BRAZIL: CONGRESSIONAL HEARING ON WEAKNESSES IN MONITORING

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 000716 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ENRG KNNP IAEA ETTC EINV IR BR SUBJECT: BRAZIL: CONGRESSIONAL HEARING ON WEAKNESSES IN MONITORING AND CONTROL OF BRAZIL'S NUCLEAR FACILITIES REF: A) BRASILIA 702, B) RIO 131 (U) THIS CABLE IS SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED AND NOT FOR INTERNET DISTRIBUTION. ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: At May 14 hearings before the Brazilian Chambers of Deputies expert witnesses disagreed over the seriousness and accuracy of the criticisms contained in a recent report by the Brazilian government accountability office (Tribunal de Contas da Uniao) finding faults and irregularities in the monitoring and control over Brazil's 2,350 nuclear facilities and institutions. According to experts, Brazil's two nuclear reactors are more secure and better supervised than many of the other entities using nuclear materials, the majority of which have been operating without the necessary permits and licensing. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (SBU) At the end of March, the Brazilian government accountability office (Tribunal de Contas da Uniao or TCU) released a report identifying weaknesses in the government's oversight of entities handling nuclear materials. It found that 54% of Brazil's 2,350 institutions handling nuclear materials had been operating without the necessary permits and licensing. Further, 45% of these entities had not received proper inspections by Brazilian authorities. The report also indicated that numerous radiotherapy clinics had no record of ever having been inspected. It concluded that Brazil's two nuclear reactors at Angra dos Reis were lacking proper inspection facilities, properly trained personnel, and that their emergency plans lacked sufficient guidelines and safeguards for the plants' operators and the people living nearby. (NOTE: Since the TCU released its report, one of Brazil's reactors - Angra II - had a minor incident, without any serious injuries or contamination of property. The authorities reviewed the incident and determined that current policies and practices are satisfactory. REFTELS. END NOTE.) ¶3. (SBU) In response to the TCU's critical report, the Chamber of Deputies' Committee on the Environment and Sustainable Development held a public hearing on May 14. Three prominent figures involved in nuclear matters testified: Othon Luiz Pinheiro da Silva, the President of the Brazilian nuclear energy company Eletronuclear - Eletrobras Thermonuclear S.A. (which runs Brazil's two nuclear energy reactors); Odair Dias Goncalves, the President of the ;National Commission on Nuclear Energy (CNEN),which regulates and oversees nuclear energy in Brazil; and, Rogerio dos Santos Gomes, the President of the Radio-protection and Nuclear Security Inspectors Association (AFEN). ¶4. (SBU) Both Electronuclear President Pinheiro and CNEN President Goncalves stressed that nuclear facilities in Brazil, especially Brazil's nuclear energy plant at Angra, have extensive emergency plans in place to mitigate the hazards of a potential nuclear accident. Although both men argued that plans are currently in place which meet today's standards, neither man explained what the plans entailed or what they are intended to prevent or mitigate. In his remarks, Goncalves expressed concern regarding some of Brazil's 2,500 nuclear institutions with expired authorization permits (such as research facilities, factories and medical institutions),but indicated that only 9% of those reported by the TCU merited immediate concern. Goncalves added, however, that these entities had been notified and would be inspected and reauthorized soon. During his presentation, Pinheiro emphasized that Brazil's growth will require an increase in nuclear energy. He also underscored the need for Brazil to have up to date operation and safety procedures in all of its nuclear facilities in order to prevent problems. Both Pinheiro and Goncalves were optimistic about Brazil's nuclear program, and they skipped over potential weaknesses. ¶5. (SBU) In contrast, AFEN President Gomes was critical of the current state of Brazil's nuclear program. He questioned many of the positive claims made by Pinheiro and Goncalves. Gomes asserted that Brazil's regulatory laws regarding nuclear materials are conflicting and contradictory. According to Gomes, there is no concrete law stating who is in charge of regulating nuclear materials in Brazil. He opined that oftentimes regulation is left up to the nuclear companies themselves. This, he said, creates an ethical dilemma for the company. One specific area lacking regulation, according to Gomes, is the transportation of nuclear materials in and out of Brazil. Gomes argued that there is no established regulatory or inspection body in Brazil that monitors the transport of nuclear materials in Brazil. He feared that this lack of regulation could result in a tragic accident. Gomes cited several instances in which radioactive material passed through Brazilian ports without any type of monitoring or inspection. Gomes referred back to the 1987 nuclear accident in Goiania, Brazil, as an example of the potential threats posed by poor regulation and oversight. In that case, discarded nuclear material from a BRASILIA 00000716 002 OF 002 dentist's office, which was salvaged from a junkyard and turned into jewelry, killed several people. Gomes also accused Pinheiro and his associates of being motivated by money and, thus, compromising the security and regulation of Brazil's nuclear program. Pinheiro strongly denied that accusation. ¶6. (SBU) Several deputies voiced their concerns about the safety of Brazil's nuclear program. A number of them voiced support for Gomes' calls for tighter regulation of the transportation of nuclear material, and for institutionalizing an outside entity to monitor and inspect sites, rather than rely on self-inspection. Goncalves responded that there was not a problem with the separation of regulatory duties, and that the media and people like Gomes were exaggerating the problem. He also asserted that some regulatory and inspection duties must be retained by the industry itself in order to effectively protect its facilities from outside threats (such as terrorist attacks). ¶7. (SBU) Gomes warned that poor transport regulation could allow someone to get a hold of nuclear material and use it to make a "dirty bomb." Several of the deputies voiced alarm over this risk. Pinheiro and Goncalves replied that such a risk was very low. ¶8. (SBU) Also, Deputy Paulo Teixeira (Sao Paulo) declared that he was adamantly opposed to any development of nuclear technology for non-pacific means. The other deputies present, as well as the witnesses, concurred. Goncalves noted that the Ministry of Defense has been involved in the process of enriching uranium in Brazil. ¶9. (SBU) COMMENT. It is positive development to see the Chamber of Deputies holding a hearing about the inspection and oversight of Brazil's nuclear reactors and entities possessing nuclear materials. This attention from the legislative branch should increase the pressure on the government to put in place a good, reliable regime for nuclear security and safety. END COMMENT. SOBEL