UNDERSTANDING BRAZIL'S FOREIGN MINISTRY, PART 3:

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 000190 SIPDIS STATE FOR WHA E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON BR SUBJECT: UNDERSTANDING BRAZIL'S FOREIGN MINISTRY, PART 3: INTER-AGENCY COMPETITION REF: A. BRASILIA 0180 ¶B. BRASILIA 0177 ¶C. 2008 STATE 115233 Classified By: Ambassador Clifford M. Sobel, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) As Brazil takes an increasingly prominent place on the international stage, its Foreign Ministry, known widely as Itamaraty after its headquarters building, finds itself facing unaccustomed inter-agency competition. Still Brazil's most prestigious ministry and the unquestioned lead on foreign affairs matters, Itamaraty is nonetheless experiencing some erosion of its control over foreign policy decisions. This is likely to continue as Brazil's involvement with more countries across a broader range of issues continues to expand. For now, though, Itamaraty continues to exercise considerable control over almost all elements of the U.S.-Brazil relationship, aided by legal authority, a poorly developed inter-agency process, and insufficient preparation in many other ministries. As noted ref A, advancing U.S. interests in Brazil will require broadening our relationship with Brazilian government institutions and non-governmental players. As we do so, successful strategies will also take into account Itamaraty's influence, interests, and likely reactions, and will map out when and in what way to engage this still-dominant foreign policy player. ¶2. (C) This is the third and final cable in a series on Itamaraty. Along with the inter-agency dynamics described here, the foreign policy ideology put in place by Lula and his three principal foreign policy advisors (ref A), Itamaraty's institutional difficulties as it seeks to meet Brazil's global aspirations (reftel B),and a large new cohort of more pragmatic and globally oriented diplomats will make it challenging to work with Itamaraty in the short term, but also offer new opportunities to influence this key foreign policy player. End summary. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Control Issues - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (C) Itamaraty has long been the pre-eminent GOB agency on almost all international relations matters (with the exception of some international financial issues),guarding its prerogatives through both policy and bureaucratic instruments. Itamaraty provides international affairs advisors to most of the principal GOB executive branch agencies including the presidency, to congress, to the Supreme Court and other elements of the judiciary, to former presidents, and to larger state and municipal governments. These senior advisors generally have direct access to the minister or other senior leadership, and it is rare for foreign diplomats to attend a high-level meeting without having an Itamaraty representative present. Many ministries, particularly those with less experience working international issues, practice self-censorship, often refusing to engage their counterparts in other governments without a green light from Itamaraty. The Labor Ministry, for example, which does not have an Itamaraty advisor, almost always insists on having Itamaraty involved in anything more than an informational meeting with foreign government representatives. Officials at the Racial Integration Secretariat (SEPPIR),whose minister signed and has the lead on our bilateral action plan on racial discrimination, almost always ask Itamaraty to join our meetings, and often defer in our discussions to more junior MRE colleagues. ¶4. (C) Itamaraty intends and uses these advisors to monitor and control other agency contacts with foreign governments, BRASILIA 00000190 002 OF 003 but their presence is not necessarily detrimental to U.S. interests. While most are zealous to ensure Itamaraty control and a few are actually obstructionist, others have been helpful in moving a bureaucracy not used to working international issues or in achieving Foreign Ministry cooperation or approval for our initiatives. This has been the case, for example, with regard to Brazilian participation in the OECD. Although Secretary General (Deputy FM) Samuel Pinheiro Guimaraes, Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Marco Aurelio Garcia, and others who see Brazil as champion of the South against the North are preventing serious consideration of Brazilian membership, the Finance Ministry (Fazenda) has been successfully pushing the envelope by pressing for a red light/green light exercise to expand Brazil's participation in OECD committees. This is due in no small part to the engagement of diplomats seconded from the Foreign Ministry to Fazenda. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - A Losing Battle, But Far from Lost - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶5. (C) Such inter-agency cooperation is not the norm, however, and Itamaraty officials generally resent the challenge to their prerogatives. A full-page series of articles in Brazil's premier daily on January 19, 2009 proclaimed the Foreign Ministry's "irritation" with "informal chancellors" (Estado de Sao Paulo, p. A4, "Chanceleres Informais de Lula Irritam o Itamaraty"). Among the offenders cited were presidential foreign policy advisor Marco Aurelio Garcia, Strategic Planning Minister Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Defense Minister Nelson Jobim, and Environment Minister Carlos Minc. The stories, which appear to have been generated by complaints from within Itamaraty, are almost entirely critical of these non-MRE foreign policy players and take a familiar tack: "At Itamaraty, not even the recent arrivals from the Rio Branco Institute (Brazil's FSI) doubt that the more channels of communication that Brazil has with foreign countries, the greater the risk of confusion in the implementation of foreign policy." The line recalls one U/S for Political Affairs Everton Vargas has used with several USG officials: "It is best to work all issues directly with Itamaraty, rather than through others. Things will always work better if you come to Itamaraty first." ¶6. (C) Because the Foreign Ministry is the recognized and legally empowered GOB lead on international issues and must approve international agreements before they can be sent to the Presidency, ignoring Itamaraty is almost never an option, and MRE agreement can be crucial to the success of bilateral initiatives. On the up side, Foreign Ministry buy-in can move resistant or less qualified bureaucracies; Itamaraty has actively worked to achieve progress on bilateral tax talks, for example, and has carefully sought to shepherd a less organized SEPPIR to move forward on the Joint Action Plan Against Racial Discrimination. On the other hand, even when a ministry is willing to work with foreign counterparts, it is not uncommon for initiatives to be blocked by opposition from Itamaraty. As a result, even those ministries that more habitually work international issues, including the Industry and Commerce Ministry (MDIC),the Planning Ministry, Defense, and Fazenda, are careful to ensure Itamaraty's concurrence when working bilateral or regional issues. Other ministries regularly emphasize to us the importance of working Itamaraty to achieve success and are frequently partners in advising how best to engage Itamaraty on a particular issue. ¶7. (C) For example, even under the leadership of its first activist minister in the Defense Ministry's nine-year history, MOD has made clear that it must pick its battles. Consequently, it has been reluctant to pursue a number of BRASILIA 00000190 003 OF 003 possible avenues of cooperation because they would require sign-off by Itamaraty. In a bureaucratic tug of war soon after Defense Minister Nelson Jobim took up his post, Itamaraty succeeded in getting Lula to delay Jobim's first trip to Washington and then sought--unsuccessfully--to limit his schedule. The MOD has been unwilling to press for completion of a bilateral Defence Cooperation Agreement (although agreements with Russia, Israel, and Venezuela have moved forward) or the renewal of the Military Liaison Office's terms of reference. Both sit in the office of the anti-American MRE Secretary General (deputy FM) Samuel Pinheiro Guimaraes, without any sign of movement. Likewise, U.S. law enforcement agencies often find Itamaraty questioning their cooperation with Brazilian counterparts--in January, Itamaraty almost succeeded in preventing the move of DEA personnel from Bolivia to Brazil even though the Federal Police, the Justice Ministry, and even the Bolivian government strongly supported the move (see septel). ¶8. (C) Nonetheless, under Lula, foreign policy decisionmaking has unquestionably become more dispersed at the senior levels, drawing in more ministries than ever before, which are in turn establishing even broader relationships with their counterparts abroad. In addition, it is becoming increasingly clear that globalization and Brazil's expanding interests are quickly outstripping Itamaraty's ability to manage, provide oversight, and maintain bureaucratic control over GOB contacts with foreign counterparts. Despite his battles, Defense Minister Jobim continues to confound Itamaraty by winning bureaucratic battles to pursue his own international agenda with Lula's blessing. Justice Minister Tarso Genro has likewise been able to overcome Itamaraty opposition to work productively with the USG. As we have engaged Brazil in such areas as science and technology, education, homeland security, and environment, we have also seen evidence that Itamaraty struggles to keep up with activist ministers. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Comment: A Force to Be Reckoned With - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶9. (C) As noted Ref A, forward movement on many initiatives the USG seeks to pursue with Brazil will only be possible by working early on with Brazilian players in addition to Itamaraty, including the private sector and other non-governmental actors, or by engaging via counterpart agencies. It is not in our interest for Itamaraty to be the sole filter for working with the GOB. We have repeatedly seen the power of multi-player cooperation, and believe that it is fundamental to building a broad-based, long-term partnership with Brazil. At the same time, Itamaraty's effort to maintain dominance over bilateral relations is one more element, along with ideological forces and institutional challenges, that will make the GOB a frustrating partner to engage on many initiatives. As a general rule Itamaraty is less enthusiastic than action ministries about partnerships with the United States--particularly within South America, and more so on non-economic matters--and it maintains a significant ability to put a stop to foreign policy initiatives that it does not wish to see proceed. Whether we determine that it's best to ask the Foreign Ministry's forgiveness or permission, successful strategies will take into account Itamaraty's interests and likely reactions, and will map out when and in what way to engage this dominant foreign policy player. SOBEL