IAEA ELECTIONS: BRAZIL APPEARS POISED TO THROW ITS HAT IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 000605 SIPDIS STATE DEPT FOR D(S),P, T, IO, ISN PARIS ALSO FOR USOECD DOE FOR NA-20 NSC FOR CONNERY NRC FOR DOANE, SCHWARTZMAN UNVIE FOR IAEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/06/2019 TAGS: AORC PREL KNNP IAEA ENRG ETTC JA SF BR SUBJECT: IAEA ELECTIONS: BRAZIL APPEARS POISED TO THROW ITS HAT IN THE RING, IN THE MEANTIME - SUPPORTING MINTY Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Lisa Kubiske, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) REF: A) STATE 46302, B) UNVIE 189 AND PREVIOUS, C) BRASILIA 599 ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Post delivered demarche (REFTEL A) about USG support for the Japanese candidate Amano to become the new Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and reasons why Brazil should do so too. Nonetheless, Brazil will support the South African candidate Minty. The Brazilian Ministry of Exterior Relations (MRE) sees the two leading candidates (Amano and South African Minty) as unlikely to gather the 24 votes needed. In that situation, the Post see signals that the Brazilian Minister of Exterior Relations (MRE) Celso Amorim is poised to step in and present himself as a consensus candidate. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Per REFTEL A, Post's Environment, Science and Technology (EST) Counselor delivered on May 11 to MRE's Deputy Director of the Division for Disarmament and Sensitive Technologies, Fabio Abud Antibas, the demarche about USG support for the Japanese candidate Yukiya Amano to become the new Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the reasons why Brazil should do so too. Antibas replied that Brazil will support the South African candidate Abdul Minty. Recently, MRE's Director of the Division for Disarmament and Sensitive Technologies, Minister Santiago Mourao, told EST Counselor that Brazil did not see either of the two leading candidate - Amano or Minty - as being able to attract the 24 votes needed to gain the position as the next IAEA Director General. Mourao stressed that it was important to look not at only those voting for a candidate but also the determination and strength of those opposed (rather than just not in favor). With Amano, Mourao thought he had already peaked and would only see his votes dribble away. He added that the opposition to Amano was hardening and would grow. On the other hand, he thought Minty could see some small increase in his votes without much stiffening of the opposition against him. He opined that this was because neither Brazil nor other countries think Minty has a chance of getting close to the 
required votes. If there was a serious possibility for Minty, then the opposition would become stronger in a hurry. ¶3. (C) Mourao reiterated the position that Brazil is supporting Minty. He explained that this was out of South-South solidarity and not because it opposes Amano or the other possible candidates. ¶4. (C) Mourao was clear that he did not see Minty winning. So, if neither Minty nor Amano are going to win, who would Brazil support to be the next Director General? Mourao did not think much of the chances for the other candidates mentioned so far (REFTEL B). When pressed about who Brazil would favor if Minty drops out, Mourao offered a curious story. He said that recently he and other MRE staff members were having an informal meeting to discuss a fall back position. The MRE front office heard about this internal meeting and immediately and emphatically squashed any discussion by staff about Brazil supporting candidates other than Minty. ¶5. (C) Subsequently, a report appeared in the May 1 edition of a major newspaper (O Estado de Sao Paulo) which laid out a plan to submit MRE Minister Celso Amorim as a consensus candidate should Minty and Amano fail to get the necessary votes. This rumor had appeared in the press several months ago and MRE emphatically denied it. In a May 4 lunch with former President Jimmy Carter, Amorim emphatically denied any interest in the position, saying that the scenario laid out in the article was "plausible," but simply not accurate. He reiterated his lack of interest in public on May 6, saying that he would like to remain in place through the end of Lula's government. ¶6. (C) COMMENT: Amorim's denials do not ring true. The article, which plays up Amorim's qualifications, leaves little doubt that it was sourced from MRE. Moreover, if Mourao's analysis is accurate that Minty and Amano will not win, an opening may indeed exist for Amorim to step in as a consensus candidate -- one with good ties to the developed countries and to the G-77 members. In addition, Brazil BRASILIA 00000605 002 OF 002 is seeking a bigger role among the international organizations and it has not pursued the top job at UNESCO, which increases pressure to seek a leadership position in some other UN bodies, such as the IAEA. ¶7. (C) Given Amorim's close relations with Iran, his candidacy may seem like a longshot. Further, Brazil's reluctance to embrace the Additional Protocol and other non-proliferation measures (REFTEL C), would likely undercut support for Amorim among countries that want a Director General who can effectively advocate for universal adherence to the Additional Protocol. Still, assuming the interest is real, it provides incentive for the Brazilians to engage with us on issues that would align them more with the IAEA mainstream. END COMMENT. SOBEL