SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE (SEPQ)

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRATISLAVA 000100 DS/IP/ITA AND DS/IP/EUR E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2019 TAGS: ASEC SK PTER SUBJECT: SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE (SEPQ) - BRATISLAVA, SLOVAK REPUBLIC - SPRING 2009 REF: STATE 33533 Classified By: Classified by CDA Keith Eddins for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). The following are post's responses to the Security Environment Profile Questionnaire (SEPQ). -------------- POLITICAL VIOLENCE -------------- ¶1. (SBU) DEMONSTRATIONS ¶A. ARE THERE ANY ETHNIC OR RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES IN COUNTRY CAPABLE OF CARRYING OUT SIGNIFICANT ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATIONS? (SBU) The eastern border of Slovakia, which is shared with Ukraine, is a common passage for Afghans, Pakistanis, Indians, and Chinese who make up a sizable portion of illegal immigrants in Slovakia. It is debatable whether these groups can stage "significant" demonstrations of any sort, but they are capable of holding anti-American and anti-Slovak demonstrations. ¶B. HAVE THERE BEEN ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE COUNTRY WITHIN THE LAST 12 MONTHS? (SBU) Yes. May 8, 2008: Fifteen participants gathered in front of the Embassy referencing the crisis in Kosovo. After 40 minutes of speeches, the protesters marched through the historic district of Old Town Bratislava. April 5, 2008: Approximately 175 participants gathered in front of the Embassy to express displeasure with the independence of Kosovo and the U.S. support of the independence. The demonstration was pre-approved by the city and organized, in part, by the Slovak Organization for Peace. The demonstration lasted approximately one hour. ¶C. HAVE DEMONSTRATIONS TAKEN PLACE NEAR OR IN FRONT OF U.S. DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES? (U) Yes. Please see 1B. ¶D. WHAT IS THE AVERAGE SIZE OF AN ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATION? (SBU) Between 15-175 participants. ¶E. ARE ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATIONS USUALLY TRIGGERED BY U.S. FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVES, MILITARY ACTIONS, OR BY DOMESTIC ISSUES? (SBU) Yes. Please see 1B. ¶F. ARE DEMONSTRATIONS GENERALLY VIOLENT OR PEACEFUL? (SBU) Demonstrations are peaceful. Demonstrations must be pre-approved by the host government in advance, to include specific routes taken by the participants. Since the GOS law enforcement entities provide a show of force at the demonstrations, the crowds tend to be docile. ¶G. IF VIOLENT, HAVE ANY DEMONSTRATIONS RESULTED IN DAMAGE TO USG PROPERTY OR INJURIES TO USG EMPLOYEES? (U) No. ¶H. IF VIOLENT, HAVE ANY DEMONSTRATORS EVER PENETRATED OUR PERIMETER SECURITY LINE? (U) No. ¶I. HAVE THERE BEEN ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE COUNTRY WITHIN THE LASQ12 MONTHS? (U) Yes. The most recent demonstration was January 2, 2009. The 'Unit of Palestine Students in the Slovak Republic' organized, met, and held a peaceful rally at SNP Square in Bratislava several blocks from the Embassy. Approximately 30-40 participants gathered to express displeasure with the conflict in the Gaza Strip. ¶J. HAVE DEMONSTRATIONS QKEN PLACE NEAR OR IN FRONT OF U.S. DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES? (U) Yes. Please see 1B. ¶K. WHAT IS THE AVERAGE SIZE OF AN ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATION? (SBU) 35 participants. ¶L. ARE DEMONSTRATIONS GENERALLY VIOLENT OR PEACEFUL? (U) Peaceful. See response to question 1F. ¶M. IF VIOLENT, HAVE ANY DEMONSTRATIONS RESULTED IN DAMAGE TO USG PROPERTY? (U) N/A. ¶2. (SBU) MACRO CONFLICT CONDITIONS ¶A. IS THE HOST COUNTRY ENGAGED IN AN INTERSTATE OR INTRASTATE CONFLICT? (THIS MAY INCLUDE BATTLES BETWEEN ORGANIZED AND VIOLENT DRUG CARTELS). (U) No. ¶B. IF AN INTRASTATE CONFLICT, IS IT AN INSURGENCY LIMITED TO A SPECIFIC REGION OR IS IT A COUNTRYWIDE CIVIL WAR? (U) No. ¶C. IF LIMITED TO A SPECIFIC REGION, ARE ANY U.S. DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES LOCATED IN THIS REGION? (U) No. ¶D. HAVE ANY OF THE FACTIONS INVOLVED IN INTRASTATE CONFLICTS SIGNALED OR DEMONSTRATED AN ANTI-AMERICAN ORIENTATION? (U) No. ¶3. (SBU) HOST COUNTRY CAPABILITIES ¶A. ARE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES PROFESSIONAL AND WELL-TRAINED? The proficiency and professionalism of the Slovak police varies. The Office for the Protection of Constitutional Agents and Diplomatic Mission (commonly referred to as the Diplomatic Police, or DP) falls under the Ministry of Interior while the local police fall under the auspices of the National Police. The Ambassador's Protective Detail work for the MOI. These agents are well-trained and very professional. The Slovak SWAT team, known as Lynx Commando, are very well-trained and very professional - arguably the best the Slovak Republic has to offer. The Commandos are assigned the lead role of protecting the Embassy in the event of a demonstration or for special events such as the official Independence Day Celebration or Marine Corps Birthday Ball. From a street-crime standpoint, the Slovaks are poorly trained and fairly unprofessional. They do not have the skills to effectively investigate a crime, preserve a crime scene, conduct interviews, or collect evidence. Slovak counterparts in Bratislava of the Drug Enforcement Administration's Vienna Country Team Office appear to be capable, but do not seem to engage and interface with DEA and other DEA country team offices. This institutional or organizational downfall may be ingrained from the top down. Post is working with DEA officials in Vienna to establish better coordination on anti-narcotics. USSS counterparts in Slovakia are bifurcated into investigations and protection. On the protective side of the equation, the Slovaks are professional and well-trained. The major factor which separates protective services in Slovakia with those agencies who provide for protection in the United States is that the Slovak protective services command and control all national and local assets which are placed under the operational control of the protective services when they are on a mission. The Slovak style of protection relies on a show of force, which is very effective from a security standpoint but does not necessarily portray a positive image of the police to the average Slovak. On the investigative side of the house, the police are lacking in training and experience to effectively conduct a criminal investigation. Cybercrime in Slovakia receives little in the way of manpower, support from the decision-makers, and is only infrequently prosecuted. The best cybercrime investigators tend to be recruited into the private sector. ¶B. HAVE THEY BEEN TRAINED BY U.S. AGENCIES? (SBU) The USG has provided training to the GOS security and law enforcement personnel through the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) Budapest. ¶C. ARE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES CONFRONTED WITH SERIOUS, WIDESPREAD CORRUPTION INSIDE THEIR AGENCIES? (U) Widespread, yes. The seriousness of the corruption is disputable. Certainly, any corruption in the US law enforcement community is viewed seriously, but unfortunately the amount and degree of corruption among the local traffic police, for instance, is accepted by Slovaks as part of the culture. According to an RSO source, Slovaks are encouraged to pay bribes at the police station - directly to a police officer - for lighter penalties. A bottle of American brand whiskey or perhaps $300 could determine whether an offender is charged with DUI and loss of driver's license for six months, or avoid a DUI charge and receive only a temporary suspension of their driver's license. Embassy Bratislava maintains an active Law Enforcement Working Group and has recently established a Counter- Corruption Working Group whose goal is to address the corruption evident in the public sector and perhaps call the GOS attention to our concerns. ¶D. ARE THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES PROFESSIONAL AND CAPABLE OF DETERRING TERRORIST ACTIONS? (SBU) Yes, the GOS intelligence, law enforcement, and security services continue to remain an effective deterrent to terrorist activities. ¶E. HAVE THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES BEEN COOPERATIVE WITH U.S. EMBASSY REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION AND SUPPORT? (U) Yes. ¶F. ASSUMING THERE HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANT TERRORIST THREATS IN RECENT YEARS, HAVE HOST COUNTRY SECURITY SERVICES BEEN ABLE TO SCORE ANY MAJOR ANTI-TERRORISM SUCCESSES? (C) Yes, the Slovaks played a pivotal role in the 2002 arrest in London of three Algerian Islamists who were charged with conspiracy to develop or produce a chemical weapon (ricin) and the 2007 arrest of three suspected uranium dealers in Slovakia. ¶G. HAS HOST COUNTRY BEEN RESPONSIVE (RE: TIMELINESS AND ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES) TO EMBASSY REQUESTS FOR PROTECTIVE SECURITY? (SBU) Yes, but with mixed results. The host country is very cooperative to American Embassy requests for assistance for protective security services by providing ample resources in the protection of American personnel, property, and interests. ¶H. HOW DOES THE EMBASSY ASSESS THE OVERALL SECURITY AT MAJOR AIRPORTS IN THE COUNTRY? (EXCELLENT; VERY GOOD; GOOD/AVERAGE; POOR). (SBU) Good. ¶I. HOW EFFECTIVE ARE CUSTOMS AND IMMIGRATION CONTROLS AGENCIES? (EFFECTIVE; AVERAGE; INEFFECTIVE) (SBU) Average, but are getting better. ¶J. HOW EFFECTIVE ARE BORDER PATROL FORCES? (EFFECTIVE; AVERAGE; INEFFECTIVE). (SBU) Average. -------------- INDIGENOUS TERRORISM -------------- ¶4. (C) ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORIST GROUPS ¶A. ARE THERE INDIGENOUS, ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORIST GROUPS IN COUNTRY? (C) No. ¶B. IF YES, HOW MANY? PLEASE NAME GROUPS. (C) N/A. ¶C. HAVE GROUPS CARRIED OUT ANTI-AMERICAN ATTACKS WITHIN THE LAST 12 MONTHS? (U) No. ¶D. WERE ANY OF THESE LETHAL ATTACKS? (U) N/A. ¶E. HAVE GROUPS ATTACKED U.S. DIPLOMATIC TARGETS? (U) No. ¶F. HAVE GROUPS ATTACKED U.S. BUSINESS, U.S. MILITARY, OR U.S.-RELATED TARGETS? (U) No. ¶G. HAVE GROUPS LIMITED THEIR ATTACKS TO SPECIFIC REGIONS OR DO THEY OPERATE COUNTRY-WIDE? (SBU) N/A. ¶H. IF ATTACKS ARE LIMITED TO REGIONS, ARE THERE ANY U.S. DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES LOCATED IN THESE REGIONS? (U) N/A. ¶5. (C) OTHER INDIGENOUS TERRORIST GROUPS ¶A. ARE THERE OTHER INDIGENOUS TERRORIST GROUPS (NOT ANTI- AMERICAN) IN COUNTRY? (SBU) No. ¶B. IF YES, HOW MANY? PLEASE NAME GROUPS. (U) N/A. ¶C. HAVE GROUPS CARRIED OUT ATTACKS IN THE CAPITAL OR IN AREAS WHERE U.S. DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES ARE LOCATED? (U) No. ¶D. WERE ATTACKS LETHAL AND/OR INDISCRIMINATE? (U) No. ¶E. HAVE THERE BEEN ANY AMERICANS KILLED OR INJURED IN THESE ATTACKS? (U) No. -------------- TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM -------------- ¶6. (C) TRANSNATIONAL TERRORIST INDICATORS ¶A. ARE THERE ANY FOREIGN TERRORIST GROUPS THAT HAVE A PRESENCE IN COUNTRY? PROVIDE NAMES. (U) No. ¶B. HOW DOES POST ASSESS THIS PRESENCE? IS IT AN OPERATIONAL CELL? FINANCIAL CELL? SUPPORT CELL? PROPAGANDA CELL? (U) N/A. ¶C. IS THE HOST GOVERNMENT SYMPATHETIC TO THESE GROUPS? (U) N/A. The GOS is adamantly opposed to any/all terrorist organizations. ¶D. ARE THERE SUSPECT NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGOS) IN THE COUNTRY THAT HAVE A RELATIONSHIP WITH ANY OF THESE GROUPS? (U) N/A. ¶E. ARE THERE ANY ETHNIC OR RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES IN COUNTRY THAT ARE SYMPATHETIC TO THESE GROUPS? (SBU) N/A. ¶F. HOW DOES POST ASSESS THE LEVEL, INTENT, AND SCOPE OF HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES (IRAN, IRAQ, SYRIA, SERBIA, SUDAN, ET. AL.) IN COUNTRY RELATIVE TO POTENTIAL ANTI- AMERICAN TERRORIST ACTS? (C) Syria has no known diplomatic presence in Slovakia, but several hostile intelligence services maintain a presence in here. The Slovak, Russian, and Chinese governments have the technical capabilities to intercept cellular phone communications and wiretap hard-line phones. The Russians, whose primary targets are the Slovak government and NATO, including U.S. interests, are capable of operating with relative ease in Slovakia in terms of gathering technical intelligence. ¶G. HOW DOES POST ASSESS THE AVAILABILITY OF WEAPONS AND EXPLOSIVES IN COUNTRY OR FROM NEARBY COUNTRIES FOR HOSTILE TERRORIST ELEMENTS? (C) Low. Since there is no continuing conflict in the region, a steady market for arms smuggling into Slovakia for terrorist acts does not exist. EDDINS