GASPAROVIC REELECTED SLOVAK PRESIDENT

UNCLAS BRATISLAVA 000160 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV LO SUBJECT: GASPAROVIC REELECTED SLOVAK PRESIDENT ¶1. (U) Incumbent Slovak President Ivan Gasparovic won reelection April 4. Gasparovic defeated opposition candidate Iveta Radicova 55.5 percent to 44.5 percent; most observers had predicted a Gasparovic victory. Turnout was almost 52 percent in this second round of presidential voting, up a notch from the 44 percent of eligible Slovaks who had voted in the March 22 seven-candidate first round. ¶2. (U) Gasparovic, running with the active support of two of the three parties that comprise Slovakia's coalition government, is the first Slovak president to be reelected. He will be sworn in June 15 for his second five-year term, which will not expire until mid-2014. As head of state in a parliamentary system, Gasparovic has a limited, largely ceremonial role. But the Slovak presidency can influence government appointments and has constitutional responsibilities as commander in chief of the armed forces. Moreover, following parliamentary elections, the president can offer the option of forming a government to whichever party leader he chooses (assuming that leader can put together a coalition of at least 76 deputies). ¶3. (U) An exultant Prime Minister Robert Fico, whose coalition-leading Smer party strongly backed Gasparovic, told reporters early April 5 that "the result of these elections will have important consequences," which Fico promised to enumerate at an April 6 press conference. Gasparovic also received aggressive support from Fico's coalition partner Jan Slota, head of the notorious Slovak National Party (SNS). Slota and his subordinates hit Radicova hard for her popularity among Hungarian-speaking Slovaks, going so far as to argue that a Radicova victory wouldn't have been legitimate if she had been put over the top by ethnic Hungarian votes. ¶4. (U) Radicova ran a modern, reform-oriented campaign, but could never overcome the advantages Gasparovic held as the incumbent. Gasparovic entered 2009 with near-universal name recognition and a significant lead in the polls, and was able to use his many official public (and thus televised) appearances to great advantage in the extended period before official campaigning began in early March. He also linked himself tightly to the extremely popular Fico government, which continues to enjoy overwhelming support among Slovak voters. ¶5. (U) As in the first round, Radicova won Slovakia's two largest cities - Bratislava (with 64 percent of the vote) and Kosice (60 percent) - and ran up large majorities in ethnic Hungarians enclaves such as the Sturovo (92 percent) and Komaro (87 percent) regions. But Gasparovic won almost every other voting district in the country, taking most other cities and securing significant majorities in rural areas. ¶6. (U) COMMENT: We will provide a fuller analysis of Gasparovic's victory in the coming days, but our initial reaction is that his close ties to the ever-popular Fico government and the significant advantages of incumbency paved the way for his clear April 4 victory. Radicova successfully used her reformist image to gain the support of the Slovak intelligentsia and of many urban voters, but her anti-incumbent message never resonated outside her core, change-oriented constituencies. Gasparovic's willingness to play the "Hungarian card" (ethnic Hungarians make up about 10 percent of the population) turned off many of our interlocutors, but may have energized Gasparovic's more-populist, nationalist base to vote in greater numbers than on March 22. As we analyze the election results, we will particularly examine turnout and voter behavior in SNS-inclined regions. ¶7. (U) In any event, Fico's decision to personally and actively engage in the presidential campaign clearly showed that the governing coalition feared Radicova's candidacy. Particularly in the run-up to regional elections (later this year) and the 2010 parliamentary elections, Fico wanted to ensure that he had a strong supporter (and one who owed him something) in the Presidential Palace. And the willingness to play the volatile game of ethnic politics by marginalizing - and, on the part of Slota, vilifying - Hungarian-speaking voters demonstrated that Gasparovic and his supporters were desperate to win at any and all costs. END COMMENT. EDDINS