Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BRASILIA402
2009-03-31 21:00:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Brasilia
Cable title:
BRAZIL'S DEFENSE MINISTER PURSUING REGIONAL
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C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 000402
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2019
TAGS: PREL SNAR MOPS MARR XR BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL'S DEFENSE MINISTER PURSUING REGIONAL
COUNTERDRUG COOPERATION
REF: BRASILIA 388
Classified By: Ambassador Clifford M. Sobel, Reason 1.4(b) and (d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 000402
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2019
TAGS: PREL SNAR MOPS MARR XR BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL'S DEFENSE MINISTER PURSUING REGIONAL
COUNTERDRUG COOPERATION
REF: BRASILIA 388
Classified By: Ambassador Clifford M. Sobel, Reason 1.4(b) and (d)
1. (C) In a discussion with Ambassador Sobel March 28,
Brazilian Defense Minister Nelson Jobim (protect) said he
knew of President Lula's offer to President Obama during
their March 14 meeting to look for ways that the region could
work with the United States on counterdrug issues, possibly
through the South American Defense Council (SADC) of the
Union of South American Nations (UNASUL). He said that the
SADC might be the perfect way to get other countries to
engage their militaries in the fight against drug
trafficking. Jobim intends to work the SADC possibility
directly with Brazilian presidency (not through the Ministry
of External Relations) and plans to speak to President Lula
about the matter in the next couple of weeks.
2. (C) Jobim told the Ambassador that he is committed to
getting the military involved in fighting crime on Brazil's
borders, where the military has legal authority to act on
criminal matters within a 150-kilometer strip. The Federal
Police (DPF) is not up to the task alone, he said. Jobim
mentioned his particular concern with regard to the presence
of Colombian and Mexican drug cartels. He noted that he has
a good relationship with his Bolivian counterpart already,
adding that Lula has asked him to go to Mexico, at Calderon's
request, to talk about cooperation on counterdrug/public
security issues.
3. (C) Comment: Brazil has generally been hesitant to involve
the military in counter-crime efforts, both because of the
military history here and because of concern that it might
lead to corruption in the military. Although the latter
concern is legitimate and would need to be carefully
monitored, Jobim's plan to engage the military signals a
major step forward in Brazil's thinking about both the
severity of transnational crime, and drug trafficking in
particular, and how to address it. The issue remains highly
sensitive, both within the government and among the Brazilian
public. Moreover, Jobim's intention to work around
MRE--which reflects the fact that MRE has not been a central
player in crafting the GOB approach to military
cooperation--adds a significant bureaucratic sensitivity to
the already difficult task of uniting South AMERICA in this
cause. (Note: In a similar vein, a senior presidency foreign
policy adviser commented just a week earlier that the
presidency, rather than MRE, is the principal manager of
South AMERICA policy. See reftel.) As we engage Brazil on
regional counterdrug efforts, it will be important to take
these sensitivities into account.
SOBEL
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2019
TAGS: PREL SNAR MOPS MARR XR BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL'S DEFENSE MINISTER PURSUING REGIONAL
COUNTERDRUG COOPERATION
REF: BRASILIA 388
Classified By: Ambassador Clifford M. Sobel, Reason 1.4(b) and (d)
1. (C) In a discussion with Ambassador Sobel March 28,
Brazilian Defense Minister Nelson Jobim (protect) said he
knew of President Lula's offer to President Obama during
their March 14 meeting to look for ways that the region could
work with the United States on counterdrug issues, possibly
through the South American Defense Council (SADC) of the
Union of South American Nations (UNASUL). He said that the
SADC might be the perfect way to get other countries to
engage their militaries in the fight against drug
trafficking. Jobim intends to work the SADC possibility
directly with Brazilian presidency (not through the Ministry
of External Relations) and plans to speak to President Lula
about the matter in the next couple of weeks.
2. (C) Jobim told the Ambassador that he is committed to
getting the military involved in fighting crime on Brazil's
borders, where the military has legal authority to act on
criminal matters within a 150-kilometer strip. The Federal
Police (DPF) is not up to the task alone, he said. Jobim
mentioned his particular concern with regard to the presence
of Colombian and Mexican drug cartels. He noted that he has
a good relationship with his Bolivian counterpart already,
adding that Lula has asked him to go to Mexico, at Calderon's
request, to talk about cooperation on counterdrug/public
security issues.
3. (C) Comment: Brazil has generally been hesitant to involve
the military in counter-crime efforts, both because of the
military history here and because of concern that it might
lead to corruption in the military. Although the latter
concern is legitimate and would need to be carefully
monitored, Jobim's plan to engage the military signals a
major step forward in Brazil's thinking about both the
severity of transnational crime, and drug trafficking in
particular, and how to address it. The issue remains highly
sensitive, both within the government and among the Brazilian
public. Moreover, Jobim's intention to work around
MRE--which reflects the fact that MRE has not been a central
player in crafting the GOB approach to military
cooperation--adds a significant bureaucratic sensitivity to
the already difficult task of uniting South AMERICA in this
cause. (Note: In a similar vein, a senior presidency foreign
policy adviser commented just a week earlier that the
presidency, rather than MRE, is the principal manager of
South AMERICA policy. See reftel.) As we engage Brazil on
regional counterdrug efforts, it will be important to take
these sensitivities into account.
SOBEL