Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BRASILIA730
2009-06-08 19:46:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Brasilia
Cable title:
DEFENSE MINISTER JOBIM ON BRAZIL'S FIGHTER PURCHASE
VZCZCXYZ0001 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHBR #0730 1591946 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 081946Z JUN 09 FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA TO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4458 INFO RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0494 RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0078 RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 7835 RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 4180 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 000730
SIPDIS
STATE FOR WHA AND PM. OSD FOR DUSD VERGA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2019
TAGS: MASS PREL ETTC BR
SUBJECT: DEFENSE MINISTER JOBIM ON BRAZIL'S FIGHTER PURCHASE
REF: BRASILIA 634
Classified By: Ambassador Clifford Sobel. Reason 1.4 (d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 000730
SIPDIS
STATE FOR WHA AND PM. OSD FOR DUSD VERGA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2019
TAGS: MASS PREL ETTC BR
SUBJECT: DEFENSE MINISTER JOBIM ON BRAZIL'S FIGHTER PURCHASE
REF: BRASILIA 634
Classified By: Ambassador Clifford Sobel. Reason 1.4 (d)
1. (C) During his late May visit to the U.S., Brazilian MOD
Jobim expressed greater confidence in the U.S. as a possible
source for the purchase of Brazil's next generation fighter.
Despite a long laundry list of past export control
difficulties that Jobim delivered to DepSecDef Lynn, Jobim
said he was beginning to feel more confident about the U.S.
as a partner in Defense technology. (Embassy Note: Embassy
has confirmed that most of these cases have been resolved.)
In a later meeting with Ambassador Sobel and Boeing President
Albaugh, Jobim said that he now believes he has enough facts
to "engage" President Lula in a discussion of purchase of the
Super Hornet.
2. (C) EMBASSY COMMENT. Although Jobim did not say he would
support a purchase from Boeing, this is the most positive
statement he has made regarding the possibility of purchase
of the Super Hornet. The week after Jobim's visit, a group
of Brazilian Congressional leaders visited the U.S. and gave
a more positive view. While they were convinced that Boeing
offered the best aircraft, they believed that lack of USG
financing support was a significant negative. They also
cited direct lobbying of French President Sarkozy (and the
lack of similar efforts from the U.S.) as potentially
decisive with President Lula. Brazilian Government sources
told Ambassador Sobel that they were suprised that President
Obama did not raise the fighter sale during his conversation
with Lula before the Summit of the Americas and that this was
perceived as indicating a lower level of USG interest,
particularly in light of heavy lobbying from the leaders of
France and Sweden. Embassy has heard repeatedly from
high-level Brazilians that Presidential advocacy could be
decisive.
SOBEL
SIPDIS
STATE FOR WHA AND PM. OSD FOR DUSD VERGA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2019
TAGS: MASS PREL ETTC BR
SUBJECT: DEFENSE MINISTER JOBIM ON BRAZIL'S FIGHTER PURCHASE
REF: BRASILIA 634
Classified By: Ambassador Clifford Sobel. Reason 1.4 (d)
1. (C) During his late May visit to the U.S., Brazilian MOD
Jobim expressed greater confidence in the U.S. as a possible
source for the purchase of Brazil's next generation fighter.
Despite a long laundry list of past export control
difficulties that Jobim delivered to DepSecDef Lynn, Jobim
said he was beginning to feel more confident about the U.S.
as a partner in Defense technology. (Embassy Note: Embassy
has confirmed that most of these cases have been resolved.)
In a later meeting with Ambassador Sobel and Boeing President
Albaugh, Jobim said that he now believes he has enough facts
to "engage" President Lula in a discussion of purchase of the
Super Hornet.
2. (C) EMBASSY COMMENT. Although Jobim did not say he would
support a purchase from Boeing, this is the most positive
statement he has made regarding the possibility of purchase
of the Super Hornet. The week after Jobim's visit, a group
of Brazilian Congressional leaders visited the U.S. and gave
a more positive view. While they were convinced that Boeing
offered the best aircraft, they believed that lack of USG
financing support was a significant negative. They also
cited direct lobbying of French President Sarkozy (and the
lack of similar efforts from the U.S.) as potentially
decisive with President Lula. Brazilian Government sources
told Ambassador Sobel that they were suprised that President
Obama did not raise the fighter sale during his conversation
with Lula before the Summit of the Americas and that this was
perceived as indicating a lower level of USG interest,
particularly in light of heavy lobbying from the leaders of
France and Sweden. Embassy has heard repeatedly from
high-level Brazilians that Presidential advocacy could be
decisive.
SOBEL