BRAZIL: OPPORTUNITY TO POSITIVELY INFLUENCE CLIMATE CHANGE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 000697

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS TO SPECIAL ENVOY TODD STERN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/04/2019
TAGS: SENV ENRG KGHG EFIN ECON BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: OPPORTUNITY TO POSITIVELY INFLUENCE CLIMATE CHANGE
NEGOTIATING POSITION

REF: A) 2008 BRASILIA 1462,
B) 2008 BRASILIA 1159, C) BRASILIA 143,
D) BRASILIA 157, E) BRASILIA 202,
F) BRASILIA 265, G) 2007 BRASILIA 2020),
H) SCHNIER-DRISCOLL E-MAIL 12 MAY 2009

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Classified by: Deputy Chief of Mission Lisa Kubiske, Reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. There are signs that within the Brazilian
government there is increasing pressure to take a more pro-active
role in the ongoing international climate change negotiations. To
make progress in this area, Vice Minister for the Environment
Izabella Teixeira in recent meetings with the Ambassador and the
Deputy Chief of Mission urged that senior USG officials dealing with
climate change come to Brazil to pursue a dialogue with Minister
Dilma Rousseff in the Presidency and other key officials. We have a
good opportunity to nudge the development of Brazil's negotiating
position in a more positive direction. Post strongly concurs with
her analysis and suggestion. END SUMMARY.

OBTAINING BRAZIL'S HELP WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES


2. (C) Post has highlighted (REFTELS) the internal division within
the Brazilian government over how to deal with climate change in the
ongoing negotiations under the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC). The Ministry of Exterior Relations (MRE) has had
the lead in these negotiations. Although the MRE has replaced
veteran environmental negotiator Everton Vargas with Vera Machado as
Under Secretary for Policy and head of the climate change negotiating
team (REFTEL E),there have been only modest signs of positive
evolution in the MRE's views. In late 2007, Vargas adamantly
rejected the idea put forth by National Economic Council Director Al
Hubbard and Deputy National Security Advisor Dan Price that Brazil
and other developing countries should make commitments to help reduce
global climate change. Vargas repeatedly stressed that developing
countries had no obligations under the UNFCCCC except to provide
reports (REFTEL B). In May, Vera Machado echoed that view to the
Ambassador, namely, that only Annex I countries in the UNFCCC needed
to take on targets. There may be some modest movement in MRE's
stance based on the discussion in March between Luis Alberto
Figueiredo Machado, Vera Machado's deputy (no relation) and the MRE's
Director of the Environment Department, and Special Envoy Todd Stern.
Figueiredo said that Brazil might be willing to support the creation
of a registry mechanism to measure and verify actions of non-Kyoto
parties, non-Annex I countries. (REF H)


3. (C) In contrast to the incremental evolution of the MRE's
thinking, the Ministry of the Environment (MMA) has been bursting
forth with new energy and ideas since Minister Carlos Minc and Vice
Minister Izabella Teixeira took office in May 2008. The MMA is
advocating positions that are more supportive of those of the U.S.
Government (USG). In February 2009, Environment Minister Carlos Minc
in Nairobi publicly underscored the necessity of developing countries
to do more, citing the case of Brazil where the government has
committed to reducing deforestation - the primary source of its
emissions - by 70% by 2017. In return for developing countries
taking stronger measures to reduce emissions, Minc said, the
developed countries would need to provide them with greater financial
assistance and transfer of technology. Minc has consistently sought
a more pro-active role for Brazil in the UNFCCC negotiations, acting
as a bridge between the developed and the developing countries.


4. (C) At a working lunch with the Ambassador on May 7 and later at
a meeting with the Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) on May 20, Vice
Minister Teixeira (with her advisors Suzana Kahn and Branca
Americano) reiterated the MMA's thinking that Brazil could serve as a
bridge between developed and developing countries. She emphasized
that a partnership with the United States early on would make a major
difference in the negotiations. She acknowledged to the Ambassador
that there were differences between the MMA's approach and that of
the MRE. She stated that fortunately the Presidency (referred to as
Casa Civil) has the ability to weigh in decisively. She considered
the Casa Civil as an ally, noting that Casa Civil's Minister Dilma
Rousseff sided with the MMA in a dispute with the MRE in December
2008 over whether or not to include in the domestic national climate
change plan targets for reductions in the deforestation rate. For
Brazil, deforestation accounts for the vast majority of its
greenhouse gas emissions (REFTEL A). COMMENT. While Rousseff
appears to be a friend and political ally of Minc, she has
infrequently intervened to help Minc in his various struggles on
environmental issues with the MRE, the Agriculture Ministry, and
other agencies. END COMMENT.


5. (C) For their part, MRE officials in discussions with Post have
sought to minimize the role of the MMA in these negotiations. MRE's

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Special Envoy for Climate Change Sergio Serra regularly emphasizes to
the Post's Environment, Science & Technology, and Health (ESTH)
Counselor that the MRE leads the Brazilian negotiating team and that
Minc is speaking just his own personal views. On May 19, a key MRE
director once (but no longer) involved in climate change issues
privately told the DCM that Minc was not a good interlocutor on
climate change because he wasn't realistic enough. Rather than
focusing on what this director views as unattainable goals, he
suggested that the United States focus on what is attainable, at one
point using the formulation that "developed countries will have to
cut emissions, developing countries will have to cut the rate of
growth of emissions." In his view, there is a strategic effort being
planned by the Europeans to put the United States, China, India, and
Brazil on the defensive at Copenhagen. To counter this, he advocated
that the United States and Brazil should focus on the principles we
can agree on to take together to Copenhagen for the UNFCC talks. In
this regard, he steered us back to the MRE negotiators. The MRE went
so far as to contemplate sending a negotiating team to the first
meeting of the Major Economies Forum without a representative from
the MMA, though it later backed down and dropped out one of its
officials (Serra) to allow an MMA official (Americano) to attend.


6. (C) COMMENT. To date, the MRE has been generally successful in
keeping to a minimum the MMA's role in setting the negotiating team's
positions in the UNFCCC negotiations. There are several reasons that
undergird this split with the MMA. There is an institutional turf
battle, with the MRE not wanting to cede its well-established
authority to another ministry in these high-profile international
negotiations. Further, the MRE is probably more sensitive to
repercussions from China, India and other developing countries if it
is seen to be breaking ranks with them by agreeing that developing
countries should take on more responsibility for solving the global
warming problem. The MMA, being primarily domestic oriented, is more
shielded from such repercussions. Another factor is that the MMA
seems to be much more concerned about solving the problem, while the
MRE views the matter in the context of Brazil's broader foreign
policy concerns and goals (for example, defending Brazilian
sovereignty and enhancing Brazil's leader-of-the-Third World
credentials),rather than primarily as a significant, imminent threat
to Brazil. Thus, for the MRE there is limited value in Brazil making
commitments and sacrifices to address this challenge. END COMMENT.


7. (C) Another important difference between the MRE and the MMA is
over granting of credits or offsets for conserving standing forests.
The MRE succeeded in keeping forests out of the UNFCCC's clean
development mechanism (CDM) and to this day opposes this concept.
Minc is open to ideas with regard to standing forests, and in April
spoke at a conference regarding Reducing Emissions from Deforestation
and forest Degradation (REDD). The MRE's opposition is not limited
to REDD; Vera Machado told the Ambassador that, although Brazil now
does not oppose the use of a "cap-and-trade" mechanism, Brazil sees
it as only a stop-gap measure, as it will only maintain current
emission levels, not reduce them. The MRE wants to see deep cuts by
those countries responsible for historic emissions.


8. (C) The MMA and the MRE agree on two key points in the UNFCCC
negotiations. First, they both see a need for greater technology
transfer and financial assistance to developing countries to help
them mitigate and adapt to climate change. Second, they both have
highlighted the pivotal role the United States plays in the
negotiations. Vera Machado and Teixeira have said the United States
is key to the success or failure in these negotiations.

HOW TO POSITIVELY INFLUENCE BRAZIL'S POSITION


9. (C) Teixeira discussed with the Ambassador and the DCM means to
encourage the Brazilian negotiating team position to evolve in a
positive manner. She suggested to the Ambassador that senior USG
officials come to Brazil and meet with the key MMA (Minc and
Teixeira) and MRE officials (Machado and Figueiredo) and that they
should reach out to Casa Civil Minister Rousseff and Ministry of
Science and Technology (MCT) Vice Minister Luiz Antonio Rodrigues
Elias. While in Brazil, visiting USG officials should also meet with
other important Brazilian leaders from the national government, the
congress, the state governments, non-governmental organizations, and
the private sector.


10. (C) At the later meeting with the DCM, Teixeira and her staff
elaborated on the idea of a partnership with the United States. This
would include a political dialogue and also concrete technical
projects on climate change. Teixeira also suggested that while these
dialogues would initially be focused on climate change issues, they
could also be used as a vehicle for fostering a conversation on other
related environmental issues, such as forest management,
biodiversity, or access and benefit sharing. In addition, she said
the United States could send a strong signal about its new commitment

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to climate change by making a significant contribution to the Amazon
Fund (REFTEL B).


11. (C) COMMENT. The USG has a clear opportunity to nudge the
development of Brazil's negotiating position in a more positive
direction. The arrival of the new team at the Environment Ministry
(Minc, Teixeira, Kahn and Americano) has built up internal support
for such a change. Visits from senior USG officials who can meet
with Casa Civil Minister Rousseff and other influential Brazilians
could be very fruitful. Rousseff, whose influence on these issues
and with President Lula makes her a key player, is not likely to
travel much to the United States this year as a result of health
issues. If we want to reach her with input from Washington, USG
officials will need to come here. END COMMENT.

SOBEL