance's efforts in Afghanistan, but -- because of the impact of the economic crisis on the budget -- his request had been denied. Nevertheless, he underscored his personal commitment to NATO and trans-Atlantic solidarity, and pointed to Slovak plans to send a special forces unit to Afghanistan in 2011 (ref B),as well as the government's desire to send Slovak police to the country as part of an EU mission (ref D). He also reiterated previous Slovak offers to host training sessions for Afghan police in Lest, the Slovak military's state-of-the-art training facility. -------------- Asad Visit -------------- ¶4. (C) Regarding Syrian President Asad's upcoming trip to Bratislava, Charge noted that we were discussing the visit with both the President's staff and the MFA. Gasparovic took pains to make clear that he had personally asked his senior foreign policy advisor to consult with the U.S. in preparation for the visit; he wanted to ensure that the message Slovakia delivers to Asad is consistent with U.S. and EU views on engaging Syria. Drawing on guidance provided by NEA, Charge stressed that U.S. engagement with Syria covered a wide range of issues and was designed to produce concrete results. Our discussion with the Syrians have been frank and have frankly addressed areas of disagreement, such as continuing Syrian interference in Lebanon and support for terrorist organizations. We welcomed Gasparovic's desire to avoid sending mixed signals, and -- in our more detailed discussions with Slovak specialists -- urged the Slovaks to ensure that the Syrians fully understand that greater engagement will require concrete Syrian efforts to respond to key areas of concern that the U.S. and EU share. -------------- Roma Torture Incident -------------- ¶5. (C) Charge next raised with Gasparovic the recent case in which Slovak police were caught on camera brutalizing four BRATISLAVA 00000190 002 OF 003 young Roma boys who had been arrested for assault and theft (ref C and previous). While expressing criticism of the individual policemen involved and endorsing the police presidium's rapid response (i.e., suspending the policemen, announcing a criminal investigation),Gasparovic also pointed out that some "average Slovaks" with whom he had met felt the government had gone too far in disciplining the police. He noted that the young Roma had attacked and robbed an elderly woman, and that at least some of them had been previously arrested (although, as minors, they could not be prosecuted). When the Charge emphasized the importance of holding law enforcement officials accountable for their actions -- regardless of the circumstances -- Gasparovic suggested that the young men's parents should also be held responsible for failure to control their children. ¶6. (C) On the broader question of Romany rights and opportunities in Slovakia, Gasparovic reiterated the steps Slovakia is taking to increase educational options and improve housing for the Roma minority. And he suggested that he was pleased that Slovaks weren't as "racist and nationalist" as Hungarians, particularly when it came to treatment of the Roma. But when Charge suggested that the torture incident might present an opportunity for a presidential speech on the importance of tolerance and integration, Gasparovic expressed no interest. He cited his own willingness to receive and meet with Roma representatives "here in the Presidential Palace," and proudly noted that he had outpolled the opposition presidential candidate among Roma voters in ethnic Hungarian areas. But he argued that it would be two or three generations (at least) before Slovakia could make real progress on Roma integration. -------------- Judicial Sector -------------- ¶7. (C) Charge then asked Gasparovic -- both as President and as a former law professor and prosecutor -- his thoughts on proposed changes in the Slovak legal system that would grant more power to head of the Supreme Court (ref E). In doing so, Charge noted the widespread assumption within Slovak political circles that Justice Minister Harabin would soon be returning to the court as the chief justice. Charge wondered whether Gasparovic perceived a conflict in Harabin's pushing through legislation that would appear to benefit him and his patron, notorious ex-Prime Minister Meciar. In response, Gasparovic made clear that he did not hold Harabin in high regard. But, at the same time, he averred that the previous justice minister -- Daniel Lipsic, who served from 2002-2006 under Prime Minister Dzurinda -- had been much worse. Both ministers, Gasparovic asserted, had proved too willing to modify laws quickly to override a court decision with which they disagreed. And both, he continued, were too eager to eliminate bodies they didn't like (here he appeared to be alluding to Harabin's ongoing efforts to disband the special anti-corruption court). ¶8. (C) Gasparovic said that, in his personal opinion, the Slovak judicial system needed to be left alone for a while. Judges and prosecutors had gone through too many structural changes in the past decade; they needed more stability for the system to be able to mature. Gasparovic acknowledged he was concerned about political influence on the judicial system, but added that he was reassured by the fact that Slovak parliamentarians could and would provide appropriate oversight and guidance. Without making any commitments, Gasparovic added that many journalists and commentators had recently assumed that he would be nominating Harabin to the Supreme Court, but he hadn't yet done so. People should be careful about making such assumptions, he concluded. -------------- Embassy Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) Following his reelection, Gasparovic is clearly beholden to Prime Minister Fico, Fico's Smer party, and their Slovak National Party (SNS) allies for the support they provided during the presidential campaign. On some issues, such as NATO's commitments in Afghanistan, Gasparovic appears sincere when he asserts his preference for a strong trans-Atlantic orientation in Slovak foreign policy. But those are not the issues that matter the most to Fico, Smer, or the SNS. As he recently demonstrated, Gasparovic has no compunction against appointing an SNS candidate as Minister of Construction even though the new appointee was the linchpin within the very corruption scandal that led to the previous minister's sacking (septel). The one slim ray of BRATISLAVA 00000190 003 OF 003 hope we see in the judicial world is that Harabin (and his HZDS party) did not support Gasparovic's presidential bid; in fact, Gasparovic and Meciar remain sworn enemies. But if Fico were to eventually come to Gasparovic and say "it has to be Harabin" on the Supreme Court, Gasparovic would almost certainly oblige. ¶10. (C) On Roma issues, Gasparovic's failure to assume any sort of leading pro-tolerance role is no big surprise. As with his willingness to play the so-called Hungarian card during the presidential campaign, Gasparovic's reticence most likely represents his inherent prejudices (which are shared by much of Slovak -- and Central European -- society). When pressed, he is able to voice an appropriate level of revulsion at police brutality, but his heart doesn't seem to be in it. Ultimately, under the Slovak system, President Gasparovic has little real power. But we see little prospect that Gasparovic, despite his stated willingness to show some political independence as a second-term president, will use what little authority he has to challenge Prime Minister Fico or his ruling coalition. When Gasparovic said during the campaign "it is as if I were a member of Smer," he clearly meant it. EDDINS