BRAZIL: PRESIDENTIAL FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR SEES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 000388 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2019 TAGS: PREL ECON ENRG EFIN KSUM BR SUBJECT: BRAZIL: PRESIDENTIAL FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR SEES POSSIBILITIES FOR COOPERATION WITH THE U.S. Classified By: Ambassador Clifford M. Sobel, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary. Brazilian Presidency (Planalto) Foreign Policy Advisor Ambassador Marcel Biato (protect) discussed energy cooperation, touched on G20 and Summit of the Americas (SOA) preparations, and offered views on managing challenges in both the hemisphere and within the GOB in a discussion with the Ambassador March 26. Noting that bilateral energy cooperation often bogs down in bilateral political relationships, Biato saw potential for a regional initiative to help break free of this "rut." Separately, he believes GOB is likely to create a new company to manage "pre-salt" resources. Biato does not see Cuba dominating the SOA and suggested the GOB would be interested in USG views on how best to capitalize on positive momentum generated at the Summit. Emphasizing that creative thinking on South America is coming out of Planalto rather than Itamaraty (the Foreign Ministry),Biato argued that GOB-managed South American mechanisms and positions will allow the region to engage the United States in a more coherent fashion and "on our (South America's) terms," but allowed for "parallel cooperation" with the United States as these mechanisms develop. He stressed that the USG, like the GOB, needed to exercise "strategic patience" in managing relationships with problematic countries in the region. Biato's remarks confirm what we have observed and hear from other senior GOB players, including for example Defense Minister Nelson Jobim, regarding the importance of working through Planalto on regional issues, among others, and of thinking through beforehand how and when to engage Itamaraty. End summary. - - - Regional Energy Cooperation - - - ¶2. (C) Commenting that energy cooperation in the hemisphere tends to happen bilaterally and has often bogged down in a "rut" of political relationship issues, Biato remarked that outside perspectives and broader cooperation could help "reframe" and move some energy cooperation issues forward. As an example of bilateral dialogue that is not working well, Biato cited Brazilian efforts to build an energy grid with Paraguay, which are being hampered by Paraguay insisting Brazil "pay 20 years in advance" for electricity. As a specific example that might usefully fit into an eventual regional initiative, Biato offered that Peruvian gas out of Camisea might be a good candidate. He also noted that Electrobras is beginning to look for expanded commercial opportunities and is exploring building 15 dams along the Peru border--another project, he suggested, that might fit well into a regional initiative. He commented that such an initiative could help the region "break out of where we are -- a series of bilateral relations. We need things that help us be seen outside as a region." - - - Model for Pre-Salt Oil - - - ¶3. (C) Biato believes the GOB is likely to create a new company to manage the pre-salt oil reserves. He commented that Petrobras, despite the GOB stake, is often impenetrable and the government often feels it is not fully aware of what the company is doing. In addition, Petrobras is already an enormous company holding a significant percentage of overall GOB investment. To fold "pre-salt" oil (i.e., Brazil's recently discovered off-shore deposits) into Petrobras would risk putting all the government,s investment eggs in one basket, which he believed the government would find too risky a strategy. He reassured the Ambassador that multinational companies would find whatever model GOB ultimately selects to be transparent and workable. - - - Energy Politics within the GOB - - - ¶4. (SBU) Biato noted that MME Minister Lobao is an extremely &political8 as opposed to technocrat Minister. That is "fine," he commented--"he has good technical people under him" and he is able to focus on elevating the relative power and position of the Ministry in a way that his technocrat predecessor was unable to do. Lobao is keenly aware of BRASILIA 00000388 002 OF 003 domestic stakeholder interests in issues such as managing pre-salt resources. At the same time, he is gaining understanding of the international implications of domestic action and is fully appreciative of the need to manage the international aspect effectively as well, according to Biato. As such, his political importance on international energy issues as well as strictly domestic issues is higher than his predecessor could claim. - - - G20 Preparations - - - ¶5. (SBU) While not deeply engaged on the substance of G20 discussions on global crisis response, Biato mentioned his frustration with the UK regarding preparations for the Leaders, meeting itself. Responsible for President Lula,s speech and his briefing book, Biato felt the UK had been insufficiently forthcoming about meeting logistics--what the speaking opportunities would be, how topics would be organized, etc. (Note: UK PM Gordon Brown visited Brasilia and met with President Lula later the same day. End note.) - - - Future POTUS-Lula Meeting - - - ¶6. (C) The Ambassador asked what priorities Biato would recommend for an eventual future meeting between the presidents. Biato listed making the G20 work as number one. Secondly, he suggested Lula would be interested in USG views on the outcomes from the SOA and specifics regarding USG plans to move forward based on whatever positive momentum is generated at the Summit. He also noted that further discussions on regional energy as ideas evolve would be interesting. - - - No Worries on Cuba or Other "Difficult" Countries at SOA - - - ¶7. (C) Biato, who served as Planalto's point person on Cuba for several years, said he did not expect Cuba to be a topic at the SOA. However, he reiterated Brazil's view that it would be important for the United States to take the first steps in improving the relationship, and that these should be "unconditional." In response to the Ambassador,s query, he affirmed that permitting financing for imports would be a good concrete step. He said that Brazil's read of the recent cabinet changes in Cuba was that it both represented an effort by Cuban President Raul Castro to consolidate his control and was indicative of a real interest on the part of Raul to open the way for better relations with the United States. He added that the move demonstrates the importance of the Communist Party and the military in Cuban governance, although he believes the Party has expanded to the point that it is unwieldy and therefore less effective than in the past. ¶8. (C) Biato was optimistic that the SOA will go well, saying that the GOB believes all countries in the region want a good dialogue with the United States. When the Ambassador noted the comments by Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez following Lula's meeting with President Obama March 14, Biato said that the GOB had told the GOV "at the highest levels" that his remarks were inappropriate. (Note: In response to Chavez's comments, FM Amorim publicly denied his assertion that Lula had come away from the meeting with the President "disappointed," stating that in fact the opposite was true. End note.) - - - South America and the U.S.: "Parallel Cooperation" and "Strategic Patience" - - - ¶9. (C) The Ambassador noted that Lula had, in his meeting with the President, raised and endorsed possible U.S. cooperation with Union of South American Nations (UNASUL) and the South American Defense Council (SADC) on counternarcotics efforts in the region. This differed substantially from the message we were receiving from Itamaraty, which had ruled out such cooperation. Biato took note of the issue, reiterating Planalto's support for exploring such cooperation. BRASILIA 00000388 003 OF 003 ¶10. (C) Biato explained that it is important for South America as a region to "get its act together" on issues such as counternarcotics and trade as a means of engaging the United States more coherently. This would allow for "real partnership" between South America and the United States "on our terms" in approaching common issues. The Ambassador warned that waiting for a perfect consensus in the region was not realistic. Biato agreed, saying that development of cooperation within the region and between the region and the United States would have to happen in parallel. He sees good possibilities for Brazil and the United States to work together in the region, reiterating that it might help get some relationships out of a rut. He added, however, that Brazil and the United States both had to exercise "strategic patience" with some of the more difficult countries in the region and resist the urge to react to every provocation. ¶11. (C) Biato made clear that regional initiatives like UNASUL and the SADC, as well as the initiative for energy cooperation with the United States, were not coming out of Itamaraty, but out of Planalto. At the same time, as a career diplomat, Biato also was able to explain Itamaraty's caution with regard to international initiatives being launched out of other agencies. Itamaraty sees itself as the "defender of Brazilian national interests," he said, ensuring coherence and reining in "free agents" acting on the basis of more narrow interests. Although Itamaraty's role is inevitably changing, he said, it is still the most capable bureaucracy in the GOB and sees itself as providing necessary coordination. He emphasized that Itamaraty "does not stop everything," and that it is often important eventually to gain Itamaraty "buy-in" for initiatives that germinate elsewhere in the government. - - - Comment: Planalto First, Itamaraty Later - - - ¶12. (C) Biato was remarkably candid in his assessment of the dynamics between Planalto, Itamaraty, and other agencies. On the one hand, he underlined that the creative thinking on South American issues is coming out of Planalto, not Itamaraty, and that on U.S.-Brazil cooperation in the region, Planalto will almost certainly be more favorably inclined than Itamaraty. On the other hand, Biato's explanation of the rationale for the broader GOB effort to build Brazil-managed coalitions in South America confirms that it is principally in Itamaraty where this effort is seen as a means of excluding or creating a regional counter-weight to the United States. We have seen repeatedly a willingness in Planalto, as well as other ministries, to go around Itamaraty in order to work with us on regional and other strategic issues. Biato's comments confirm those we have heard from others, including for example Defense Minister Nelson Jobim, regarding the importance of working through Planalto first on such issues, and considering carefully a strategy with regard to how and when we engage Itamaraty. SOBEL