BRAZIL: SCENESETTER FOR OCTOBER 27-30 VISIT OF SPECIAL REP

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 001261 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/23/2019 TAGS: PREL KNNP IAEA ENRG ETTC BR SUBJECT: BRAZIL: SCENESETTER FOR OCTOBER 27-30 VISIT OF SPECIAL REP OF THE PRESIDENT FOR NON-PROLIFERATION-AMB BURK Classified by: Political Counselor Stephen Liston, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. The visit of the Special Representative of the President for Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Ambassador Susan Burk, comes at an important time. Brazil is reviving its long dormant civilian and military nuclear energy programs. It closed down its nuclear weapons program in 1990 and joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1998, but of late Brazil has often not joined in supporting, and on occasion has opposed, USG non-proliferation efforts. President Obama's Prague speech created new interest in Brazil in U.S. initiatives and positions related to non-proliferation, but two trends in the nuclear field are cause for concern. First, Brazil seeks to rapidly expand its nuclear activities, in particular developing enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technologies and building up an unsafeguarded Naval nuclear research facility. Second, Ministry of External Relations (MRE) and other GoB officials are becoming less helpful in the non-proliferation world, using the excuse that the nuclear weapon states should do more on disarming first, despite all evidence of U.S. progress in this area. If these trends continue, it could complicate our global non-proliferation initiatives and at the same time increase temptations for some future government to think about possibly developing weapons technology, if not weapons themselves. ¶2. (U) With Brazil emerging rapidly from the global economic downturn, President Lula's high popularity ratings, the country's new stature in the G20, international trade and financial architecture discussions, a tenth term on the UN Security Council set to begin in January, and Rio de Janeiro's successful bid to host the 2016 Olympics on the heels of the 2014 Soccer World Cup, Brazil is rapidly gaining international confidence and clout. The relationship between the United States and Brazil is as productive and broad-based as it has ever been, and the election of President Obama brought prospects for additional improvements. At the same time, although Brazil and the United States share many broad goals, it is often still a challenge to develop concrete areas for cooperation. These difficulties are likely to increase as the country gears up for elections in October 2010 to determine Lula's successor. END SUMMARY. 
NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AND NUCLEAR ENERGY ISSUES ¶3. (C) With the return of democracy in both Brazil and Argentina, the two countries abandoned their nuclear weapons programs in 1990. Later in 1998, Brazil joined the NPT. As late as mid-2008, despite growing resistance from the Ministry of Defense (MOD) some within the GoB were considering the possibility of signing an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol. In December 2008 the GoB adopted a new Defense Strategy that rejects accepting any new non-proliferation measures unless the nuclear powers "disarm." This hardening of position by Brazil undercut USG efforts to have the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) adopt a new rule regarding a criteria based procedure for transferring enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technology, including the requirement that the recipient have an IAEA Additional Protocol in place. Brazil's opposition to an IAEA Additional Protocol has had the collateral effect of preventing Argentina from signing one, both for legal reasons (Brazil and Argentina are linked with the IAEA by the Quadpartite Agreement) and political grounds, not wanting to upset its large neighbor. ¶4. (C) The GoB has not clearly articulated its rationale for opposing an Additional Protocol; several reasons have been offered from time to time. GoB officials have said that an Additional Protocol would mean that the IAEA is suspicious of Brazil's intentions regarding its future nuclear program. The MRE's Director of the Division for Disarmament and Sensitive Technologies, Santiago Mourao, opined that this would be treating Brazil "as if it were Iraq or Iran." At the same time, Mourao and civilian officials from National Commission on Nuclear Energy (CNEN) have indicated that technically there is not a problem with complying with an Additional Protocol. The obstacle is a political one, and Mourao and others have consistently pointed to the MOD, particularly the Navy, as the primary source of opposition. Admiral Othon Pinheiro, now the President of Eletronuclear (the operator of Brazil's nuclear power plants),commented that the Navy was very concerned about obtrusive inspections, which could reveal to outsiders Brazil's most sensitive technology. There is also a faction of the Brazilian leadership that believes joining the NPT was a mistake because it meant accepting a sort of second class status for Brazil. This group believes an Additional Protocol would compound this mistake. Whatever the reasons, the GoB has moved from a position of leaning toward signing an IAEA Additional Protocol just a year ago to stiff opposition. It is generally supposed that Brazilian enrichment technology may have been illegally obtained from Germany, and Brazil may want to hide evidence of this. ¶5. (C) Multilaterally, the GoB is cautious about taking an active role on non-proliferation and has consistently refused to take a strong position against Iran's nuclear efforts. Brazil strives not to break ranks with the G-77. Although the GoB has been careful to comply fully with UN sanctions against Iran and has asserted the importance of Iranian compliance with UN resolutions, the GoB has also stressed Iran's right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and occasionally cast doubts on IAEA findings that certain Iranian activities were inconsistent with a peaceful nuclear program. The GoB is looking to improve political and economic ties with Iran. President Lula met with Iran's President Ahmadinejad in New York in September, and Ahmadinejad is planning to visit Brazil in the near future. Citing efforts with North Korea, the GoB has made clear that it believes dialogue is the best option to ensure Iran is not a threat to the global community, and has commended P5+1 efforts to engage Iran. North Korea's testing of a nuclear device earlier this year only delayed Brazil's opening of an Embassy there temporarily. In discussions on non-proliferation, GoB officials frequently avoid supporting non-proliferation efforts by resorting to oft-repeated protestations that the nuclear powers are not doing enough on disarmament ignoring progress being made in this area. ¶6. (U) Brazil has decided to revive its civilian nuclear energy program. Government-owned entities control over aspect of nuclear energy, from mining uranium, to building nuclear reactors, to owning, operating, and overseeing those reactors. Currently, two reactors at Angra dos Reis, south of Rio de Janeiro, are completed and operating. Westinghouse built Angra I, and Siemens constructed Angra II. Siemens stopped work on a third reactor (Angra III) in 1986, but work resumed in September after a 23-year lapse. For the mid-term, Brazil plans to build 4-8 new reactors by 2030. The GoB has expressed interest in working with the United States as they move toward developing its nuclear sector. GoB officials would like U.S. firms to compete for work on these new reactors, and Westinghouse has been actively pursuing opportunities here. Further, GoB officials have expressed interest in collaborating with the USG to improve nuclear safety and security and its nuclear facilities and to help in training the next generation of technicians and experts. In addition, Brazil is struggling with a long-term solution to handling nuclear wastes, which are currently stored on site. They are interested in advice on this sensitive issue. Moreover, the GoB is thinking of reorganizing CNEN, which currently oversees the nuclear energy sector, into a new agency for regulation, along the lines of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and another entity for promoting and developing nuclear energy. They are interested in discussing this reorganization with the USG. ¶7. (C) In addition to building more reactors, Brazil is seeking to complete the nuclear fuel cycle and master enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technologies. Brazil is installing cascades of centrifuges to enrich uranium. While rich in uranium, with the sixth largest reserves in the world, Brazil ships yellowcake to Canada and then to Europe (URENCO) for processing into fuel. President Lula has directed the GoB to develop the skills to do the processing itself and become self-sufficient. This is estimated to take through 2030, after which Brazil may become a supplier within South America and possibly elsewhere of nuclear fuel. The Presidents of Brazil and Argentina have announced that they will form a joint entity to process nuclear fuel, but there has been little progress. While Brazil uses centrifuges for enrichment, Argentina uses gas technology. Brazilians sometimes regard efforts to urge them to join the Additional Protocol with concern that such efforts could be part of an agenda to deny Brazilian mastery of the full fuel cycle. ¶8. (C) Internationally, Brazil participates in the IAEA and the NSG. It is an observer at the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), though it may decide to join at some later date. During a visit to Washington this summer, Minister of Mines and Energy Edison Lobao expressed his openness to a suggestion from Department of Energy Deputy Secretary Poneman that Brazil help lead an effort to encourage nuclear responsibility among nations considering developing civilian nuclear programs. The GoB has shown signs of interest in joining the nuclear fusion research consortium (ITER). While it is not convinced about the merits of the proposals to create a nuclear fuel bank, the GoB seems open to discussing the idea further. Brazil supported the G-77 candidate for Director General of the IAEA (South African Minty) to the end, though it has not voiced public opposition to the winner (Japanese Amano). Brazil is interested in renewing exchanges of nuclear technology with India, but it still needs to change its laws to permit this cooperation. Both India and Brazil are rich in thorium, though the GoB has downplayed interest in developing a reactor using thorium. ¶9. (C) The Brazilian Navy has revived its program to build a nuclear powered submarine. This would be based on the hull of a French conventional submarine. It is not clear whether the Navy will receive sufficient funding for this project. Further, the GoB will need to overcome the significant technological hurdles involved in this project. However, Brazilian leaders perceive a nuclear powered sub as an essential trapping of great power status and are unlikely to abandon the program -- even if its completion is remote. POLITICAL OVERVIEW ¶10. (U) With democracy re-established in 1988 after decades of military dictatorship, Brazil's democratic institutions are generally strong and stable. President Lula remains a popular president - one of the most popular in Brazil's history and indeed in the world today, with recent approval ratings as high as 68% - as a result of his disciplined economic policies and expanded social programs. Most recently he is basking in the glow from Rio de Janeiro winning the rights to the 2016 Olympics, which even tops Rio gaining the 2014 World Cup. In the Congress, ongoing public scandals involving the leadership of the Senate and various members of congress have led to low ratings for the institution among the Brazilian public. Increasingly, the court system has taken steps to curb impunity among public officials. These steps have been well received by a public accustomed to abuses by authorities. ¶11. (U) The campaign to replace Lula in the October 2010 elections is well under way, unofficially, affecting most major decisions. Lula is constitutionally barred from seeking a third term and has designated his Chief of Staff, Dilma Rouseff as his successor. Lula's personal popularity has thus far not transferred, and at this point the race remains unpredictable. The opposition governor of Sao Paulo state, Jose Serra, currently has a lead in the polls, only ten percent of voters have a party affiliation and most are not yet following the race. As a result, Rousseff, with the strong backing of Lula, will almost certainly gain ground. Whoever wins is likely to continue the sound economic management and aggressive international outreach that have characterized Lula's presidency. FOREIGN POLICY ¶12. (U) Under Lula, Brazil's priority has been to solidify its regional leadership while reaching beyond traditional partners like the United States and Europe to a broad range of players. Despite a great deal of criticism from those in Brazil who question the value of this so-called South-South strategy, the GoB has expanded its diplomatic presence in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and the Caribbean and has promoted cross-regional meetings such as the Arab States-South America Summit, the Africa-South America Summit, the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China) meetings, and the IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa) forum. At the same time, Brazil has sought to create new regional mechanisms, such as the Union of South American Nations (UNASUL),the South American Defense Council, and the Summit of Latin America and the Caribbean (CALC) that serve to strengthen its leadership in South America and the Western Hemisphere more broadly. The attainment of a permanent seat on the UN Security Council (UNSC) has been a central goal of Brazil's foreign policy under President Lula's government, and Brazil has just been elected to a tenth UNSC term, a record matched only by Japan. Brazil has also taken a more visible role on major international negotiations, including the Doha trade round, G20 discussions on the global economic crisis, and post-Kyoto climate change talks, taken the lead on peacekeeping in Haiti, and is seeking a role in the Middle East peace process. ¶13. (U) The United States and Brazil share many interests in the region, such as fostering hemispheric stability and preventing drug transit activity. Regionally, Lula has maintained Brazil's historic focus on stability, seeing dialogue and good relations with all parties as the best way to achieve this goal. As a result, Brazil maintains an active dialogue with Venezuela and Cuba, has worked to foster good relations with Bolivia, has given its assistance in resolving the FARC hostage crisis in Colombia, and has stood firmly on the principle of respect for sovereignty in the region. SECURITY ISSUES AND FIGHTER PURCHASE ¶14. (C) Brazil announced in December 2008 a new defense strategy, which has three main elements: modernization of the armed forces; revitalization of defense industries; and implementation of a new regime of national service. For the Brazilian military, the key result of the strategy process has been the reintegration of defense goals into the country's overall development strategy and political dialogue. The Defense Strategy notes that Brazil is prohibited from having nuclear weapons, both by the NPT and its own constitution, but identifies nuclear power instead as a key strategic interest. ¶15. (C) An important watershed in achieving a more robust defense relationship with Brazil will be the US$4 billion decision on a next generation fighter aircraft. Boeing's F-18 Super Hornet is a finalist along with the French Rafale and Swedish Gripen. After hosting French President Sarkozy in Brasilia for Brazilian Independence Day celebrations, President Lula announced on September 7 that Brazil is entering advanced negotiations to purchase 36 French-made Rafale fighters. The following day Brazil's Defense Ministry confirmed that the selection process was not closed and the U.S. contender is still under consideration. With a lower cost and stronger offset program, Boeing is well-positioned to win on the merits of its bid, but faces a presumption in the Brazilian political community that doing business with the United States is negative for Brazil. ECONOMIC OVERVIEW ¶16. (U) Brazil is the tenth largest economy in the world and received investment grade status from Standard and Poor's and Fitch in 2008, and from Moody's in 2009. Annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew 5.1 percent in 2008, and annual inflation was 5.8 percent. The global economic crisis eroded previous predictions for annual GDP growth for 2009 from four per cent to essentially flat or slightly negative. Despite this decline in immediate prospects, Brazil has thus far weathered the crisis better than most major economies and appears to be entering into a solid recovery position, led by strong domestic demand. Conservative macroeconomic policies in the years prior to the crisis, and targeted responses during the crisis -- including credit injections in the financial system, a reduction in interest rates, and tax cuts on automobiles and consumer durables -- played a role in lessening the impact of the global crisis on Brazil. Brazil is projected to return to a 4 to 5 percent GDP growth rate in 2010. ¶17. (U) Brazil's relatively successful management of the crisis has encouraged the GoB to engage proactively and constructively in the debate over how to handle the economic crisis including through the G20 process. Brazil has called for increased regulation of the global financial system, increased global access to trade finance, and an expanded voice and vote for large emerging countries like Brazil in the international financial institutions. ¶18. (U) Brazil is a major producer and exporter. Agriculture makes up 36 percent of exports, and the agribusiness sector accounts for 25 percent of Brazil's GDP. Brazil is a leading exporter of soybeans, beef, sugar, coffee, and orange juice. Brazil also distinguishes itself as a major exporter of civilian aircraft, steel, and petrochemicals. The United States is Brazil's top trading partner overall, and China as of March of this year moved into first position as Brazil's primary export destination. Prior to the current financial crisis, U.S.-Brazil trade experienced significant annual growth surpassing USD 50 billion in 2008 -- Brazil typically experiences a slight positive balance in the trade relationship. ¶19. (U) Foreign direct investment (FDI) in Brazil is increasing, with inflows of USD 44 billion in 2008; USD 6.9 billion came from the United States. Brazilian investment in the United States almost tripled between 2001 (USD 1.4 billion) and 2006 (USD 3.9 billion). President Lula has been actively selling Brazil as a solid investment destination during the financial crisis due to its sound macroeconomic policies and relatively strong economy. Brazil is Latin America's biggest recipient of FDI, and in 2008 received roughly twice the volume of inflow that Mexico received. ¶20. (U) Despite progress in recent years, income distribution in Brazil remains grossly unequal, with 10 percent of the population holding over 50 percent of the nation's wealth. With a total population near 200 million, Brazil is also home to 50 percent of the people who live in extreme poverty in Latin America. President Lula's social programs, combined with formal sector job growth and real increases in the minimum wage, have reduced income inequalities each year since 2004. BRAZILIAN MEDIA AND PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE USA ¶21. (U) In terms of general public opinion, the election of Barack Obama as president seems to have influenced views of the United States in a positive way. An Office of Research Opinion Analysis released in March 2009 found that seven-in-10 Brazilians believe the Obama presidency will be positive for Brazil and the world. Economically, Brazilians say their future lies with the United States and China. Majorities held a favorable view of the United States (57 percent) and saw bilateral relations as being good (65 percent). However, Brazilians have often seen the United States as an impediment to Brazil's aspirations for regional leadership. Pluralities said last year that politically and economically, the United States was as much a competitor as it was an ally and partner. As of January, half lack confidence in the United States' ability to deal responsibly with world problems. ¶22. (U) Brazilian journalists, generally speaking, are professional, balanced, and strive for objectivity. Many are evenhanded in their treatment of the United States, even if they do not personally agree with U.S. policies. Some mainstream Brazilian opinion writers demonstrate biases against U.S. policies, though the trend has started to change with the election of President Obama. A small segment of the Brazilian public accepts the notion that the United States has a campaign to subjugate Brazil economically, undermine it culturally, and occupy with troops at least part of its territory. Such attitudes and beliefs have occasionally influenced Brazilian reporting and commentary on issues such as the reestablishment of the U.S. Navy's Fourth Fleet (which has been characterized as a threat to Brazil),supposed U.S. nefarious intentions toward the Amazon, and most recently, the announcement on U.S. access to Colombian military bases. That said, the Brazilian media have reported favorably on U.S. efforts at the recent meeting of the General Assembly of the Organization of American States and the Summit of the Americas, and the Obama Administration overall, portending a change in perspective with regards to U.S. intentions in Brazil and the region at large. Non-proliferation issues have a low profile with the Brazilian media and raise little interest among the public. CLIMATE CHANGE ¶23. (U) After intensive lobbying from senior USG officials and pressure from other countries and domestic constituencies, President Lula announced a major shift in Brazil's position in the international climate change negotiations. He has said Brazil will offer in Copenhagen a target of reducing the rate of deforestation of the Amazon Forest by 80% by 2020, which would amount to about 20% reduction in country-wide emissions. This represents a significant advance over Brazil's previous position, which was that only the developed countries should have emissions reductions targets and the developing ones needed to preserve room for growth. Brazil, however, insists that developed countries provide substantial technology transfer and financial assistance to developing countries so that they can take mitigation and adaptation measures. ENERGY ¶24. (U) Brazil is the world's leading exporter of biofuels, which now have surpassed petroleum as the largest component of the domestic transportation fuel sector. The GoB is proud of its energy matrix which is largely made up of renewable sources of energy, over 80 percent of which is hydro-reliant. To further diversify the matrix and help Brazil meet its goal of doubling its energy supply in the next 20 years, the GoB is looking to increase its civilian nuclear energy sector. Brazil also stands to become a world player in the supply of oil with the discovery in 2007 of potentially massive offshore ("pre-salt") reserves of oil and gas estimated to contain between 30-80 billion barrels of oil equivalent could put Brazil within the top ten oil countries in terms of reserves. The depth of the area will make recovery challenging and expensive. The eventual exploitation and investment in the attendant infrastructure could provide rich opportunities for U.S. companies but recently proposed legislation by the GoB to regulate the area has brought the extent of that potential into doubt. ¶25. (U) The USG and the GoB have built a close and productive energy relationship through the 2007 Biofuels Memorandum of Understanding in which we agreed to work together to promote biofuels as a global commodity, research and development in next generation biofuels, and development of biofuels capacities in third countries. Building on the success of this initiative, the United States and Brazil are currently exploring other avenues for cooperation, such as a possible Binational Commission on Energy, which could include cooperation on commercial nuclear energy. SECURITY SITUATION IN BRAZIL ¶26. (U) Crime throughout Brazil (especially Rio de Janeiro) has reached very high levels. The Brazilian police and the Brazilian press report that the rate of crime continues to rise, especially in the major urban centers - though it is also spreading in rural areas. Brazil's murder rate is more than four times higher than that of the United States. Rates for other crimes are similarly high. The majority of crimes are not solved. ¶27. (U) Street crime remains a problem for visitors and local residents alike, especially in the evenings and late at night. Foreign tourists are often targets of crime and Americans are not exempt. This targeting occurs in all tourist areas but is especially problematic in Rio de Janeiro, Salvador and Recife. ¶28. (U) At airports, hotel lobbies, bus stations and other public places, incidents of pick pocketing, theft of hand carried luggage, and laptop computers are common. Travelers should "dress down" when outside and avoid carrying valuables or wearing jewelry or expensive watches. "Good Samaritan" scams are common. If a tourist looks lost or seems to be having trouble communicating, a seemingly innocent bystander offering help may victimize them. Care should be taken at and around banks and internationally connected automatic teller machines that take U.S. credit or debit cards. ¶29. (U) Travelers using personal ATMs or credit cards sometimes receive billing statements with non-authorized charges after returning from a visit to Brazil. The Embassy and Consulates have received numerous reports from both official Americans and tourists who have had their cards cloned or duplicated without their knowledge. Those using such payment methods should carefully monitor their banking online for the duration of their visit. KUBISKE