BRAZIL'S DEFENSE MINISTER PURSUING REGIONAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 000402 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2019 TAGS: PREL SNAR MOPS MARR XR BR SUBJECT: BRAZIL'S DEFENSE MINISTER PURSUING REGIONAL COUNTERDRUG COOPERATION REF: BRASILIA 388 Classified By: Ambassador Clifford M. Sobel, Reason 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (C) In a discussion with Ambassador Sobel March 28, Brazilian Defense Minister Nelson Jobim (protect) said he knew of President Lula's offer to President Obama during their March 14 meeting to look for ways that the region could work with the United States on counterdrug issues, possibly through the South American Defense Council (SADC) of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUL). He said that the SADC might be the perfect way to get other countries to engage their militaries in the fight against drug trafficking. Jobim intends to work the SADC possibility directly with Brazilian presidency (not through the Ministry of External Relations) and plans to speak to President Lula about the matter in the next couple of weeks. ¶2. (C) Jobim told the Ambassador that he is committed to getting the military involved in fighting crime on Brazil's borders, where the military has legal authority to act on criminal matters within a 150-kilometer strip. The Federal Police (DPF) is not up to the task alone, he said. Jobim mentioned his particular concern with regard to the presence of Colombian and Mexican drug cartels. He noted that he has a good relationship with his Bolivian counterpart already, adding that Lula has asked him to go to Mexico, at Calderon's request, to talk about cooperation on counterdrug/public security issues. ¶3. (C) Comment: Brazil has generally been hesitant to involve the military in counter-crime efforts, both because of the military history here and because of concern that it might lead to corruption in the military. Although the latter concern is legitimate and would need to be carefully monitored, Jobim's plan to engage the military signals a major step forward in Brazil's thinking about both the severity of transnational crime, and drug trafficking in particular, and how to address it. The issue remains highly sensitive, both within the government and among the Brazilian public. Moreover, Jobim's intention to work around MRE--which reflects the fact that MRE has not been a central player in crafting the GOB approach to military cooperation--adds a significant bureaucratic sensitivity to the already difficult task of uniting South America in this cause. (Note: In a similar vein, a senior presidency foreign policy adviser commented just a week earlier that the presidency, rather than MRE, is the principal manager of South America policy. See reftel.) As we engage Brazil on regional counterdrug efforts, it will be important to take these sensitivities into account. SOBEL