Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BRASILIA1407
2009-12-09 11:32:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Brasilia
Cable title:  

Brazil: Center-Left Presidential Candidates Compete for

Tags:  PGOV PREL BR 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 001407 

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AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PASS TO AMCONSUL RECIFE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/12/09
TAGS: PGOV PREL BR
SUBJECT: Brazil: Center-Left Presidential Candidates Compete for
Small Party Support

CLASSIFIED BY: Lisa Kubiske, Charge D'Affaires; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 001407 SIPDIS AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PASS TO AMCONSUL RECIFE E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/12/09 TAGS: PGOV PREL BR SUBJECT: Brazil: Center-Left Presidential Candidates Compete for Small Party Support CLASSIFIED BY: Lisa Kubiske, Charge D'Affaires; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (SBU) Summary. While the gap between front-running presidential candidates Jose Serra (PSDB) and Dilma Rousseff (PT) appears to be tightening, parties within President Lula's PT-led governing alliance are quietly considering other options besides supporting Dilma. Ciro Gomes (PSB) entered the presidential race with Lula's blessing as an additional voice against Serra, but PT and PSB are currently in a behind-the-scenes battle to win the support and television time of five smaller parties in the governing coalition. With adequate support, Ciro could seriously rival Dilma's efforts to attract the center-left vote, especially in Lula's northeastern base, where she has thus far been underperforming. The odds of PSB succeeding in cobbling together this coalition still appear considerably less than 50-50, however. Meanwhile, the center-right opposition Democratas (DEM) party, also primarily based in the northeast, may be seriously hurt by a high-profile corruption scandal revolving around Federal District (Brasilia) Governor Jose Arruda. End summary. Presidential Race State of Affairs -------------- ¶2. (SBU) As predicted by most local political insiders, the gap between front-running Serra and PT's Rousseff appears to be tightening somewhat; a late November CNT/Sensus poll indicates Serra at 32 percent, Dilma with 22 percent, 18 percent for Ciro Gomes, and PV candidate Marina Silva with 6 percent. The poll confirms that both Serra and Dilma carry significant baggage. Dilma maintains the highest voter "rejection rate" among serious candidates; politicians from both sides concur that her stature was not helped by statements made before and during the November blackout. PT insiders hope Dilma's role leading the massive Brazilian delegation in Copenhagen for climate change talks will give her a significant boost. Serra must contend with an environment in which half the electorate state they would never vote for a candidate backed by former President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (PSDB). The market for presidential candidate alternatives to PT and PSDB continues to be strong. Aligned with Lula, not PT -------------- ¶3. (C) Ciro Gomes, ostensibly i
n the race with Lula's blessing to be an attack dog against Serra, has most effectively filled the need for an alternative candidate by attracting the many voters and politicians who support Lula but are suspicious of PT. (Ciro also has been drawing some support away from Serra.) Lula still maintains a strong connection with Ciro and PSB. In a recent meeting with the Charge, Pernambuco Governor Eduardo Campos (PSB) said that Lula, Dilma, Ciro and others (including himself) would meet shortly in advance of the PT national convention in early March, when Dilma is expected to announce her candidacy officially. Campos made it clear that Ciro would step aside if asked to do so by Lula at that time. ¶4. (C) Some PSB leaders see Ciro's rise mostly as an opportunity to leverage Lula, while others foresee a strong Ciro presidential candidacy up to the general election. Fernando Bezerra Coelho, a leading Pernambuco state official and 2010 PSB candidate for federal senate, told us that, as a price for Ciro stepping down, a coalition of supporters could force Lula to withdraw support from a weak Dilma candidacy and support a third candidate. He believes that Governor Campos, who is especially close to Lula, could be that candidate. Bezerra Coelho also spoke of the need to solidify PT support for several PSB senate and governor candidates, the strongest of whom are running against opposition bloc incumbents in the northeast. (PSB's glaring weakness is in the federal senate, where they hold only two seats.) In a December 2 conversation with poloff, Senator Renato Casagrande (PSB-Espirito Santo) outlined a more ambitious goal. He confirmed that PSB is in a fairly heated behind-the-scenes battle with PT to secure the support for Ciro from all the other smaller parties within the governing coalition. PSB, Small Parties and TV time -------------- ¶5. (C) Senator Casagrande outlined the central challenge facing Ciro Gomes. With political advertising on television and radio calculated based on the number of seats each party has in the Chamber of Deputies, PSB earns minimal airtime based on having 28 of the 513 seats in the Chamber. The next largest parties within Lula's governing coalition - PP, PDT, PTB, and PC do B - include slightly over 100 more seats, which combined with PSB would almost rival the 170 combined held by PT and the largest delegation in the coalition, the PMDB. PSB has therefore been aggressively courting these parties since October to gain their official support and TV/radio time. The senator did not want to reveal too much detail or sound overly optimistic about outfoxing Lula and PT, but hinted that negotiations with some parties (PDT) were more advanced than others. He also confirmed that, if Aecio Neves were nominated as PSDB candidate instead of Serra, Ciro would stop his candidacy and most of the party would support Neves. ¶6. (C) November conversations with representatives from the recruited parties indicate support for the idea of backing Ciro but have questions about the wisdom of doing so. A political advisor for the conservative Progressive Party (PP),which holds the most seats among the courted parties, told poloff that he is pushing his party leadership to donate TV time to Ciro. He reasons that Ciro is in excellent position to supplant PT in the north, given PSB's strength in two major states, Pernambuco and Fortaleza, and the weakness of PT in Bahia. The advisor said that most of the party's elected representatives prefer Ciro, but that they are still figuring out if there would be repercussions for breaking with Lula. The PDT party deputy chair from the state of Goias told poloff much the same thing. He even compared favorably the idea of smaller parties joining to offset the power of PT and PMDB with Brazil's strategy of allying with other emerging countries (like India, South Africa) to balance the power of the United States and the European Union. Most of these parties are considered more conservative than PSB or Ciro, but are philosophically more comfortable with PSB/Ciro than with PT/Dilma. DEM disaster -------------- ¶7. (SBU) While PSB and Ciro Gomes make their case to be stronger players on the national scene, the center-right opposition Democratas (DEM) party, also based primarily in the Northeast, faces a scandal that could darken their already-dimming prospects on the national level. Jose Arruda, Governor of the Federal District (Brasilia area),was caught on November 23 accepting bribes on camera, as were many of his political supporters. While most politicians caught on camera represented other parties, DEM faces the brunt of the scrutiny as it prepares to kick its only elected governor out of the party and office. DEM still has the third-largest benches in both the Senate and House of Deputies, despite a significant number of recent switches by its elected officials to other parties. The fall of one of its only nationally known figures outside the Northeast, considered a possible vice-presidential candidate for Jose Serra, will further isolate DEM. One DEM staffer told poloff that, "it's just too much of a disaster to talk about now." More on this and the challenges facing the Brazilian center-right will be reported septel. Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) The fact that so many political insiders like the idea of a Ciro candidacy (or an Aecio Neves candidacy) suggests significant space for maneuver during the 2010 election season, including a possible reshuffling of alliances. The vitality of smaller political parties such as PSB and its prospective allies is particularly interesting. In an environment where PT sans Lula is not widely trusted, PSDB still suffers from negative public perceptions of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, PMDB is associated with Sarney and corruption, and DEM has its own growing corruption scandal, smaller parties have potential to fill the vacuum and to play a meaningful role in affecting Brazil's 2010 presidential, gubernatorial, and congressional race outcomes. Nonetheless, although Ciro Gomes and PSB hold a surprisingly strong hand right now, President Lula's immense power to block ambitions of other center-left presidential contenders means that efforts to unite the smaller governing coalition parties behind Ciro and eventually supplant Dilma as the center-left candidate remain a long shot. End comment. ¶9. (U) This cable was coordinated with Consulate Recife. KUBISKE

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